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General Introduction 
 
“Deixis introduces subjective, attentional,  
intentional and of course context-dependent  
properties into natural languages”  
(Levinson, 2004, p. 97) 
 
We refer to the things around us. In everyday communication, we often use words to describe 
intended referents, and our bodies (e.g., eyes, head, hands, and torso) to indicate the location to which 
our addressee should focus her attention in order to further identify what we are talking about (Bühler, 
1934; Clark & Bangerter, 2004). Prima facie this is a very simple and straightforward part of human 
communication. Upon careful inspection however, simple acts of reference turn out to require quite a 
complex interplay between speaker and addressee, arguably relying on multiple cognitive mechanisms 
and multimodal social cues. In a prototypical instance of successful everyday referential communication, 
a speaker produces a manual pointing gesture to a physical object, often in temporal alignment with a 
spoken referential expression that canonically contains a spatial demonstrative (as in I have bought that 
book), while alternating gaze between addressee and referent. At the same time, the addressee perceives 
the speech, gesture, and other bodily behavior of the speaker, integrates the transmitted visual and 
auditory information, recognizes and understands the speaker’s communicative intention and social 
motive, and shifts her gaze to identify the referent and establish joint attention.  
In instances of demonstrative reference, speaker and addressee thus need to work together in a 
collaborative and interactive process to establish a joint focus of attention on a referent (Clark & 
Bangerter, 2004; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Tomasello, Carpenter, & Liszkowski, 2007). It can 
therefore be considered a joint action (Clark, 1996) and a clear instance of human cooperative 
communication (Tomasello, 2008).  
The current thesis focuses on such triadic situations in which speech and gesture are used in a 
deictic manner, i.e. they relate to the space (and time) in which they occur and their interpretation is for 
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an important part dependent on the context in which they are produced (Bühler, 1934; Levinson, 1994; 
McNeill, 1992). Deixis (or: ‘indexicality’) has been a topic of interest in many different scientific 
disciplines, including philosophy (e.g., Peirce, 1955; Russell, 1940; Quine, 1960; Wittgenstein, 1953), 
linguistics and anthropology (Enfield, 2003; Hanks, 1990; Levinson, 1983), and developmental and 
comparative psychology (e.g., Clark & Sengul, 1978; Henderson, Yoder, Yale, & McDuffie, 2002; 
Küntay & Özyürek, 2006; Leavens, Hopkins, & Bard, 1996; Tomasello et al., 2007). However, in spite 
of the complexity of everyday demonstrative reference outlined above, linguistic (e.g. spatial 
demonstratives) and gestural (e.g. pointing gestures) markers of demonstrative reference have often been 
studied in isolation. Furthermore, the neurocognitive mechanisms that allow us to refer to the things 
around us and those that allow us to understand our interlocutors’ referential acts remain largely unclear. 
The current thesis therefore brings spatial demonstratives and pointing gestures together in an 
experimental and neurobiological approach to demonstrative reference. It studies the phenomenon from 
both the production and the comprehension side and takes into account the social and communicative 
context in which demonstrative reference generally occurs. This multifaceted approach allows 
contrasting and testing different theoretical views of spatial deixis (see below) and advances our 
understanding of the social, cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying demonstrative reference. In 
general, “any analytical inquiry is destined to compartmentalize different parts of a complex system” 
(Kita, 2003, p. 307). The different chapters of this thesis do exactly that by focusing on different 
elements of the larger complex system of everyday demonstrative reference in a visual, triadic, and 
communicative context.  
In the remainder of this General Introduction I will first outline the traditional and dominant 
view of spatial deixis, in which demonstratives have played a central role. Second, I will discuss an 
alternative, sociocentric view. Third, I will elaborate on the approach taken in the current thesis to 
contrast these two views in four empirical studies. Finally, I will provide an overview of the structure of 
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the thesis and briefly clarify the specific experimental methods that are used in each of the empirical 
chapters.  
  
The null hypothesis: Egocentric proximity 
Traditional views of spatial deixis, across scientific disciplines and generally inspired by 
Bühler’s (1934) theory of language, are egocentric in nature. They often focus on spatial demonstratives 
such as this and that and argue that by using these terms speakers “indicate the relative distance of an 
object, location, or person vis-à-vis the deictic center (also called the origo), which is usually associated 
with the location of the speaker” (Diessel, 1999, p. 36). In other words, “the anchoring point of deictic 
expressions is egocentric (or, better, speaker-centric). Adult speakers skillfully relate what they are 
talking about to this me-here-now” (Levelt, 1989, p. 46), such that “the speaker, by virtue of being the 
speaker, casts himself in the role of ego and relates everything to his viewpoint” (Lyons, 1977, p. 638). 
In the case of simple two-term demonstrative systems, this means that, canonically, a proximal 
demonstrative is used for referents relatively close to the speaker, and a distal demonstrative for 
referents relatively remote from where the speaker is located. This egocentricity in how demonstratives 
are used is said to be a universal property of demonstrative systems. Diessel (2014, p. 128), for instance, 
states that “speakers of all languages employ an egocentric coordinate system that is anchored by the 
speaker’s body at the time of the utterance” (see also Levelt, 1989, p. 47). The egocentric proximity-
based view has been very influential, is intuitively appealing, and is still present in the literature today 
(e.g., Anderson & Keenan, 1985; Clark & Sengul, 1978; Coventry, Valdés, Castillo, & Guijarro-
Fuentes, 2008; Diessel, 2005, 2014; Fillmore, 1982; Halliday & Hasan, 1977; Hottenroth, 1982; Lakoff, 
1974; Levelt, 1989; Lyons, 1977; Rauh, 1983; Russell, 1940; Stevens & Zhang, 2013). Surprisingly, 
very few such studies take into account the interplay between spatial demonstratives and pointing 
gestures in acts of multimodal reference. 
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In addition, this theoretical view of deixis focuses on the speaker so much that it often does not 
consider how addressees comprehend or interpret the demonstratives they hear. However, according to 
Diessel (2014), demonstratives are not only used but also interpreted (by an addressee) based on the 
relative distance to the deictic center (i.e. the speaker) in face-to-face conversations. An addressee will 
thus generally expect that a speaker uses a proximal demonstrative in reference to an object, location, or 
person that is relatively close to the speaker’s body at the time of the utterance and a distal term for 
entities that are relatively further away from the speaker (cf. Stevens & Zhang, 2013). The 
straightforward predictions made by this account, with regards to both the production and 
comprehension of demonstrative reference, will serve as the null hypothesis that is tested in this thesis. 
The alternative hypothesis, described below, considers demonstrative reference a sociocentric, 
collaborative, and multimodal phenomenon. 
 
The alternative hypothesis: Sociocentric collaboration 
Traditional accounts of demonstrative reference argue that speakers are egocentric and that they 
mainly use demonstrative terms as a function of the physical proximity of the referent. The alternative is 
that demonstrative reference is a sociocentric phenomenon (Hanks, 1992) in which the addressee plays a 
crucial role and in which contextual factors other than the relative proximity of the referent drive the 
demonstrative choice. In-depth observational studies of demonstrative use in everyday interactions in 
different languages suggest that this may be the case. Enfield (2003), for instance, in describing the Lao 
two-term demonstrative system, concludes that “distance cannot be what distinguishes the meanings of 
these two demonstratives” (p. 104). Rather, demonstrative reference is described as a social, interactive 
process in which the choice for a proximal or distal demonstrative depends on how interlocutors 
perceive and interpret the physical space during their interaction (Enfield, 2003). What is perceived as 
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"proximal" may depend, for instance, on the engagement areas of speaker and addressee during their 
conversation (Enfield, 2003).   
Other work also suggests that demonstrative reference is a sociocentric phenomenon in which 
social factors are more important than the relative distance of a referent in a speaker's demonstrative 
choice. Piwek, Beun, and Cremers (2008), for instance, argue that demonstrative choice in Dutch is not 
driven by the relative proximity of a referent to the speaker, but by the cognitive and visual accessibility 
of a referent to the speaker and the addressee. Özyürek (1998) argues that the Turkish demonstrative şu 
is used as a function of whether the addressee already looks at the intended referent or not. Jungbluth 
(2003) states that the physical orientation of interlocutors relative to each other in a conversation drives 
demonstrative choice in Spanish. When speaker and addressee are face-to-face in a conversational dyad, 
all referents within the dyad are treated as proximal “without any further differentiation” (Jungbluth, 
2003, p. 19). Thus, possible referents are not considered from an egocentric point of view, but from a 
sociocentric perspective. More than traditional views of spatial deixis, such sociocentric accounts are in 
line with the broader perspective of everyday reference as a collaborative, joint action in which speaker 
and addressee work together to establish a joint focus of attention. The current thesis contrasts these two 
views of spatial deixis in both production and comprehension. 
 
The current thesis 
An experimental and neurobiological approach to spatial deixis 
The theoretical differences between egocentric and sociocentric accounts of spatial deixis may be 
related to the different types of methodological approach that have been taken in the study of spatial 
demonstratives. The egocentric view is largely based on linguistic intuitions (or: the ‘armchair’ 
approach, Clark & Bangerter, 2004), which have often shaped descriptions of demonstrative systems in 
typological sources such as reference grammars (see Diessel, 2005, for an overview). Indeed, when 
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asking a naïve informant how s/he uses the terms “this” and “that” in daily conversations, the reply will 
almost always be related to the physical distance of referents to the speaker’s physical location. 
Moreover, when participants are explicitly asked to judge whether a speaker uses a demonstrative 
correctly, they will take the distance of a referent to the speaker as the criterion on which they base their 
judgments (Stevens & Zhang, 2013). One may question, however, whether such linguistic intuitions are 
reliable. Extensive analysis of demonstrative choice in different languages on the basis of (videotaped) 
observational materials has shown that people’s intuitions are often simply not in line with their actual 
patterns of demonstrative use in everyday interactions (e.g., Enfield, 2003; Hanks, 1990; Özyürek, 
1998). 
 More recently, experimental approaches have aimed to shed more light on demonstrative choice, 
for instance by placing objects at different distances from a participant in the lab and eliciting the 
production of demonstratives (e.g., Coventry et al., 2008; Coventry, Griffiths, & Hamilton, 2014; 
Stevens & Zhang, 2014). An important advantage of experimentally studying demonstrative reference is 
that insights from observational work can be tested and further specified in a controlled, experimental 
environment, which allows disentangling the relative influence of different variables (e.g. attentional, 
cultural, intentional, physical, social, subjective) that are not easily distinguishable in everyday multi-
modal communication. The current thesis takes such an experimental approach to contrast and test 
egocentric and sociocentric theories of spatial deixis, aiming to advance our understanding of the 
production and comprehension of spatial demonstratives. In doing so, it builds on knowledge obtained 
from earlier observational studies and goes beyond previous experimental work in studying the 
phenomenon from a multimodal perspective and from both the production and the comprehension side. 
As we will see, many experimental findings reported in this thesis align well with and further specify 
suggestions that were made by observational work. Importantly, however, they also clearly reject other 
conclusions that were based on linguistic intuitions.  
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Furthermore, the current thesis makes use of methods from cognitive neuroscience to study 
demonstrative reference. This novel, neurobiological approach has at least two advantages. First, it 
allows putting different theoretical views to the test by inspecting the electrophysiological signatures of 
the production and comprehension of demonstrative reference in different experimental conditions. 
Second, the neural and cognitive underpinnings of demonstrative reference themselves, in both 
production and comprehension, have remained largely unclear. Therefore, a neuroscientific approach to 
the phenomenon advances our understanding of the neurobiological mechanisms involved in everyday 
referential acts, for instance by identifying the brain regions involved in the perception and integration 
of auditory and visual markers of multimodal reference to an object in a triadic context.   
In addition to taking an experimental and neurobiological approach to the study of demonstrative 
reference, the current thesis also acknowledges the multimodal nature of the phenomenon. As outlined 
in the following section, it thus studies the use and comprehension of demonstratives not in isolation, but 
in a broader, visual context in which speakers of different languages use their body to indicate which 
referent they want their addressee to focus on, for instance by producing a pointing gesture. 
 
A multimodal approach to spatial deixis 
A core property of human communication is that it allows us to shift the attention of our 
conversational partners to entities in the world around us, and often, unlike our closest phylogenetic 
relatives, we do so simply to share interest in a particular referent with one another (Clark, 1996; Kita, 
2003; Tomasello et al., 2007). As we have seen above, spatial demonstratives often form an important 
part of the spoken component of a multimodal utterance that is produced to establish a joint focus of 
attention. Such linguistically transmitted information is often paired with some form of pointing, for 
instance with the head, chin, thumb, or the extended index-finger (see Cooperrider & Núñez, 2012; 
Enfield, 2001; Kendon, 2004; Kita, 2003; Sherzer, 1973; Wilkins, 2003). Although it is generally 
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acknowledged that both demonstratives and pointing gestures play a pivotal role in shifting the 
addressee’s attention to a referent (e.g., Diessel, 2006), surprisingly, they have often been studied as 
separate phenomena (but see Bangerter, 2004; Cooperrider, 2011). Links that have been made remain 
largely descriptive. For instance, it has been found that some demonstratives need an accompanying 
pointing gesture (e.g., Senft, 2004), whereas others are rarely accompanied by pointing (e.g., Burenhult, 
2003). Moreover, within languages some demonstratives are paired with a pointing gesture more 
commonly than others (Cooperrider, 2011; Küntay & Özyürek, 2002; Piwek et al., 2008). The current 
thesis acknowledges that demonstrative reference is a multimodal phenomenon (cf. Bangerter, 2004) 
and aims to use insights about pointing to inform theories of spatial deixis that have focused mainly on 
demonstratives.  
In producing a spatial demonstrative, speakers of most languages have the choice between 
different linguistic alternatives (Diessel, 2005). Similarly, the exact form a pointing gesture takes is 
variable and not fully determined a priori (De Ruiter, 2000). Different articulators may be used, and 
parameters such as the trajectory, endpoint, and velocity of the gesture may differ across instances. If 
demonstrative reference is considered an egocentric act, it is unlikely that people will modify their 
gesture on the basis of social considerations that relate to their addressee. In other words, irrespective of 
the speaker’s communicative intentions, the gesture will be the same (cf. Brunetti et al., 2014). Under 
such an account, it has been considered sufficient to study the kinematic properties and neurobiological 
underpinnings of pointing gestures in the lab in situations in which there is no addressee involved (see 
Cleret de Langavant et al., 2011, for discussion). 
Alternatively, people may design the form of their pointing gestures from a sociocentric 
perspective, and there are some preliminary indications that this is the case. Enfield, Kita, and De Ruiter 
(2007), for instance, distinguish between relatively big points in which the whole arm is outstretched 
and relatively small points in which the hand is the main articulator. Big points would do the primary 
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work of an utterance, such as pointing out the location of an object, whereas small points would occur in 
utterances in which speech is central, adding a background modifier on the basis of social and 
communicative factors such as the common ground between interlocutors (p. 1738). Cleret de 
Langavant et al. (2011) report pointing gestures that had a trajectory and endpoint distribution that were 
tilted away from the gesturer’s addressee, arguably because the addressee's perspective on the target 
object was taken into account in the form of the gesture.  
One of the aims of the current thesis, therefore, is to examine whether and how the form (or: 
kinematics) of index-finger pointing gestures differs as a function of one’s communicative intentions 
and as a function of the presence of concomitantly produced spatial demonstratives. Models of speech 
production (Levelt, 1989) and speech and gesture production (e.g., De Ruiter, 1998; Kita & Özyürek, 
2003) stress the importance of communicative intentions in driving the production of (multimodal) 
utterances. However, the exact influence of intentions on this type of action remains unclear. If speakers 
are egocentric in demonstrative reference, no difference in the kinematics of their pointing gesture is 
expected as a function of their communicative intentions. The sociocentric alternative is that speakers 
tailor the kinematics of their gesture to the needs of their addressee.  
   
Outline and methodology 
This thesis presents four empirical studies that focus on different aspects of the multimodal act of 
establishing joint attention to a referent in a visual, triadic context. Together these studies contrast and 
test egocentric and sociocentric views of spatial deixis and aim to further our understanding of the 
cognitive and neural underpinnings that support the production and comprehension of demonstrative 
reference. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on spatial demonstratives in a larger multimodal context including 
pointing gestures. Chapters 4 and 5 investigate pointing gestures in a wider multimodal context 
including demonstrative speech. 
Chapter 1 
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Chapter 2 focuses on the production of spatial demonstratives in Dutch and Turkish. 
Observational work in both languages suggests that contextual factors beyond the physical proximity of 
a referent influence speakers' demonstrative choice. Building on such observational findings, this 
chapter further investigates in a controlled setting whether and to what extent the attentional status of the 
addressee, the location of a physical referent, and the presence of a manual pointing gesture influence 
the particular demonstrative native speakers of Dutch and Turkish use in triadic settings. A controlled 
elicitation task was developed that, going beyond the methods generally used in observational work, 
allowed orthogonal manipulation of these different contextual factors and observation of their individual 
and interacting contributions to demonstrative choice in both languages. The egocentric account 
described above predicts that only the relative proximity of a referent to the speaker determines 
demonstrative choice. An influence of other contextual factors such as the locus of attention of the 
addressee is in line with a sociocentric view of demonstrative reference.  
Chapter 3, on the other hand, focuses on the comprehension of spatial demonstrative terms. 
Two experiments are presented in which participants’ electrophysiological brain activity was recorded 
while they saw pictures of a person pointing at an object and listened to her referential speech. These 
experiments allowed for directly contrasting and testing, from a comprehension perspective, the two 
main theoretical views on demonstratives that were described above. In addition, they further our 
understanding of how the brain allows one to comprehend and integrate demonstrative speech and 
gesture in a visual, everyday context.    Studies investigating the comprehension of spatial 
demonstratives are scarce, and an important novelty of this chapter is that it takes into account how the 
physical, spatial orientation of speaker and addressee vis-à-vis each other may influence the addressee’s 
demonstrative comprehension in relation to the location of referents. The egocentric proximity account 
predicts that participant addressees interpret spatial demonstratives as a function of the relative distance 
of a referent to the speaker (e.g., Diessel, 2014). The sociocentric alternative is that socially relevant 
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factors such as the position of a referent inside or outside the shared space between speaker and 
addressee play a more important role (e.g., Jungbluth, 2003), as reflected in participants' 
electrophysiological brain response time-locked to hearing a demonstrative. 
In Chapter 3 participants’ electrical brain activity is measured by electrodes placed in a cap 
covering the scalp, a method known as electroencephalography (EEG). The electrophysiological 
correlates of brain activity recorded in this way are time-locked to important events in the experiment 
(such as the onset of critical stimuli), baseline-corrected, filtered, and averaged off-line, which creates 
event-related potentials (ERPs). In Chapter 3, the assumption is that differences in processing ease of 
different demonstrative terms in a particular visual context should be reflected in the ERPs. The logic 
behind this approach is inspired by “regular” N400 experiments in which the contextually incongruent 
use of a noun elicits a negative deflection in the N400 component relative to its congruent counterpart 
(see e.g., Kutas & Federmeier, 2011; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). However, in regular N400 experiments, 
congruent and incongruent experimental conditions are generally defined before the start of the 
experiment on the basis of the intuitions of the researcher or the results of a pre-test. In the case of 
spatial demonstratives, there are different theoretical views on what it means that a demonstrative is 
used in a ‘congruent’ or ‘incongruent’ way, and meta-linguistic intuitions seem unreliable in this respect. 
Therefore, the simple recording of the brain’s electrophysiological response to hearing different 
demonstrative terms in a visual, triadic context allows the contrasting of opposing theoretical views to 
shed more light on which demonstrative term an addressee prefers and expects in a particular context. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the planning and production of index-finger pointing gestures in the 
context of demonstrative reference. More specifically it investigates the role of one’s communicative 
intentions in shaping unimodal and bimodal acts of pointing as a function of the shared knowledge 
between speaker and addressee. Two experiments are presented in which participants produced index-
finger pointing gestures in the lab, while their index-finger kinematics and electrophysiological brain 
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activity were continuously recorded. This approach allows for the exploration of how people may use 
the kinematics of their pointing gesture in order to be more or less informative as a function of their 
communicative intentions. In addition, it explores whether and when intentional and/or attentional 
neurocognitive mechanisms are involved in the planning of a communicative pointing gesture. The 
egocentric null hypothesis is that speakers do not consider the addressee’s knowledge state while 
shaping the kinematics of their gesture. The sociocentric alternative is that they modulate the kinematics 
of their gesture to be as informative as necessary for their addressee and that this is reflected in the 
neuronal activity preceding the execution of their gesture. 
The recording of index-finger kinematics in Chapter 4 is allowed by the use of a motion tracking 
system that continuously records the spatial position of a marker placed on the nail of participants’ 
index-finger. By comparing the spatial location of the marker at different time points during the 
execution of pointing gestures, the velocity and duration of different components of the gesture (e.g., the 
stroke and post-stroke hold phase) could be calculated. At the same time, participants’ EEG is 
continuously recorded, which allows for pinpointing electrophysiological markers of different cognitive 
mechanisms involved in the planning and production of gesture. 
Chapter 5 presents a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study investigating the 
neural integration of index-finger pointing gestures and referential speech in comprehension. The 
majority of previous studies that investigated the neural correlates of speech-gesture integration looked 
at iconic gestures. However the neural infrastructure involved in integrating speech and pointing 
gestures is currently unclear. Therefore, participants were placed inside an MR scanner and watched 
images of a speaker pointing at an object while listening to her speech that referred to the object she 
pointed at. The blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) response to bimodal (speech + pointing 
gesture) presentation of stimuli was compared to the sum of unimodal (speech-only and pointing 
gesture-only) presentations of the same stimuli. In addition, a matching condition (i.e. the speaker 
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correctly named the object she pointed at) was compared to a mismatch condition (i.e. the speaker 
named one object but pointed at another). Both these manipulations allow for investigating the putative 
role of bilateral superior/middle temporal and left inferior frontal regions of the brain in the semantic 
unification (Hagoort, 2005; 2013) and audiovisual integration of speech and pointing gestures in 
comprehension. 
Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary of the four empirical chapters and discusses the findings 
from the broader perspective of multimodal demonstrative reference. 
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The Interplay between Joint Attention, Physical Proximity, and Pointing Gesture in 
Demonstrative Choice: Evidence from Dutch and Turkish 
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Abstract 
A fundamental property of language is that it allows establishing a joint focus of attention on a referent, 
for instance by the use of spatial demonstratives. Traditional accounts of demonstrative choice focus 
mainly on the physical proximity of the referent to the speaker. However, recent cross-linguistic and 
corpus based work, taking into account the multimodal and social context in which demonstratives are 
used, shows that such accounts are insufficient. Using a controlled elicitation task, we here tested the 
differential roles of the visual joint attention between speaker and addressee to a referent, the physical 
proximity of the referent to speaker and addressee, and the use of a pointing gesture in demonstrative 
choice in Dutch (which has a 2-term demonstrative system) and Turkish (which has a 3-term system). 
We also compared how these different factors played a role in the choice of demonstrative versus other 
referring expressions (i.e., in/definite terms). We found that in both languages ‘proximal’ demonstratives 
were used to refer to objects nearby the speaker and ‘distal’ demonstratives were used for referents not 
nearby the speaker. In Turkish, the distal term was also used when the referent was in the addressee’s 
focus of visual attention. Pointing gestures were closely tied to the use of demonstratives but not to other 
(in)definite expressions. These findings confirm recent observational findings in showing that 
demonstrative choice goes beyond taking into account the physical proximity of a referent and is 
dependent on a subtle interplay between different context-dependent factors that can be employed in 
different ways by speakers of different languages. 
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The Interplay between Joint Attention, Physical Proximity, and Pointing Gesture in Demonstrative 
Choice: Evidence from Dutch and Turkish 
 
 On Tuesday, when it hails and snows, 
 The feeling on me grows and grows 
 That hardly anybody knows 
 If those are these or these are those.  
 
 (A.A. Milne)  
 
Establishing triadic joint attention to a referent is a very basic human communicative ability 
(Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998). A common way to do so is by using demonstrative pronouns 
and determiners (henceforth: demonstratives) such as this and that in English, often combined with a 
manual pointing gesture and a shift of gaze to the referent (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Clark & 
Bangerter, 2004; Diessel, 1999). Most languages contain more than one demonstrative term (Diessel, 
2005), which implies that one has to choose among different options when using a demonstrative. 
Traditional accounts of demonstrative reference have generally been spatialist in nature, taking the 
relative proximity of a referent to the speaker as a fundamental criterion in demonstrative choice (e.g., 
Anderson & Keenan, 1985; Halliday & Hasan, 1977; Lyons, 1977, inter alia). Such egocentric proximity 
accounts argue that one selects a ‘proximal’ demonstrative to refer to an object that is physically 
relatively close to oneself, and a ‘distal’ demonstrative to refer to an object that is relatively far away 
from oneself. This speaker-centered view is omnipresent in reference grammars (Diessel, 2005) and in 
recent experimental studies (e.g., Coventry, Valdés, Castillo, & Guijarro-Fuentes, 2008; Stevens & 
Zhang, 2013).  
However, evidence is accumulating showing that traditional accounts, based on physical 
proximity alone, are insufficient in explaining demonstrative choice, in particular when one considers 
the multimodal and visual context in which exophoric demonstrative use canonically occurs (e.g., 
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Coventry, Griffiths, & Hamilton, 2014; Enfield, 2003; Hanks, 1990; Jones, 1995; Strauss, 2002). 
Descriptions of demonstrative systems in different languages from different language families (e.g., 
Dutch, English, Jahai, Jordanian Arabic, Turkish) for instance suggest that factors related to the locus of 
visual attention of the addressee and/or the cognitive (rather than physical) accessibility of a referent 
may play an important role in which demonstrative a speaker chooses (Burenhult, 2003; Jarbou, 2010; 
Küntay & Özyürek, 2006; Piwek, Beun, & Cremers, 2008; Stevens & Zhang, 2013). Küntay and 
Özyürek (2006), for example, suggest that the Turkish “medial” demonstrative şu is primarily used to 
shift the visual attention of the addressee when she does not (yet) visually attend to a certain referent, 
independent of the relative physical distance of that referent. Conversely, the “distal” demonstrative o 
was used for referents that were already in the addressee’s focus of attention. As such, joint attention 
between speaker and addressee focused on a referent is not only often the desired outcome of exophoric 
demonstrative use (Diessel, 1999), but the presence or absence of joint attention to a referent at the 
moment a referring expression is instantiated may also drive the choice for a particular demonstrative 
over another. Being able to monitor and follow the gaze of an interlocutor is indeed a pivotal 
communicative skill and is often a prerequisite for successful communication (e.g., Bakeman & 
Adamson, 1984; Küntay & Özyürek, 2006; Senju & Csibra, 2008). 
Another fundamental aspect of demonstratives in exophoric use is that they are canonically 
combined with a concomitantly produced manual pointing gesture, often in addition to other ostensive 
cues in the speaker’s eye gaze and/or head and body orientation. An interesting observation is that in 
their contextual uses some demonstrative terms have been found to be more often combined with a 
manual pointing gesture than others (Burenhult, 2003; Küntay & Özyürek, 2006; Piwek et al., 2008; 
Senft, 2004). For instance, in a study by Piwek et al. (2008) native speakers of Dutch always produced a 
manual pointing gesture when uttering a proximal demonstrative, but not always when using a distal 
demonstrative term, and similar observations have been reported for native speakers of English 
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(Cooperrider, 2011, p. 73). It is an open question to what extent these findings interact with or are driven 
by other factors such as the relative proximity of the referents to the speaker (e.g., Bangerter, 2004).  
In general, findings from relatively naturalistic settings can be tested and further specified in a 
controlled environment (Hanks, 2009).  In the current study, going beyond previous experimental 
approaches to demonstrative choice (e.g., Coventry et al., 2008), we therefore orthogonally contrasted in 
a controlled setting three variables that may influence demonstrative choice: the visual joint attention 
between speaker and addressee to a referent prior to demonstrative use, the location of the referent and 
as such its physical proximity to the speaker, and the presence of a manual pointing gesture. We focus 
on Dutch (Study 1) and Turkish (Study 2), two languages with typologically different demonstrative 
systems (two-term versus three-term respectively). Previous observational work suggests that, beyond 
the physical proximity of a referent to the speaker, contextual factors related to the locus of visual 
attention of the addressee and the concurrent production of a pointing gesture also influence 
demonstrative choice in these two languages (see below). In contrast, if speakers of all languages apply 
an egocentric coordinate system and use demonstratives as a function of the referent’s proximity to the 
speaker (Diessel, 2014), then the only difference between Dutch and Turkish should be that two-term 
Dutch makes a two-way distance contrast (close vs. far referents) whereas three-term Turkish makes a 
three-way contrast (for referents close to, at middle distance, or far from the speaker).  
Finally, the current study not only focuses on the choice of demonstratives but also looks at noun 
phrases containing (in)definite articles in Dutch and definite nouns in Turkish (see below for examples). 
Demonstratives can be placed within a wider class of referring expressions (e.g., Ariel, 1988) and it is an 
open question whether similar factors influence the choice of demonstratives and the choice of definite 
and indefinite expressions in exophoric reference more broadly. Furthermore, pointing gestures may be 
paired with demonstratives more than with other referring expressions, because one function of 
demonstratives may be to direct the addressee’s gaze to the gesture (Bangerter, 2004; Bühler, 1934). 
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Identification of the factors influencing the choice of referring expression is not only theoretically 
interesting, but may also inform computational models of reference production (see Van Deemter, Gatt, 
Van Gompel, & Krahmer, 2012). 
 
Study 1 
In Study 1 we tested demonstrative choice in Dutch. In a controlled elicitation task, we presented 
participants with visual scenes and asked them to complete a sentence from the perspective of the 
“speaker” in the scene. Three factors were orthogonally manipulated in these materials. First, the visual 
focus of attention of the addressee (and as such the joint attention between speaker and addressee to a 
referent before demonstrative choice) in the visual scenes was varied. Second, we varied the location of 
the referent and as such its physical distance from the speaker and addressee. A third factor manipulated 
was the presence or absence of an index-finger pointing gesture produced by the speaker.   
Traditional (egocentric) proximity-based theories do not predict a difference in demonstrative 
choice based on the attentional focus of the addressee. In contrast, there are some preliminary 
indications that suggest that joint attention may play a role in demonstrative choice in Dutch. Piwek et 
al. (2008) had pairs of Dutch participants, consisting of an instructor and a builder, construct a small 
building using Lego blocks. Participants’ speech, recorded during the task, was analyzed off-line and 
related to their focus of attention on a referent. A referent was coded as in the focus of attention, i.e. 
cognitively relatively accessible, when it was mentioned in the preceding utterance and/or when it was 
in an area toward which the speaker had explicitly directed the attention of the addressee already. It was 
found that participants used proximal demonstratives (dit, deze in Dutch) to refer to objects that were not 
in the focus of attention (‘low cognitive accessibility’) and distal demonstratives (dat, die) to objects that 
were in the focus of attention (‘high cognitive accessibility’).  
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On the basis of their results, Piwek et al. (2008) argue against proximity-based views of 
demonstrative choice. However, the physical proximity of the referents was not quantified. It is 
therefore unclear whether the physical proximity of referents (to speaker and/or to addressee) also 
influenced demonstrative choice and whether this interacted with the addressee’s focus of attention. 
Furthermore, in their operationalization of cognitive accessibility the addressee’s visual and cognitive 
foci of attention were collapsed. If the findings by Piwek et al. (2008) generalize to situations where the 
visual focus of attention of the addressee is manipulated, this would predict the use of proximal 
demonstratives for referents that are not in the addressee’s visual focus of attention. In such a situation, a 
proximal demonstrative in Dutch would indeed allow strong indicating to shift the addressee’s attention 
towards the referent (Piwek et al., 2008). Under such an account, Dutch speakers use distal 
demonstratives for referents that are already in the focus of visual attention of the addressee. 
Piwek et al. (2008) thus argue that the relative physical distance of a referent does not primarily 
drive demonstrative choice. In contrast, egocentric proximity accounts predict that proximal 
demonstratives are used for referents close to the speaker and that the use of distal demonstratives 
increases with an increase in the relative physical distance of the referent from the speaker (e.g., 
Anderson & Keenan, 1985; Halliday & Hasan, 1977; Lyons, 1977). Our manipulation allows contrasting 
and testing these views. Moreover, egocentric proximity accounts do not predict an influence of the 
presence or absence of a pointing gesture on demonstrative choice. However, observational research 
suggests that within a language pointing gestures may be more closely tied to some demonstratives than 
to others (Burenhult, 2003; Cooperrider, 2011; Küntay & Özyürek, 2006; Piwek et al., 2008; Senft, 
2004). We here further explore whether the presence of a manual pointing gesture is more closely tied to 
one demonstrative than to another in Dutch. 
Finally, in the current paradigm participants were free in their choice of referring expression, 
which elicited not only demonstratives but also definite and indefinite articles. The advantage of this 
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approach compared to a forced choice paradigm is that it does not give away the aim of the study to the 
participants, and as such decreases the chances that the results reflect their meta-linguistic intuitions 
about demonstratives. Similar to English, Dutch speakers may use not only ‘proximal’ demonstratives 
(dit/deze, “this”, depending on the gender of the noun corresponding to the referent) or ‘distal’ 
demonstratives (dat/die, “that”), but also definite articles (as in de bal, “the ball”) or indefinite articles 
(as in een bal, “a ball”) in reference to an object. This allowed testing whether the same contextual 
factors influence demonstrative choice and the choice of other referring expressions more broadly. For 
instance, it is not unlikely that speakers would use more definite than indefinite articles in Dutch when 
objects are nearby and/or when their addressee is already visually attending to a referent.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty native speakers of Dutch studying in Nijmegen (13 female; mean age 22.2) participated 
in return for payment. They had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of language 
impairment. 
 
Materials 
The materials consisted of 64 target triplets of still images that contained a speaker, an addressee, 
and an object. Each triplet consisted of an introductory picture, a target picture, and a concluding 
picture. Figure 1 shows an example of one such triplet.  
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Figure 1. Each trial consisted of a sequence of three pictures (introductory picture, target picture, and 
concluding picture; converted to grayscale). Participants read out loud and completed the sentence 
presented in the target picture. 
 
Three independent variables were orthogonally manipulated in the target pictures. First, the 
location of the object was either close to the speaker, close to the addressee, at middle distance from 
both speaker and addressee, or relatively far away from speaker and addressee. Second, there was either 
visual joint attention or no visual joint attention between speaker and addressee to the object before the 
referential expression was to be used. In the case of no visual joint attention, the speaker looked at the 
referent object while the addressee looked at another part of the visual scene (e.g., a painting, see Fig.1). 
Third, the speaker either produced a pointing gesture towards the object or not. It is not uncommon in 
natural interactions for speakers to refer to an object using speech and gesture while their addressee is 
not yet looking at them or their referent (e.g., Küntay & Özyürek, 2006). The three manipulated factors 
are henceforth called Location, Joint Attention, and Pointing Gesture respectively. Figure 2 shows a 
subset of the target pictures. 
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Figure 2. Subset of target pictures used in the elicitation task in Dutch (converted to grayscale). Below 
the pictures it is indicated to which condition the picture belonged. The object could be in four different 
locations. There could be joint attention (JA) or no joint attention (no JA) between speaker and 
addressee to the object, and the speaker could either manually point towards the object or not. 
 
In all target pictures the speaker and addressee were located opposite each other. The referent 
object was a ball, a bowl, a bucket, or a cup (n=16 each). Whether the person on the left or the right in 
the picture was the speaker was counterbalanced and indicated by a text balloon close to the mouth of 
the speaker. The rationale behind showing the pictures from a sagittal viewpoint (instead of from behind 
the speaker) was that in this way the exact focus of visual attention of the speaker and addressee was 
clear to the participants. Every target picture contained a text balloon presenting a declarative sentence 
that was missing a referring expression and could be completed using a demonstrative or an article and a 
noun. All sentences were of the form ‘Ik heb + [          ] + verb form’ (‘I have + [         ] + verb form’), 
which elicited sentences such as ‘Ik heb dit kopje schoongemaakt’ (I have cleaned this cup) or ‘Ik heb 
die bal meegebracht’ (I have brought that ball). The verb form was specified in the sentences; only the 
referring expression was left out. 
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The introductory picture was always the same as the target picture except for the presence of the 
text balloon, and served to introduce the visual context of each trial. In the concluding picture there was 
always joint attention between speaker and addressee to the referent object. As such every referential act 
successfully resulted in joint attention to the referent. 
In addition to the 64 experimental trials, 64 triplets were created that were used as fillers in the 
task. The rationale behind adding the filler trials was to ensure that participants would not guess that the 
study targeted demonstrative choice. The filler images depicted a single speaker and one object. A large 
number of different objects were used. In these filler trials, the text balloons contained a sentence that 
did not elicit a demonstrative or article (e.g. the Dutch translation of ‘What a nice [          ]’).  
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a sound-proof booth. The experiment was presented on a 
computer screen using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems). Participants were instructed to 
carefully look at the pictures, and read aloud and complete the sentence shown in the picture that was 
presented in the center of the screen. Trials were presented one by one. Each trial started with an 
introductory picture at the left part of the screen. After 1500 ms, the target picture appeared in the center 
of the screen, while the introductory picture remained visible. After having read aloud and completed 
the written sentence in the target picture, participants pressed the spacebar on a keyboard, which resulted 
in presentation of the concluding picture. Together with the other two pictures, this picture remained 
visible on the screen for another 1500 ms, after which the next trial started. The 128 trials were 
presented in a fully randomized order, different for each participant.  
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Data Coding 
Throughout the task, participants’ speech was continuously recorded by a voice recorder 
(Olympus Imaging Corp.) linked to an external microphone. The elicitation task yielded 128 uttered 
sentences per participant. Speech was transcribed off-line by a native speaker of Dutch and each 
referring expression was coded for the presence of a demonstrative (‘proximal’ dit/deze or ‘distal’ 
dat/die) or an article (definite de/het or indefinite een) preceding the noun. In line with previous studies 
(e.g. Piwek et al., 2008), demonstratives were collapsed across grammatical gender in the analysis.  
 
Results 
Participants produced a demonstrative or article on 95.3% of all trials. In this dataset, 32.4% of 
trials contained a demonstrative (9.0% ‘dit/deze’ + 23.4% ‘dat/die’) and 67.6% of trials contained an 
article (20.2% definite + 47.4% indefinite). Figure 3 gives an overview of the proportion of use of each 
of these terms for each level of each of the three independent variables. 
A multinomial logistic regression analysis was carried out on the use of the proximal and distal 
demonstrative and the definite and indefinite article, with the three independent variables (Joint 
Attention, Location, and Pointing Gesture) as predictors (forced entry) and their interaction terms 
included in the model. Because indefinite articles were used more often than the three other types of 
referring expression and because their use was relatively stable across the levels of each independent 
variable (see Figure 3), they were selected as the reference category. Interaction terms were eliminated 
backwards from the model to test whether this changed the fit of the model to the data. The results 
showed that the final model, consisting of the three predictors, explained significantly more variance 
than the baseline model, χ2 (15) = 295.3, p < .001; R2 = .22 (Cox & Snell), .24 (Nagelkerke). This final 
model contained no interaction terms, because removal of each interaction term did not significantly 
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alter how well the model explained the variance in the data. There was no sign of overdispersion 
[Pearson χ2 (30) = 20.1, p = .914; Deviance χ2 (30) = 20.8, p = .895]. 
Table 1 presents the results of the analysis. There are three main findings. First, the presence or 
absence of joint attention between speaker and addressee to a referent did not predict the use of referring 
expression (i.e. any demonstrative or article) in Dutch. Second, the location of the referent significantly 
predicted the use of demonstratives (vs. indefinite articles), but not the use of definite articles (vs. 
indefinite articles). The odds ratio and Figure 3 show that, globally, proximal demonstratives were used 
for referents close to the speaker and not for referents at the other three locations, and vice versa for 
distal demonstratives. A change in referent location from middle distance to far away also significantly 
decreased the use of a proximal demonstrative. Third, the presence of a pointing gesture significantly 
predicted the use of both demonstrative terms (vs. indefinite articles), but not the use of definite articles 
(vs. indefinite articles). Demonstratives were used more often when there was a pointing gesture 
compared to when there was no pointing gesture.    
 
Discussion 
The first study investigated three factors that might influence how we refer to entities in the 
world around us by zooming in on the choice of demonstratives and articles in Dutch.  
  We found that Dutch speakers took into account the physical location of the referent in their 
demonstrative choice. Globally, referents nearby the speaker elicited a proximal demonstrative whereas 
referents in three physically more distant regions elicited a distal demonstrative. Interestingly, no linear 
increase of distal demonstrative use was found as a function of an increase in relative physical distance 
from the speaker to the referent. Rather, speakers seemed to differentiate between a zone close to the 
speaker and the rest of the extra-linguistic space (Enfield, 2003). In addition, the presence of a pointing 
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gesture elicited the use of demonstrative terms rather than the use of (in)definite articles. Arguably, in 
cases when a distal demonstrative is produced, a pointing gesture could narrow down the addressee’s 
search space in looking for the intended referent. Piwek et al. (2008) suggested that the Dutch distal 
demonstrative may be used systematically in cases when no strong indicating is necessary because the 
referent is already in the focus of attention. In contrast with this suggestion, we did not observe an 
influence of the presence or absence of the addressee’s visual attention to a referent on demonstrative (or 
article) choice.  
In sum, the location of the referent and the presence of a manual pointing gesture are exploited in 
the use of different demonstratives in Dutch. These factors do not necessarily play a similar role in 
influencing the choice of definite and indefinite articles. These findings will be further discussed in the 
General Discussion. 
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 Figure 3. Separate panels for the mean proportion of use of ‘proximal’ demonstratives, ‘distal’ 
demonstratives, definite articles, and indefinite articles in Study 1 (Dutch) as a function of the three 
factors manipulated in the target pictures (Joint Attention, Location, and Pointing Gesture). Error bars 
represent standard errors of the mean. 
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Table 1. Outcome of the multinomial logistic regression analysis on the referring expressions elicited in Dutch. The use of the indefinite 
article was used as the baseline category. 
               95% CI for Odds Ratio 
        B (SE)   Wald χ2 (df)  Lower  Odds  Upper 
Proximal Demonstrative (dit/deze) 
 Intercept     -4.77 (1.02)*** 22.09 (1)  
 Joint Attention (no vs. yes)  -0.03 (0.23)  0.02 (1)  0.62  0.97  1.52 
 Location  (close to Spkr)  4.60 (1.01)*** 20.65 (1)  13.70  99.64  724.93 
    (close to Addr) 1.76 (1.10)  2.54 (1)  0.67  5.80  50.27 
    (mid-distance)  2.70 (1.04)**  6.73 (1)  1.93  14.90  114.79 
    (far away) 
 Pointing Gesture  (no vs. yes)  -0.55 (0.23)*  5.77 (1)  0.37  0.58  0.90 
 
Distal Demonstrative (dat/die) 
 Intercept     -0.90 (0.17)  0.30 (1) 
 Joint Attention (no vs. yes)  -0.21 (0.15)  2.02 (1)  0.60  0.81  1.08 
 Location  (close to Spkr)  -2.05 (0.34)*** 36.07 (1)  0.07  0.13  0.25 
    (close to Addr) 0.15 (0.19)  0.62 (1)  0.80  1.16  1.68 
    (mid-distance)  -0.03 (0.19)  0.02 (1)  0.67  0.98  1.42 
    (far away) 
 Pointing Gesture (no vs. yes)   -0.67 (0.15)*** 19.42 (1)  0.38  0.51  0.69 
 
Definite Article (de/het) 
Intercept     -0.91***  23.36 (1) 
Joint Attention (no vs. yes)  0.03   0.04 (1)  0.77  1.03  1.39 
 Location  (close to Spkr)  0.09   0.18 (1)  0.72  1.10  1.67  
    (close to Addr) 0.15   0.46 (1)  0.76  1.16  1.76 
    (mid-distance)  0.06   0.08 (1)  0.70  1.06  1.61 
    (far away) 
 Pointing Gesture  (no vs. yes)  -0.05   0.09 (1)  0.71  0.96  1.29 
 
*p <.05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p < .001
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Study 2 
The first study showed that demonstrative choice in Dutch, a language with a simple two-term 
demonstrative system, was dependent on (at least) two contextual factors, i.e. the physical location of 
the referent and the presence of a pointing gesture. This raises the question whether these findings are 
language-specific or, instead, generalize to other languages with typologically different demonstrative 
systems.  In a second step, therefore, we investigated whether the same three contextual factors 
influenced demonstrative choice in Turkish, a language with a three-term demonstrative system. 
Traditionally, the Turkish demonstrative system has been described both as a proximity-based 
system and as a person-oriented system. In addition to a ‘proximal’ demonstrative (bu) that is used for 
referents relatively close to the speaker and a ‘distal’ demonstrative (o) that is used for referents 
relatively distant from speaker and addressee, these accounts differ in their description of the ‘medial’ 
demonstrative term (şu). The (egocentric) proximity-based account argues that this term is used 
exophorically for referents that are somewhat removed from the speaker (Kornfilt, 1997), whereas the 
person-oriented account claims that it is used for referents in physical proximity to the addressee (Lyons, 
1977). Both these accounts thus explain Turkish demonstrative choice in terms of physical proximity; 
the latter only includes the addressee as a zero-point from where proximity may be determined. In 
contrast, as outlined in the Introduction, more recent observational findings suggest that the medial term 
(şu) is used independent of the distance of the referent to the speaker, as a function of whether the 
attention of the addressee is already on the referent or not. If the referent is not yet in focus of visual 
attention of the addressee, şu will be used to shift the addressee’s attention towards the referent 
(Özyürek, 1998; Küntay & Özyürek, 2006). Conversely, in addition to referring to objects that are 
relatively far away, the distal term o may be used for referents in the addressee’s focus of attention 
(Küntay & Özyürek, 2006).   Besides testing whether and to what extent the current findings on Dutch 
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generalize to a language with a typologically different demonstrative system, our manipulation allowed 
contrasting and testing these three different views in a controlled setting. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty native speakers of Turkish studying in Istanbul (15 female; mean age 21.4) participated 
in the study and received course credits in return for their participation. They had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and no history of language impairment.  
 
Materials 
The images used in Study 2 were identical to the images used in Study 1, except for two changes. 
First, the Dutch speakers in the pictures were replaced by Turkish speakers. Second, the target sentences 
were Turkish equivalents of the Dutch sentences used in Study 1. All target sentences were of the form 
‘[          ] +ben + verb form’ (in English: ‘[          ] +I + verb form’), which elicited sentences such as ‘Bu 
bardağı ben temizledim’ (I have cleaned this cup) or ‘O topu ben getirdim’ (I have brought that ball). 
The verb form was always specified in the sentences; only the referring expression was left out. Filler 
sentences were used that would not elicit a demonstrative (e.g. the Turkish translation of ‘What a nice [          
]’). 
 
Procedure and Data Coding 
The procedure was identical to Study 1. For Study 2, the speech was transcribed off-line and 
coded by a native speaker of Turkish. Data coding was similar to Study 1. Turkish has no article system, 
but to indicate the specificity of the referent Turkish speakers may use accusative marking on direct 
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objects (see Göksel & Kerslake, 2005). In our data, definite noun phrases with an accusative case 
marker were commonly used (without a demonstrative), henceforth referred to as ‘definite nouns’. An 
example sentence is as follows: 
 
‘Top-u ben getir-di-m’  
Ball-ACC I bring-PAST-1
st
 PERSON 
“I brought the ball” 
 
Results 
Participants produced a demonstrative or definite noun on 95.5% of all trials. In this dataset, 
64.7% of trials contained a demonstrative (26.4% bu + 17.6% şu + 20.8% o) and 35.3% of trials 
contained a definite noun. Figure 4 gives an overview of the proportion of use of each of these terms for 
each level of each of the three independent variables. 
A multinomial logistic regression analysis was carried out on the use of the three types of 
demonstrative and the definite noun, with the three independent variables (Joint Attention, Location, and 
Pointing Gesture) as predictors (forced entry) and their interaction terms included in the model. Because 
definite nouns were used more often than the three other types of referring expression and because their 
use was relatively stable across the levels of each independent variable (see Figure 4), they were 
selected as the reference category. Interaction terms were eliminated backwards from the model to test 
whether this changed the fit of the model to the data. The results showed that the final model, consisting 
of the three predictors, explained significantly more variance than the baseline model, χ2 (15) = 385.1, p 
< .001; R
2
 = .27 (Cox & Snell), .29 (Nagelkerke).
 
This final model contained no interaction terms, 
because removal of each interaction term did not significantly alter how well the model explained the 
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variance in the data. There was no sign of overdispersion [Pearson χ2 (30) = 14.9, p = .990; Deviance χ2 
(30) = 15.8, p = .984]. 
 Table 2 presents the results of the analysis. Again, there are three main findings. First, the 
presence or absence of joint attention between speaker and addressee to a referent significantly predicted 
the use of the distal demonstrative (o) in Turkish. When there was joint attention to the referent 
compared to no joint attention, the use of o (rather than a definite expression) increased significantly. 
Second, the location of the referent significantly predicted the type of demonstrative that was used. The 
proximal term (bu) was mainly used for referents close to the speaker. In addition, a change in referent 
location from close to the speaker to close to the addressee, and from close to the addressee to middle 
distance, led to a significant increase in the use of the medial term (şu). The distal term (o) was used 
more when the referent was close to the addressee compared to when it was close to the speaker. In 
addition, it was used more for referents far away compared to referents at middle distance. Third, the 
presence of a pointing gesture also significantly predicted the use of the demonstratives bu and şu, rather 
than the use of a definite noun.   
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Figure 4. Separate panels for the mean proportion of use of the three Turkish demonstrative types (bu, 
şu, and o), and the use of definite nouns in Study 2 (Turkish) as a function of the three factors 
manipulated in the target pictures (Joint Attention, Location, and Pointing Gesture). Error bars 
represent standard errors of the mean. 
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Table 2. Outcome of the multinomial logistic regression analysis on the referring expressions elicited in Turkish. The use of a definite 
expression was used as the baseline category. 
               95% CI for Odds Ratio 
        B (SE)   Wald χ2 (df)  Lower  Odds  Upper 
Proximal Demonstrative (bu) 
 Intercept     -0.69**  10.10 (1)   
 Joint Attention  (no vs. yes)  -0.16   1.02 (1)  0.63  0.86  1.16 
 Location  (close to Spkr)  1.36***  37.17 (1)  2.52  3.89  6.03 
    (close to Addr) 0.13   0.24 (1)  0.69  1.13  1.88 
    (mid-distance)  0.30   1.53 (1)  0.84  1.36  2.20 
    (far away) 
 Pointing Gesture  (no vs. yes)  -0.30*   3.90 (1)  0.55  0.74  1.00 
  
Medial Demonstrative (şu) 
 Intercept     -0.06   0.08 (1) 
 Joint Attention (no vs. yes)  0.19   1.22 (1)  0.86  1.21  1.71 
 Location  (close to Spkr)  -2.33***  38.04 (1)  0.05  0.10  0.20 
    (close to Addr) -0.90***  13.22 (1)  0.25  0.41  0.66 
    (mid-distance)  -0.03   0.02 (1)  0.65  0.97  1.46 
    (far away) 
 Pointing Gesture  (no vs. yes)  -0.53**  9.32 (1)  0.42  0.59  0.83 
 
Distal Demonstrative (o) 
Intercept     0.24   1.69 (1) 
 Joint Attention (no vs. yes)  -0.54**  10.57 (1)  0.42  0.58  0.81 
 Location  (close to Spkr)  -2.97***  38.26 (1)  0.02  0.05  0.13  
    (close to Addr) 0.22   1.16 (1)  0.84  1.24  1.84 
    (mid-distance)  -0.64**  8.05 (1)  0.34  0.53  0.82 
    (far away) 
 Pointing Gesture  (no vs. yes)  -0.27   2.72 (1)  0.55  0.76  1.05 
 
*p <.05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p < .001.
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Discussion 
A second study was carried out to investigate to what extent three contextual factors 
would influence demonstrative choice in Turkish, a language with a three-term demonstrative 
system. The results of Study 2 critically showed that, in Turkish, the ‘distal’ term o was used 
when the addressee’s focus of visual attention was already on the referent. This pattern thus 
falsifies person-oriented and egocentric proximity-based accounts of Turkish demonstrative 
reference (Kornfilt, 1997; Lyons, 1977), as it is in line with a more recent proposal that suggests 
a crucial role for the focus of visual attention of the addressee in demonstrative choice in Turkish 
(Küntay & Özyürek, 2006).  
Regardless of the focus of visual attention of the addressee, and in line with previous 
descriptions, the ‘proximal’ term bu was used to refer to objects near the speaker. Interestingly, 
the ‘medial’ term şu was used more when the referent was at middle distance and far away 
compared to when it was close to speaker or addressee (see Figure 4). Although this effect 
showed up in the manipulation of the location of the referent, it may have been driven by the 
attentional status of the addressee. When in everyday life a referent is outside of the shared space 
between speaker and addressee, it may be assumed to be more likely outside of their attentional 
focus as well, eliciting şu (cf. Küntay & Özyürek, 2006). Again, proximity-based accounts of 
demonstrative choice cannot explain such findings, in this case because the referent close to the 
addressee was equally far from the speaker as the referent in middle distance. 
Furthermore, the results of the second study showed that the specific interplay between 
the referent’s location and the addressee’s attentional focus may be specific to demonstrative 
terms, and not to other definite expressions. Finally, similar to the findings in Dutch, pointing 
gestures were found to be tied more closely to demonstratives than to other definite expressions. 
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We will compare the Turkish results to the Dutch results and further discuss the theoretical 
implications of our findings in the General Discussion, presented next. 
 
General Discussion 
 
A fundamental property of language is that it allows us to refer to entities in the world 
around us (e.g., Clark, 1996; Tomasello, 2008). The current study found that the visual 
attentional focus of one’s addressee, the physical location of the referent, and the concomitant 
use of a pointing gesture may differentially influence how speakers do this in two languages 
(Dutch and Turkish) that have typologically different demonstrative systems (two-term versus 
three-term). It further specifies that the influence of these factors may play a significant role in 
demonstrative choice, but not necessarily in the choice of (in)definite articles in Dutch and 
definite expressions more broadly in Turkish. Earlier accounts of demonstrative reference have 
sometimes explained demonstrative choice in terms of a single factor such as physical proximity 
(e.g., Anderson & Keenan, 1985; Halliday & Hasan, 1977; Lyons, 1977) or a general notion of 
‘accessibility’ (e.g., Jarbou, 2010; Piwek et al., 2008). Here we show that different visual 
contextual factors may play differential roles within and across demonstrative systems and that 
speakers have different strategies at their disposal. Furthermore, our findings confirm the 
significance of orthogonally contrasting different factors in the same study (cf. Coventry et al., 
2014; Stevens & Zhang, 2013), the importance of testing observational findings in a controlled 
paradigm (Hanks, 2009), and the added value of cross-linguistically comparing typologically 
different demonstrative systems using the same methodological approach.  
The Dutch two-term system and the Turkish three-term system showed several 
similarities in patterns of demonstrative use in a triadic situation. The ‘proximal’ demonstratives 
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dit/deze in Dutch and bu in Turkish were used in a similar, speaker-anchored way in both 
languages to differentiate a zone near the speaker from the rest of the extra-linguistic space. The 
‘distal’ demonstratives dat/die in Dutch and o in Turkish were used for referents not near the 
speaker. Furthermore, in both Dutch and Turkish no influence of the attention of the addressee 
and the physical location of the referent was found on the choice of referring expressions that did 
not contain a demonstrative. 
As a language-specific strategy, the ‘distal’ term o in Turkish was used when the referent 
was already in the focus of attention of the addressee. This finding confirmed previous 
observational results (Küntay & Özyürek, 2006) and falsified traditional accounts of the Turkish 
demonstrative system, which were purely based on the physical proximity of the referent to the 
speaker and addressee (Lyons, 1977; Kornfilt, 1997). Interestingly, in this respect Turkish differs 
from other demonstrative systems (see Kirsner & Van Heuven, 1988). For instance, in Jordanian 
Arabic it is the proximal demonstrative that is used for entities with high perceptibility to the 
addressee (Jarbou, 2010). Interestingly, research on other languages has also found an influence 
of the addressee’s attention on demonstrative choice (e.g., Burenhult, 2003; Jarbou, 2010; Piwek 
et al., 2008). Together, these findings confirm that joint attention may not only be the aim and 
result of using a referring expression (Diessel, 1999), but also a driving force in demonstrative 
choice.  
Another finding specific to Turkish was the higher use of the ‘medial’ demonstrative şu 
for objects away from speaker and addressee compared to objects close to one of the two 
interlocutors. We tentatively suggested that this effect of ‘location’ may be driven by a strong 
positive correlation in everyday life between the physical proximity of a referent to speaker and 
addressee and the likelihood of that referent being in their focus of visual attention. Note that this 
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finding is in sharp contrast with what was predicted by the person-oriented account of Turkish 
demonstrative choice, namely that it is mainly used for referents close to the addressee (Lyons, 
1977). 
 Our findings also have implications for more general accounts of demonstrative 
reference. It is surprising that, especially in the linguistic literature since Bühler (1934), 
demonstrative systems have often been described in egocentric terms (e.g., Anderson & Keenan, 
1985; Halliday & Hasan, 1977; Lyons, 1977; see also Russell, 1940). Even recently, Diessel 
(2014) for instance stated that, when using a demonstrative term, ‘speakers of all languages 
employ an egocentric coordinate system that is anchored by the speaker’s body at the time of the 
utterance (p.128)’. Such a view is largely based on linguistic intuitions (cf. Enfield 2003) and not 
on careful empirical testing or in-depth observational analysis of patterns of use in context. There 
are now many empirical reasons to believe that demonstrative use is driven by sociocentric rather 
than egocentric motives (e.g., Enfield, 2003; Hanks, 1990; Jungbluth, 2003; Laury, 1996; Piwek 
et al., 2008). The current study confirms such a sociocentric view in showing that speakers may 
take into account the addressee’s focus of attention in their choice of a demonstrative. Even the 
finding that the ‘proximal’ demonstrative in both Dutch and Turkish was used in a speaker-
anchored fashion does not imply that this was done with egocentric intentions or from an 
egocentric coordinate system. One may use a ‘proximal’ demonstrative in a particular context 
simply to inform one’s addressee that a referent is close to oneself, taking into account both 
oneself and the addressee. After all, the addressee is just as necessary and prominent in a 
communicative act as the speaker (Jones, 1995), and establishing reference is often a joint, 
collaborative act in a social context (Clark, 1996; Clark, Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983; Hanks, 
1990). 
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 Our results further suggest that people may divide space into a zone near the speaker, 
possibly a zone near the addressee, and the rest of the physical space. Indeed, it is not uncommon 
that physical space is transformed into meaningful space in everyday interactions (Enfield, 2003; 
Kendon, 1977; Scheflen & Ashcraft, 1976). How the space is exactly carved up in the mind of 
interlocutors may strongly depend on the context. In certain situations, unlike in the current 
study, a distinction will be made between the shared space in between speaker and addressee in a 
conversational dyad, and the rest of the space outside of the dyad (Jungbluth, 2003; see also 
Chapter 3 of this thesis). This may have consequences for speakers’ demonstrative choice, in that 
all referents within the dyad may elicit a proximal demonstrative term (Jungbluth, 2003). The 
current results confirm that in demonstrative choice the context-dependent division of space is 
more important than purely physical factors such as the relative proximity of a referent to the 
speaker (Enfield, 2003).  
 Both in the current Dutch and Turkish study, we found that the presence of a pointing 
gesture was more closely tied to the use of demonstratives than to the use of (in)definite 
expressions that did not contain a demonstrative. Bangerter (2004, p. 418) suggested that 
demonstratives may direct gaze to a concurrently used pointing gesture when the gesture carries 
the main informational burden (see also Bühler, 1934). Our results are in line with this idea and 
we suggest that a pointing gesture may demarcate the addressee’s search space in cases when a 
distal demonstrative is used in reference to an object not near the speaker. Previous research has 
shown that speakers design the exact kinematic properties of their index-finger pointing gesture, 
such as its velocity, trajectory, and the duration of its post-stroke hold-phase, by taking into 
account the mental state of their addressee (Cleret de Langavant et al., 2011; see also Chapter 4 
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of the current thesis). A demonstrative could then indeed be used to make the addressee pay 
attention to such an effort. 
To conclude, the current study showed differential roles of visual joint attention, physical 
proximity, and the presence of pointing gestures in demonstrative choice in two languages with 
typologically different demonstrative systems. Our findings confirm that the very basic human 
communicative ability of establishing triadic joint attention to a referent turns out to be 
dependent on a subtle interplay between different context-dependent factors, as reflected in one’s 
choice of demonstrative. These results open up new avenues towards understanding the complex 
interplay between contextual factors involved in demonstrative choice within and across 
languages. 
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Abstract 
A fundamental property of language is that it can be used to refer to entities in the extra-
linguistic physical context of a conversation in order to establish a joint focus of attention on a 
referent. Typological and psycholinguistic work across a wide range of languages has put 
forward at least two different theoretical views on demonstrative reference. Here we contrasted 
and tested these two accounts by investigating the electrophysiological brain activity underlying 
the construction of indexical meaning in comprehension. In two EEG experiments, participants 
watched pictures of a speaker who referred to one of two objects using speech and an index-
finger pointing gesture. In contrast with separately collected native speakers’ linguistic 
intuitions, N400 effects showed a preference for a proximal demonstrative when speaker and 
addressee were in a face-to-face orientation and all possible referents were located in the shared 
space between them, irrespective of the physical proximity of the referent to the speaker. These 
findings reject egocentric proximity-based accounts of demonstrative reference, support a 
sociocentric approach to deixis, suggest that interlocutors construe a shared space during 
conversation, and imply that the psychological proximity of a referent may be more important 
than its physical proximity. 
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Electrophysiological Evidence for the Role of Shared Space in Online Comprehension of Spatial 
Demonstratives 
 
“Distance cannot be what distinguishes the  
meanings of these two demonstratives”  
(Enfield, 2003, p. 104) 
 
 
A fundamental property of language is that it can be used to refer to entities in the extra-
linguistic physical context of a conversation. Using a spatial demonstrative such as “this” or 
“that” in combination with a pointing gesture allows one to establish a joint focus of attention on 
a referent (Diessel, 2006), and to directly anchor one’s communication to the material world 
(Clark, 2003; Weissenborn & Klein, 1982). The production and comprehension of such referring 
expressions entails a complex interaction between language, gesture, space, and attention. This 
has long been a topic of interest in not only linguistics (e.g., Bühler, 1934; Jakobson, 1971; 
Jespersen, 1922; Levinson, 1983; Rommetveit, 1968) but also in anthropology (see Hanks, 1990; 
2005), cognitive science (e.g., Kemmerer, 1999), and philosophy (e.g., Peirce, 1931; Russell, 
1940). Furthermore, establishing and understanding triadic reference is a milestone in the 
acquisition of language and social skills (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Butterworth, 2003; 
Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998; Clark & Sengul, 1978; Tomasello, Carpenter, & 
Liszkowski, 2007). Here we focus on the neural and cognitive mechanisms underlying the 
comprehension of referential speech acts that contain a spatial demonstrative and a concurrently 
produced pointing gesture. The present study investigates this issue by contrasting and testing 
two different theoretical views on demonstrative reference. To set the stage for the description of 
the present study, we will first outline these two views, which were put forward on the basis of 
Chapter 3 
68 
 
previous typological and experimental studies on the production and comprehension of such 
spatial demonstratives. 
 Demonstrative systems in the world’s languages have long mainly been described in 
egocentric and speaker-anchored terms. Speakers would use demonstrative pronouns and 
determiners on the basis of the proximity of the referent from their own physical location (cf. 
Anderson & Keenan, 1985; Diessel, 2005; Fillmore, 1982; Halliday & Hasan, 1977; Hottenroth, 
1982; Lakoff, 1974; Lyons, 1977; Rauh, 1983) and as such do not consider demonstrative 
reference a joint activity but rather an egocentric act. In a survey of reference grammars and 
other typological sources on 234 languages from a large range of different language families and 
geographical areas, Diessel (1999, 2005) found that the large majority (i.e., 227) of languages in 
his corpus used a proximal-distal contrast in the description of their adnominal demonstrative 
system. In English, for instance, the adnominal demonstratives “this” and “that” would be used 
comparably to the adverbials “here” and “there”, in that a distance scale is used with the speaker 
as its deictic center (Anderson & Keenan, 1985; Clark & Sengul, 1978; Diessel, 1999; Fillmore, 
1982; Halliday & Hasan, 1977; Lakoff, 1974; Lyons, 1977). When the two demonstratives are 
used contrastively, “this” is used for referents in relative proximity to the deictic center (i.e., the 
speaker), whereas “that” is used for referents relatively remote from the speaker’s location 
(Diessel, 2005; Lakoff, 1974; Levinson, 1983). Also three-term systems, such as Spanish, have 
been described as speaker-anchored systems, with a “medial” demonstrative that would be used 
for entities at medial distance from the speaker (Anderson & Keenan, 1985; Diessel, 1999; 
Fillmore, 1982; Levinson, 2004). Such an egocentric speaker-anchored explanation of deictic 
reference is found not only in linguistic typology, but also in philosophical approaches to 
indexicality (e.g., Russell, 1940). We will call this first theoretical view the egocentric proximity 
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account. Recently, this account has been taken as a starting point in psycholinguistic 
experimental work. 
Coventry et al. (2008), for instance, experimentally investigated the production of 
English and Spanish demonstratives in a controlled “memory game” paradigm. Participants were 
seated at a table with twelve spatial locations marked by colored dots in front of them at different 
distances. They were instructed to name objects that were placed on the different dots by using a 
three-term structure (e.g., that red triangle). When objects were within the participant’s reach, 
both English and Spanish participants preferred to use a proximal demonstrative (this in English; 
este in Spanish). When the objects were placed outside of the participants’ reach, a non-proximal 
demonstrative was preferred (that in English; ese or aquel in Spanish). The authors conclude that 
spatial demonstratives are used on the basis of a perceptual distinction between peripersonal 
space near the speaker and extrapersonal space far away from the speaker (but see Bonfiglioli, 
Finocchiaro, Gesierich, Rositani, & Vescovi, 2009; Kemmerer, 1999). 
Recently, Stevens and Zhang (2013) studied the comprehension of demonstratives by 
showing participants (native speakers of English) images of a speaker, an addressee, and several 
potential referents. In all the images, the speaker pointed and gazed toward a referent, which was 
always a blue cat. In a 2x3 design, the locus of attention of the addressee (on the referent, not on 
the referent), and the location of the referent (in speaker-associated space, i.e., close to speaker, 
in hearer-associated space, i.e., close to addressee, or in non-associated space, i.e., remote from 
both) were manipulated. Each image was then combined once with the auditory expression “this 
one” and once with the expression “that one”. Participants looked at the images and listened to 
the referential utterances, and were asked to judge by pressing one of two buttons whether the 
audiovisual scene (this one or that one in combination with the image) was semantically 
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congruent or incongruent. In addition, their electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded 
continuously during the experiment. 
 Stevens and Zhang found that participants judged a proximal demonstrative (this) 
congruent for referents in speaker-associated space, and a distal demonstrative (that) congruent 
for referents in hearer-associated and non-associated space. Thus, the participants’ linguistic 
intuitions as expressed in their congruency judgments were in line with the egocentric proximity 
account outlined above. In addition, it was found that reaction times were faster for congruent 
demonstrative usages, but only when speaker and hearer shared gaze at the referent. Thus, the 
egocentric proximity account would only hold for situations in which speaker and addressee both 
already focus their gaze on the referent. The event-related potential (ERP) data further 
complicated the story, in only showing an effect in one of the six conditions. When the referent 
was in hearer-associated space, and there was shared gaze between speaker and hearer on the 
referent, a late negative deflection was found for the proximal demonstrative compared to the 
distal demonstrative. The authors name this an N600 effect, which would be a delayed variant of 
the canonical N400 effect for semantically anomalous words (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011; Kutas 
& Hillyard, 1980).  
The egocentric proximity account has been challenged by a number of studies that argued 
that a referent’s relative proximity to the speaker is not the only or not the most important 
parameter in determining the selection of demonstratives in a particular context (Anderson & 
Keenan, 1985; Burenhult, 2003; Da Milano, 2007; Himmelmann, 1996; Küntay & Özyürek, 
2006; Levinson, 1983; Piwek, Beun, & Cremers, 2008). Some three-term systems would have 
the middle demonstrative refer to entities close to the addressee (e.g., Japanese: Diessel, 1999, 
2005; Levinson, 2004) thus taking the addressee’s location into account. In other languages, the 
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visibility, geographical location (e.g., uphill or downhill), and height of the referent (Anderson & 
Keenan, 1985; Diessel, 1999), or the presence or absence of joint attention between speaker and 
addressee (Küntay & Özyürek, 2006; Levinson, 2004) on the referent would also play a role in 
which demonstrative a speaker would select. Nevertheless, the egocentric proximity account is 
omnipresent in typologies of demonstrative systems (Diessel, 2005). 
A theoretical alternative to the egocentric proximity account was put forward by 
Jungbluth (2003) in line with Weinrich (1988) and Laury (1996). This second theoretical view 
has been termed the dyad-oriented account. On the basis of fieldwork observations on Spanish, 
Jungbluth (2003) proposes that the physical orientation of speaker and addressee relative to each 
other plays a crucial role in explaining which demonstrative a Spanish speaker would select to 
use. More specifically, when speaker and addressee are face-to-face, as in a conversational dyad, 
a proximal demonstrative (este in Spanish) would be used to refer to an object within the shared 
space between speaker and addressee, irrespective of whether the referent is close to the speaker 
or not. In other words, every referent inside the conversational dyad is treated as proximal 
without any further differentiation (Jungbluth, 2003, p.19). Referents outside of the dyad, for 
instance when located behind the addressee, would elicit a distal demonstrative (aquel in 
Spanish). Thus, this view on demonstratives moves away from the egocentric, ‘monadic’ 
typologies that underline a referent’s relative physical proximity to the speaker, and supports a 
more sociocentric, dyadic view of multimodal reference in which the spatial locations of speaker, 
addressee, and referent play an important role (Weinrich, 1988). This sociocentric approach to 
deixis is in line with other work arguing that the egocentric speaker-anchored proximity view is 
too simplistic because it does not acknowledge that establishing reference is a social, interactive 
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process that always takes place in a socio-cultural framework (Enfield, 2003; Hanks, 1990; 
2005). 
 In the current study we will contrast and empirically test these two theoretical accounts 
on spatial demonstratives, which were mainly based on the study of demonstrative production, in 
two electrophysiological experiments in demonstrative comprehension. 
 
The present study 
The first aim of the present study is to contrast and test the two theoretical accounts 
outlined above by recording participants’ electroencephalogram (EEG) and time-lock event-
related potentials (ERPs) to the onset of an auditorily presented demonstrative. In order to create 
a visual, referential context, we presented participants with pictures in which there were two 
objects and a speaker. One object was always close to the speaker and another at a larger relative 
distance from the speaker, and on each trial the speaker referred to one of the two objects by 
manually pointing at it and using a demonstrative (this or that) embedded in a sentence. The two 
objects were located in one of two differentially oriented axes (i.e., lateral vs. sagittal) which 
allowed us to contrast the two theoretical views. Figure 1 below shows a subset of the stimuli. 
The egocentric proximity account (e.g., Anderson & Keenan, 1985; Clark & Sengul, 
1978; Diessel, 1999; Fillmore, 1982; Halliday & Hasan, 1977; Lakoff, 1974; Lyons, 1977; Rauh, 
1983; Russell, 1940) predicts that perceiving a distal demonstrative (“that”) in reference to an 
object close to the speaker should be reflected in a higher processing cost compared to 
perceiving a proximal demonstrative (“this”) in reference to the same object. Similarly, 
perceiving a proximal demonstrative in reference to an object that is relatively remote from the 
speaker should also be experienced as caused by a violation. According to this account, it should 
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not matter whether objects are oriented on a sagittal or on a lateral plane between speaker and 
addressee. More specifically, this account thus predicts a Demonstrative x Distance interaction, 
and no Demonstrative x Orientation interaction. 
In contrast, the dyad-oriented account (Jungbluth, 2003; Weinrich, 1988) predicts that 
people prefer a proximal demonstrative when speaker and addressee are oriented in a dyad and 
the referent is positioned in any location within the shared space in that dyad. This is the case for 
both referents in our sagitally oriented picture stimuli because the speaker and the participant 
addressee are sitting face-to-face, with the referents between them. It further predicts a 
preference for a proximal demonstrative for the object close to the speaker in the lateral 
orientation of objects, because this object may be considered to be inside the shared dyad space. 
Conversely, it predicts a preference for a distal demonstrative for the distal object in the lateral 
orientation, because this object is clearly outside of the dyad. In contrast with the egocentric 
account, this account thus predicts no Demonstrative x Distance interaction, but a Demonstrative 
x Orientation interaction effect instead.  
The current study goes beyond the previous electrophysiological study by Stevens and 
Zhang (2013) on demonstrative comprehension in several ways. Firstly, it is the first study 
investigating the neural and cognitive mechanisms underlying demonstrative comprehension by 
an implicit addressee. It may be the case that overhearing a referential speech act uttered by a 
speaker for an addressee, as in Stevens and Zhang (2013), taps into different neural and cognitive 
mechanisms than being the (implicit) addressee of a referential speech act (e.g., Schober & 
Clark, 1989). Second, it is likely that people’s linguistic intuitions about demonstratives do not 
align with their actual everyday usage and comprehension of demonstratives (Enfield, 2003; 
Piwek et al., 2008). Therefore, we will avoid using an experimental task that gives away the aim 
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of the study to the participants. In addition, we will use a large number of different referents 
throughout the experiment and embed the demonstratives in a wider sentence context, aspects 
which were both absent in Stevens and Zhang (2013).  
Finally, Stevens and Zhang (2013) argue that the N600 effect they found is similar to the 
canonical N400 effect generally found to semantic violations on the noun. However, they did not 
include a condition in their experiment in which they compared the two types of violation. 
Friedrich and Friederici (2010) have shown that hearing an incorrect label to an object elicits a 
widespread semantic N400 effect on the noun. In the present study, we compare the time-course 
and topography of such an N400 effect to an effect of a “demonstrative violation” in the same 
study to the same visual materials.  
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-seven participants (mean age 20.9, range 18-27, three male) took part in the 
experiment. They were all right-handed as assessed by a Dutch translation of the Edinburgh 
Inventory for hand dominance (Oldfield, 1971). Data from four participants were discarded due 
to a large number of trials that contained eye blinks and movement artifacts. All participants 
were Dutch, studying in Nijmegen, and Dutch was their native language. They had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, no language or hearing impairments or history of neurological 
disease. They provided written informed consent and were paid for participation.  
 
Materials and Pretest of Materials 
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The experimental materials consisted of 120 introductory pictures, 240 target pictures, 
and 240 spoken Dutch sentences. The pictures were selected after pretesting from an initial set of 
140 introductory and 280 target pictures (see below). Half of the critical pictures were sagitally 
oriented and the other half of the pictures were laterally oriented (see Figure 1). In the laterally 
oriented pictures, the position of the speaker (left or right) was counterbalanced. All pictures 
contained two similar objects, one close to the speaker and one further away from the speaker. In 
total, 120 different object pairs were used. In half of the critical pictures, the speaker was looking 
and pointing at the proximate object (the proximate condition). In the other half, she was looking 
and pointing at the remote object (the distal condition). The size of the laterally oriented pictures 
was 15 x 9 cm and the sagitally oriented pictures 11 x 12 cm, subtending visual angles of 
respectively 7.8 x 4.7 and 5.7 x 6.2 degrees. 
The 240 sentences were spoken by a female native speaker of Dutch and digitized at a 
sample frequency of 44.1 kHz. They consisted of 120 sentence pairs. The two sentences in each 
pair only differed in the demonstrative (proximal versus distal) they contained. All sentences 
started as follows: “Ik heb [demonstrative] [noun] etc.” (see Table 1 for examples translated into 
English) such that the words preceding the demonstrative were always the same across all 
conditions. For every sentence, the onsets of the demonstrative and the following noun were 
determined by using a speech analysis software package (Praat, version 5.2; www.praat.org). 
The sentences had an average duration of 2176 ms (SD = 224). The critical demonstratives had 
an average duration of 197 ms (SD = 67) and the critical nouns had an average duration of 409 
ms (SD = 132). Sentences were equalized in maximum amplitude. 
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Figure 1. Subset of stimuli used in Experiment 1. Each row contains an introductory picture, a 
target picture in which the speaker refers to the proximate object, and a target picture in which 
she refers to the distal object. The top row shows pictures with a sagittal orientation of objects. 
The bottom row shows pictures with a lateral orientation of objects. The position of the 
participant (i.e. the implicit Addressee) is marked below the pictures. 
 
The experiment contained a demonstrative manipulation and a noun manipulation. The 
main independent variables in the demonstrative manipulation were Object Orientation (lateral 
or sagittal), Distance of the referent from the speaker (proximate or distal), and Demonstrative 
(proximal or distal). The demonstrative manipulation was done by having each picture paired 
with an auditorily presented sentence that could contain a proximal demonstrative (dit or deze, 
“this”) or a distal demonstrative (dat or die, “that”). The experiment was carried out in Dutch, in 
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which generally a distinction is made between proximal (dit, deze) and distal (dat, die) 
demonstratives, with separate terms for neuter (dit, dat) and common gender (deze, die) nouns 
following the demonstrative. 
The main independent variables in the noun manipulation were Object Orientation 
(lateral or sagittal), Distance of the referent from the speaker (proximate or distal), and Noun 
(congruent or incongruent). The noun manipulation was done by having each picture paired with 
an auditorily presented sentence that contained a correct noun-referent (e.g., “plate” for a plate) 
or an incorrect noun-referent (e.g., “mango” for a plate). In the noun manipulation, the 
demonstrative preceding the noun was always similar across noun congruency conditions. Table 
1 shows an overview of the different manipulations. 
To select the best materials, all pictures were presented in a pre-test to 16 native Dutch 
participants (mean age 20.4, range 18-26) who did not participate in the main experiment. They 
were shown the critical pictures, one by one, on a computer screen in a soundproof booth, and 
were asked to type the demonstrative and the noun that they would use imagining they were the 
speaker in the picture. This provided us with the demonstratives that participants intuitively 
prefer in different conditions and the labels that participants use for the depicted objects. 
Whenever the speaker pointed to the close object, participants used a proximal demonstrative 
(“this”) in 97.86 % of the cases. When the speaker pointed to the remote object, participants used 
a distal demonstrative (“that”) in 98.21 % of the cases. This preference was irrespective of the 
orientation (lateral vs. sagittal) of objects. From the 140 pictures, the 120 pictures that were 
labeled most consistently were selected for the main experiment. 
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Table 1. Design of both Experiments 1 and 2 with examples of the auditory stimuli (translated 
from Dutch).  
Condition Orientation Distance  Example sentences   Picture 
Proximal Demonstrative 
  Sagittal 
    Proximate “I have bought this plate at the market “ Plate-close  
    Distal  “I have bought this plate at the market” Plate-far 
  Lateral 
    Proximate “I have found this vase in the cupboard“ Vase-close  
    Distal  “I have found this vase in the cupboard” Vase-far 
Distal Demonstrative 
  Sagittal    
   Proximate “I have bought that plate at the market” Plate-close 
    Distal  “I have bought that plate at the market” Plate-far  
  Lateral 
   Proximate “I have found that vase in the cupboard” Vase-close 
    Distal  “I have found that vase in the cupboard” Vase-far 
 
Congruent Noun 
  Sagittal 
    Proximate “I have bought this plate at the market” Plate-close  
    Distal  “I have bought that plate at the market” Plate-far  
  Lateral 
    Proximate “I have found this vase in the cupboard“ Vase-close  
    Distal  “I have found that vase in the cupboard” Vase-far 
 
Incongruent Noun 
  Sagittal 
    Proximate “I have bought this mango at the market”  Plate-close  
    Distal  “I have bought that mango at the market” Plate-far 
  Lateral 
    Proximate “I have found this spoon in the cupboard”  Vase-close 
    Distal  “I have found that spoon in the cupboard” Vase-far 
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 Procedure 
Participants were seated in a comfortable chair in a dimly lit room at a distance of 110 cm 
from a computer screen. Pictures were presented on the screen using Presentation software 
(Neurobehavioral Systems) and speech was presented through EEG-compatible headphones.  
Figure 2 shows the structure of a trial. A trial consisted of a fixation cross (200 ms), an 
introductory picture (800 ms), another fixation cross (200 ms), the target picture (2500 ms), and 
a symbol (- -) during which participants could blink their eyes (3000 ms). The spoken sentence 
was presented 500 ms after target picture onset and lasted, on average, 2176 ms. The 
introductory picture was presented to familiarize participants with the objects in the picture and 
to mark the speaker’s referential, communicative intention. Directly looking at someone is often 
interpreted as an ostensive signal that establishes the speaker’s intention to communicate (e.g., 
Csibra, 2010). As such, we hoped that participants would consider themselves the addressee of 
the speaker’s utterance, as in a referential triadic context in which speakers alternate their gaze 
between the referent and their addressee (e.g., Bakeman & Adamson, 1984). 
Participants were instructed to carefully look at the pictures and listen to the sentences. 
Their task was to push a button whenever the speaker in the pictures referred to both objects in 
the picture (catch trials, 10 % of all trials). When the speaker was referring to only one object, 
participants did not push a button (target trials, 90 % of all trials). They were instructed to blink 
their eyes only during the presentation of the symbol (- -). They were instructed to fixate on a 
central point on the screen and not to blink or make any saccades during the presentation of the 
target pictures. Participants correctly identified 89 % of all catch trials. 
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Figure 2. Overview of the trial structure used in Experiments 1 and 2. During the presentation of 
the second picture a spoken sentence was presented. 
 
The experiment consisted of four blocks of 60 trials. A different randomized list was used 
for each participant. The experiment started with a practice session of twelve practice items, not 
used in the main experiment, to familiarize the subjects with the experiment. The experimental 
session lasted approximately 55 minutes.  
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Figure 3. Electrode montage. The four quadrants used in the analysis of the electrophysiological 
data (in addition to the vertical midline column) are circled and highlighted in blue. The 
electrode locations indicated with dashed lines refer to the electrode sites displayed in Figures 
4-7 and 9-12 (left anterior, LA; middle anterior, MA; right anterior, RA; left posterior, LP; 
middle posterior, MP, right posterior, RP).  
 
EEG Recording and analysis 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded continuously from 59 active electrodes 
held in place on the scalp by an elastic cap. Figure 3 shows the electrode montage. In addition to 
the 59 scalp sites, three external electrodes were attached to record EOG, one below the left eye 
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(to monitor for vertical eye movement/blinks), and two on the lateral canthi next to the left and 
right eye (to monitor for horizontal eye movements/saccades). Finally, one electrode was placed 
over the left mastoid bone and one over the right mastoid bone. All electrode impedances were 
kept below 20 KΩ. The continuous EEG was recorded with a sampling rate of 500 Hz, a low cut-
off filter of 0.01 Hz and a high cut-off filter of 200 Hz. EEG was filtered offline (high-pass at 
0.01 Hz and low-pass at 40 Hz). All electrode sites were online referenced to the electrode 
placed over the left mastoid and re-referenced offline to the average of the right and left 
mastoids. 
Epochs from 200 ms preceding the onset of the demonstrative (“this” or “that”) to 800 ms 
after the onset of the demonstrative, and epochs from 200 ms preceding the onset of the noun to 
800 ms after the onset of the noun were selected using Brain Vision Analyzer software (Version 
2.0, Brain Products, Munich). The 200 ms pre-stimulus period was used as a baseline. Trials 
containing ocular or muscular artifacts were not taken into consideration in the averaging process 
(16.8 % of all data). The mean amplitudes of the ERP waveforms for each condition per subject 
were entered into repeated measures ANOVAs. In the demonstrative manipulation, the 
independent variables were Object Orientation (lateral or sagittal; henceforth: Orientation), 
Distance of the referent from the speaker (proximate or distal; henceforth: Distance), 
Demonstrative (proximal or distal), Quadrant (left anterior, LA; right anterior, RA; left posterior, 
LP; right posterior, RP; vertical midline, VM), and Electrode. In the noun manipulation, the 
independent variables were Orientation (lateral or sagittal), Distance (proximate or distal), Noun 
(congruent or incongruent), Quadrant (LA, RA, LP, RP, VM), and Electrode. For both 
manipulations, we performed a time-window analysis for subsequent 100 ms time-windows in 
the 800 ms following noun onset (in the noun manipulation) and in the 800 ms following 
 Shared space in online demonstrative comprehension 
 
83 
 
demonstrative onset (in the demonstrative manipulation) respectively. The Geisser and 
Greenhouse (1959) correction was applied to all analyses with more than one degree of freedom 
in the numerator (corrected degrees of freedom and p-values are reported). Only significant 
results at the 5 % level are reported. 
 
Results 
Table 2 gives an overview of the results of the time-window analysis of the ERPs time-
locked to the onset of the demonstrative. The overall analysis revealed most importantly a 
significant Demonstrative x Orientation interaction effect in time-windows between 100 and 600 
ms after demonstrative onset. Follow-up analyses revealed a significant main effect of 
Demonstrative in these time-windows for the picture stimuli with a sagittal orientation of 
referents. Figure 4 shows this effect, which denotes a more negative wave for the distal 
demonstrative compared to the proximal demonstrative and is widespread over the scalp (i.e., it 
does not interact with Quadrant). Importantly, no interaction was found with Distance, implying 
that the effect was similar for the referent close to the speaker compared to the referent remote 
from the speaker. In contrast, no significant main effect of Demonstrative was found in any of 
the time-windows for the pictures with a lateral orientation of referents. Figure 5 shows the grand 
average waveforms and the topographic plots corresponding to the difference waves for different 
time-windows for the pictures with a lateral orientation of referents. Table 2 and Figure 6 show 
that the Demonstrative x Distance interaction predicted by the egocentric proximity account was 
not present in the data.  
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Table 2. Results of the ERP analyses time-locked to the onset of the demonstrative in Experiment 1. This and subsequent tables 
present F-values and significance levels for separate analyses performed for 100 ms time-windows. 
     100-200  200-300  300-400  400-500  500-600  600-700  700-800 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Overall 
Demonstrative x Orientation x Quadrant 1.49  1.91  1.19  < 1  < 1  1.31  < 1 
Demonstrative x Orientation x Distance 2.56  < 1  < 1  < 1  < 1  < 1  < 1 
Demonstrative x Orientation  13.91**  6.08*  5.48*  5.00*  5.45*  1.44  < 1 
Demonstrative x Quadrant   < 1  < 1  4.11*  2.96  1.26  2.45  2.08 
Demonstrative x Distance   1.22  < 1  < 1  < 1  < 1  < 1  4.05 
Demonstrative    < 1  14.42**  1.30  2.55  4.91*  < 1  < 1 
 
Lateral Orientation  
Demonstrative    2.14  < 1  < 1  < 1  < 1  1.15  < 1 
  
Sagittal Orientation 
 Demonstrative   11.67**  21.24*** 4.61*  7.91*  9.70*  < 1  < 1 
   
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Figure 4. Grand average waveforms time-locked to the onset of the demonstrative (proximal vs. 
distal) for the picture stimuli with a sagittal orientation of referents in Experiment 1. The 
electrode locations are indicated and can be found in Figure 3. The topographic plots show the 
corresponding voltage differences between the two conditions, for 100 ms time-windows.  
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Figure 5. Grand average waveforms time-locked to the onset of the demonstrative (proximal vs. 
distal) for the picture stimuli with a lateral orientation of referents in Experiment 1. The 
topographic plots show the corresponding voltage differences between the two conditions, for 
100 ms time-windows. 
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Figure 6. Grand average waveforms time-locked to the onset of the demonstrative (panel A: 
proximal demonstrative; panel B: distal demonstrative) for the picture stimuli in which the 
referent was close to the speaker (black line) or relatively distal (red line), collapsed across 
Orientation. The topographic plots show the corresponding voltage differences between the two 
conditions, for 100 ms time-windows. 
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Table 3 shows the outcome of the ERP analyses time-locked to the onset of the noun. A 
large N400 effect was found comparing incongruent to congruent referential nouns, which starts 
out as an effect that is larger in centro-parietal regions in early time-windows and is larger in 
anterior regions in late time-windows. Figure 7 shows the grand average waveforms and the 
topographic plots.  
Finally, we directly compared the effect found time-locked to the demonstrative (as 
presented in Figure 4) to the congruity effect found on the noun (as presented in Figure 7). The 
dependent variable in this analysis was the difference wave, both for the demonstrative effect 
and for the noun effect, in the different time-windows and the independent variables used were 
Word Class (Demonstrative versus Noun) and Quadrant. This analysis yielded only a significant 
Word Class x Quadrant interaction effect in the 200-300 ms time-window, F (2,39) = 4.43, p = 
.022. However, follow-up analyses for the separate quadrants did not reveal any significant main 
effect of Word Class (all p’s > .15). Thus, both the ERP effect on the demonstrative and the ERP 
effect on the noun had a negative directionality, were widespread over the scalp, and took place 
in similar time-windows. Due to the similar time course and negative directionality, we interpret 
a more negative wave in the demonstrative manipulation as reflecting a higher processing cost 
(cf. Stevens & Zhang, 2013).  
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 contrasted and tested two theoretical accounts of demonstrative reference 
by simultaneously presenting visual and auditory stimuli while recording the EEG of native 
speakers of Dutch.  
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 The results from the pretest, which tapped into participants’ linguistic intuitions on 
demonstrative use, were in line with the egocentric proximity account in that a proximal 
demonstrative was used for objects relatively close to the speaker, and a distal demonstrative for 
objects relatively remote from the speaker’s location, irrespective of the spatial orientation of 
objects. These results also resemble the congruency judgments participants made in the study by 
Stevens and Zhang (2013). Piwek et al., (2008) termed this intuitive belief on demonstrative use 
“the folk view” on proximal and distal demonstratives. Interestingly, the current ERP results tell 
a different story. 
The egocentric proximity account (e.g., Anderson & Keenan, 1985; Clark & Sengul, 
1978; Diessel, 1999; Fillmore, 1982; Halliday & Hasan, 1977; Lakoff, 1974; Lyons, 1977; Rauh, 
1983; Russell, 1940) predicted a Demonstrative x Distance interaction. According to this 
account, perceiving a proximal demonstrative in reference to an object remote from the speaker, 
and perceiving a distal demonstrative in reference to an object close to the speaker, would be 
experienced as caused by a violation, leading to a higher processing cost. The orientation of 
objects in a lateral or sagittal plane would not influence demonstrative comprehension. The 
current ERP data reject this account, because there was no Demonstrative x Distance interaction, 
and the orientation of objects played a crucial role. When objects were oriented in a sagittal 
plane between speaker and participant, a more negative wave was found for the distal compared 
to the proximal demonstrative, irrespective of whether the referent was relatively close to or 
remote from the speaker. On the other hand, when objects were oriented on a lateral plane, no 
difference was found for the ERPs to the proximal compared to the distal demonstratives. The 
egocentric proximity account cannot explain these findings. 
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Table 3. Results of the ERP analyses time-locked to the onset of the noun in Experiment 1. 
     100-200  200-300  300-400  400-500  500-600  600-700  700-800 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Overall 
Noun x Quadrant    < 1  2.09  4.76*  < 1  5.30*  3.47*  1.21 
Noun Main Effect   4.14  27.73*** 44.87*** 18.20*** 2.27  1.33  < 1 
 
Follow-up 
 Noun Main Effect 
In LA Quadrant  1.96  12.86**  29.01*** 22.86*** 9.05**  6.33*  2.54 
  In RA Quadrant  4.17  13.16**  29.04*** 15.21**  4.25  1.67  < 1 
  In LP Quadrant  8.03*  38.50*** 45.70*** 18.89*** < 1  < 1  3.44 
  In RP Quadrant  < 1  6.57*  36.29*** 6.21*  < 1  < 1  < 1 
  In Vertical Midline 10.72**  30.93*** 41.92*** 20.43*** 2.57  < 1  < 1  
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Figure 7. Grand average waveforms time-locked to the onset of the noun (incongruent vs. 
congruent) in Experiment 1. The topographic plots show the corresponding voltage differences 
between the two conditions, for 100 ms time-windows. 
 
 The results of Experiment 1 are more in line with the dyad-oriented account, as put 
forward by Jungbluth (2003). Indeed, when speaker and participant were face-to-face as in a 
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conversational dyad, and both potential referents were located in the shared space between them, 
the ERPs showed a more negative wave for the distal compared to the proximal demonstrative 
irrespective of the location of the referent. This is exactly what the dyad-oriented account 
predicted: distal demonstratives are more inappropriate in reference to an object in shared space, 
and therefore recruit more processing resources. It may seem surprising that no ERP difference 
was found when objects were oriented laterally, particularly for the proximate object which was 
located in the space between speaker and participant. However, because the picture stimuli were 
presented centrally on the screen from the perspective of the participant, the bodily orientations 
of speaker and implicit addressee were not aligned (see Figure 1), which may be a prerequisite 
for creating shared space. If this is the case, aligning speaker and participant would lead to a 
preference for a proximal demonstrative for the object close to the speaker in the lateral 
orientation of objects. We tested this possibility in Experiment 2, by aligning the speaker in the 
pictures with the position of the addressee participant. 
 Furthermore, Coventry et al. (2008) have argued that there may be a parallel between the 
linguistic encoding of space as evident in the proximal-distal demonstrative distinction and the 
neural perceptual encoding of space as divided into a peripersonal (within the reach of one’s 
arm) and an extrapersonal (beyond the reach of one’s arm) region of space. Proximal 
demonstratives would be used to refer to objects in peripersonal space, and distal ones for objects 
in extrapersonal space (Coventry et al., 2008). Although this hypothesis cannot explain why we 
did not find an ERP difference for demonstratives in the picture stimuli with a lateral orientation 
of objects, one could argue that, even though in the sagittal pictures one object was relatively 
more distal from the speaker than the other, they were still both in peripersonal space. This 
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possibility was also tested in Experiment 2, by enlarging the space between the two objects in the 
sagitally oriented picture stimuli.    
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-six participants (mean age 20.3, range 18-25, all female) took part in the 
experiment. They were all right-handed as assessed by a Dutch translation of the Edinburgh 
Inventory for hand dominance (Oldfield, 1971). Data from two participants was discarded due to 
a large number of trials that contained eye blinks and movement artifacts. All participants were 
Dutch, studying in Nijmegen, and Dutch was their native language. They had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, no language or hearing impairments or history of neurological 
disease. They provided written informed consent and were paid for participation. 
 
Materials and Pretest of Materials 
There were two changes in Experiment 2 compared to Experiment 1. First, the picture 
stimuli with a lateral orientation of objects were now presented with the speaker central on the 
screen, thus aligned with the participant, who was sitting centrally in front of the screen (as in 
Experiment 1). Second, the pictures with a sagittal orientation of objects were modified using 
Adobe Photoshop such that the distance between the two objects in the pictures became larger 
and the distal object was clearly out of reach of the speaker (see Figure 8).  
 The 120 target pictures used in Experiment 1 but adapted in the two ways described 
above were presented in a pretest that was similar to the pretest described for Experiment 1.  
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The results of this second pretest (9 subjects, 4 male, mean age 23.9, not participating in the 
main experiment) were similar to the results of the pretest that preceded Experiment 1. 
Whenever the speaker pointed to the close object, participants used a proximal demonstrative 
(“this”) in 96.80 % of the cases. When the speaker pointed to the remote object, participants used 
a distal demonstrative (“that”) in 99.17 % of the cases. This preference was again irrespective of 
the orientation (lateral vs. sagittal) of objects in the pictures. 
 
 
Figure 8. Subset of stimuli used in Experiment 2. Each row contains an introductory picture, a 
target picture in which the speaker refers to the proximate object, and a target picture in which 
she refers to the distal object. The top row shows pictures with a sagittal orientation of objects. 
The bottom row shows pictures with a lateral orientation of objects. The position of the 
participant addressee is marked below the pictures. 
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Procedure, EEG Recording and analysis 
 The experimental procedure, and the recording and analysis of the EEG data were 
identical to the procedure described for Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, trials containing 
ocular or muscular artifacts were not taken into consideration in the averaging process (7.83 % of 
all data). Participants correctly identified 94.1 % of all catch trials. 
 
Results 
Table 4 gives an overview of the results of the time-window analysis of the ERPs time-
locked to the onset of the demonstrative in Experiment 2. The overall analysis revealed a 
significant three-way interaction effect between Demonstrative, Orientation, and Quadrant in 
time-windows between 100 and 300 ms after demonstrative onset. Follow-up analyses revealed a 
significant interaction effect of Demonstrative x Quadrant in these time-windows for the picture 
stimuli with a sagittal orientation of referents. This effect started earlier and was larger in 
anterior than in posterior quadrants. Figure 9 shows this effect, which denotes a more negative 
wave for the distal demonstrative compared to the proximal demonstrative, having an anterior 
scalp distribution. No such effect was found for the pictures with a lateral orientation of objects. 
The follow-up analysis for the picture stimuli with a lateral orientation of objects did yield a 
significant main effect of Demonstrative in an early and a late time-window. Figure 10 shows the 
grand average waveforms and the topographic plots corresponding to the demonstrative contrast 
for the picture stimuli with a lateral orientation of referents. The small three-way interaction with 
Distance in the overall analysis did not yield any significant follow-up effects related to the 
Demonstrative factor. Table 4 and Figure 11 show that the Demonstrative x Distance interaction 
predicted by the egocentric proximity account was again not present in the data.
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Table 4. Results of the ERP analyses time-locked to the onset of the demonstrative in Experiment 2. 
     100-200  200-300  300-400  400-500  500-600  600-700  700-800 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Overall 
Demonstrative x Orientation x Quadrant 7.70**  7.13*  3.06  2.01  1.31  < 1  1.50 
Demonstrative x Orientation x Distance < 1  < 1  < 1  6.11*  1.64  2.28  < 1 
Demonstrative x Distance   < 1  2.41  1.02  < 1  < 1  < 1  < 1 
Demonstrative x Orientation  7.19*  7.74*  6.70*  4.04  2.54  1.46  < 1 
Demonstrative x Quadrant   1.04  2.49  2.41  1.27  < 1  < 1  1.62 
Demonstrative    < 1  6.84*  < 1  < 1  < 1  5.39*  1.17 
       
Lateral Orientation 
Dem x Quadrant   2.57  1.46  3.09  3.10  < 1  < 1  < 1 
Dem x Distance   < 1  < 1  < 1  3.40  1.20  < 1  < 1  
Demonstrative   2.71  < 1  4.94*  2.58  3.91  4.84*  1.70 
  
Sagittal Orientation 
 Dem x Quadrant   7.32**  7.09*  < 1  < 1  1.47  1.49  2.68 
 Dem x Distance   < 1  3.11  1.76  3.27  < 1  4.40*  < 1 
Demonstrative   2.99  12.07**  3.26  1.14  < 1  < 1  < 1 
  In LA Quadrant  9.00**  22.30*** 1.98  < 1  1.07  < 1  < 1 
  In RA Quadrant  4.92*  12.65**  3.19  1.37  1.40  < 1  < 1 
  In LP Quadrant  < 1  6.16*  2.13  < 1  < 1  < 1  < 1  
  In RP Quadrant  < 1  3.67  3.84  < 1  < 1  1.05  1.28 
  In Vertical Midline 3.59  12.02**  3.78  1.38  < 1  < 1  < 1 
   
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Figure 9. Grand average waveforms time-locked to the onset of the demonstrative (proximal vs. 
distal) for the picture stimuli with a sagittal orientation of referents in Experiment 2. The 
topographic plots show the corresponding voltage differences between the two conditions, for 
100 ms time-windows. 
  
Chapter 3 
98 
 
 
Figure 10. Grand average waveforms time-locked to the onset of the demonstrative (proximal vs. 
distal) for the picture stimuli with a lateral orientation of referents in Experiment 2. The 
topographic plots show the corresponding voltage differences between the two conditions, for 
100 ms time-windows. 
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Figure 11. Grand average waveforms time-locked to the onset of the demonstrative (panel A: 
proximal demonstrative; panel B: distal demonstrative) for the picture stimuli in which the 
referent was close to the speaker (black line) or relatively distal (red line), collapsed across 
Orientation. The topographic plots show the corresponding voltage differences between the two 
conditions, for 100 ms time-windows. 
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Table 5. Results of the ERP analyses time-locked to the onset of the noun in Experiment 2. 
     100-200  200-300  300-400  400-500  500-600  600-700  700-800 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Overall 
Noun x Distance x Quadrant  2.81  5.44*  2.54  2.47  1.93  < 1  1.23 
Noun x Quadrant    < 1  < 1  < 1  3.78*  20.56*** 23.17***             18.54*** 
Noun x Orientation   3.50  9.78**  8.60**  1.91  < 1  1.23  1.51 
Noun x Distance    < 1  < 1  < 1  < 1  1.79  4.82*  1.92 
Noun Main Effect   15.55**  38.37*** 62.96*** 61.98*** 21.84*** 6.49*  < 1 
 
Follow-up  
Noun Main Effect 
In LA Quadrant  5.03*  19.72*** 43.57*** 58.14*** 65.77*** 45.54*** 6.56* 
  In RA Quadrant  6.94*  21.79*** 42.13*** 54.99*** 48.37*** 25.27*** 5.91* 
  In LP Quadrant  12.48**  35.62*** 55.45*** 35.65*** 1.12  < 1  3.64 
  In RP Quadrant  18.93*** 45.24*** 64.50*** 42.30*** 1.64  < 1  1.85 
  In Vertical Midline 14.99**  37.32*** 54.41*** 51.41*** 19.05*** 6.54*  < 1 
 
  For Proximate Objects 3.66  18.35*** 29.93*** 42.58*** 20.05*** 9.27**  1.68 
  For Distal Objects 8.83**  19.42*** 60.71*** 38.77*** 6.69*  < 1  < 1 
 
  In Lateral Orientation 1.29  8.70**  13.93**  15.20**  4.13  < 1  < 1  
  In Sagittal Orientation 14.54**  38.34*** 65.02*** 41.64*** 17.77*** 6.18*  1.54 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Figure 12. Grand average waveforms time-locked to the onset of the noun (incongruent vs. congruent) 
in Experiment 2. The topographic plots show the corresponding voltage differences between the two 
conditions, for 100 ms time-windows. 
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Table 5 shows the outcome of the ERP analyses time-locked to the onset of the noun in 
Experiment 2. Similar to Experiment 1, a large N400 effect was found when comparing incongruent to 
congruent referential nouns, which started out as an effect that was larger in centro-parietal regions in 
early time-windows and was larger in anterior regions in late time-windows. The higher-order 
interaction effects denote that the effect of Noun was larger posteriorly in early time-windows and larger 
anteriorly in later time-windows, that it started slightly later when the referent was proximate compared 
to when it was distal to the speaker, and that it started slightly earlier and lasted longer when the 
referents were in sagittal orientation compared to when they were laterally oriented. Figure 12 shows the 
overall grand average waveforms and the topographic plots. 
Identical to Experiment 1, we directly compared the effect found time-locked to the 
demonstrative (as presented in Figure 9) to the congruity effect found on the noun (as presented in 
Figure 12). This analysis yielded significant Word Class x Quadrant interaction effects in the 200-300 
ms time-window, F (2,50) = 3.96, p = .022, the 500-600 ms time-window, F (2,44) = 5.45, p = .008, and 
the 600-700 ms time-window, F (2,44) = 4.76, p = .015. The early effect (200-300 ms) reflected trends 
towards a significant main effect of Word Class in both the left and right posterior quadrants (p = .054 
and .062 respectively) but not in the other quadrants. The late effects reflected significant main effects of 
Word Class in the left anterior quadrant (p = .001 and .003 in the two subsequent late time-windows), 
the right anterior quadrant (p = .011 and .010 respectively) and over the vertical midline channels (p = 
.033 and .036 respectively). These findings reflect that the demonstrative effect was slightly larger in 
anterior regions in an early time-window but smaller in later time-windows compared to the congruity 
effect on the noun. 
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Discussion 
  Experiment 2 further tested the dyad-oriented account of demonstrative reference. In Experiment 
1, it was found that participants did not prefer one demonstrative over another when a speaker referred 
to one of two objects that were oriented laterally in front of her, as indicated by an absence of a 
significant ERP difference across the auditory presentation of different demonstratives. This raised the 
question whether the bodily orientations of speaker and (implicit) addressee need to be aligned in order 
to create a notion of shared space. An alternative possibility was that the dyad-oriented account only 
holds for situations in which all possible referents are located within the shared dyadic space in between 
speaker and addressee. The findings of Experiment 2 were in line with this latter possibility. When the 
bodily orientations of speaker and participant were aligned, and the speaker referred to the object close 
to her while the other object was remote in a lateral plane, no proximal demonstrative preference was 
detected. If anything, the small negative-going main effects suggest a preference for a distal 
demonstrative for both objects in the lateral plane. Thus, these findings further specify the dyad-oriented 
account in underlining that people do indeed prefer a proximal demonstrative for referents in the shared 
space between speaker and addressee, but only if all possible referents are located within that space. In 
other words, the presence of another possible referent outside of the dyad, which introduces a lateral axis 
and as such a possible boundary between speaker and addressee, eliminates their experience of sharing 
the extra-linguistic space in between them, by creating a different division of that space. When space is 
no longer shared, addressees may prefer a distal demonstrative for all potential referents.  
 
 
General Discussion 
In two ERP experiments, participants watched images of a speaker referring to one of two 
objects while they listened to her referential speech. In order to contrast and test two theoretical accounts 
on demonstrative reference, participants’ concurrently recorded electroencephalograms were analyzed to 
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find out whether they had a preference for one demonstrative over another as a function of the proximity 
of the object-referent to the speaker and the orientation of objects in space. It was found that participants 
preferred a proximal demonstrative to all objects located in the shared space between speaker and 
addressee, but only when there was no other possible referent outside of this space. Whenever there was 
a potential referent outside of the shared space, participants either had no preference (as in Experiment 
1) or preferred a distal demonstrative (as in Experiment 2) both for referents close to the speaker as well 
as for referents distal from the speaker. The theoretical importance of these findings will now be 
discussed in the light of the theoretical views on demonstrative reference presented in the introduction. 
 The first theoretical view on demonstratives put forward was termed the egocentric proximity 
account. This view (e.g., Anderson & Keenan, 1985; Clark & Sengul, 1978; Diessel, 1999; Fillmore, 
1982; Halliday & Hasan, 1977; Lakoff, 1974; Lyons, 1977; Rauh, 1983; Russell, 1940) predicted that 
addressees would prefer a proximal demonstrative for referents physically close to the speaker and a 
distal demonstrative for referents physically remote from the speaker. Our ERP data strongly falsify this 
view on demonstrative reference and cannot be interpreted in line with it in any way, because the data 
show that participants simply did not base their online demonstrative comprehension on the referent’s 
relative proximity to the speaker. In line with the egocentric proximity account, Coventry et al. (2008) 
proposed that speakers would prefer a proximal demonstrative for referents in peripersonal space and a 
distal demonstrative for referents in extrapersonal space. Experiment 2 falsifies this proposal, in 
showing that participants may prefer a proximal demonstrative for referents in the speaker’s 
extrapersonal space. There are other theoretical and empirical arguments against the suggested parallel 
between perceptual and linguistic encoding of space (see e.g., Bonfiglioli et al., 2009; Kemmerer, 1999; 
Kirsner, 1993). As argued by Kemmerer (1999, p. 47), for instance, the mere existence of many 
languages in which there are three or more types of demonstrative shows that demonstrative systems 
need not correspond to the near-far perceptual contrast. 
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Nevertheless, the egocentric proximity view was in line with native speakers’ linguistic 
intuitions on demonstratives, as evident in the pre-tests of the current study and in linguistic judgments 
made by participants in previous studies (e.g., Stevens & Zhang, 2013). Assuming that reference 
grammars often partly or fully rely on linguistic intuitions, this may explain why the egocentric 
proximity account is omnipresent in such grammars (Diessel, 2005). However, observational (Enfield, 
2003; Hanks, 1990; Jungbluth, 2003; Piwek et al., 2008) and online processing data (this study) strongly 
suggest that such linguistic intuitions are not reliable (see Clark & Bangerter, 2004, for a similar 
argument). Although there may be instances in which speakers use demonstratives on the basis of the 
physical distance of referents, possibly when speaker and addressee sit side-by-side (Jungbluth, 2003), 
this does not imply that they are egocentric in only considering the distance of referents from their own 
physical location without taking their addressee’s location and perspective into account. Below we will 
argue in favor of a sociocentric view on reference to replace this egocentric view (cf. Clark & Bangerter, 
2004; Jungbluth, 2003; Weinrich, 1988). 
 The current ERP results are not in line with a previous EEG study on the comprehension of 
demonstratives either. Stevens and Zhang (2013) only found an ERP effect for situations in which a 
speaker referred to an object close to the addressee and speaker and addressee shared gaze at this object. 
They interpreted this effect as denoting a preference for a distal demonstrative in this situation, in line 
with participants’ linguistic intuitions. In our study we found a preference for a proximal demonstrative 
for the referent close to the addressee. One possible explanation for this discrepancy across studies may 
be that overhearing referential speech, as in Stevens and Zhang (2013), may require different processing 
mechanisms compared to being the (implicit) addressee of referential speech and gesture (see e.g., 
Schober & Clark, 1989) as in the current study. An alternative explanation for the finding in Stevens and 
Zhang (2013), and the absence of ERP effects for any other contrast in their study, may be the fact that 
their participants on every trial made congruency judgments on the relation between the auditorily 
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presented demonstrative and the visually presented image. Participants’ use of linguistic intuitions and 
the fact that they were not naïve to the goal of the experiment may have prevented a natural processing 
of the presented demonstratives.   
Our data are most in line with the dyad-oriented account of demonstrative reference (Jungbluth, 
2003; see also Weinrich, 1988, and Laury, 1996). For the stimuli with a sagittal orientation of objects, 
the dyad-oriented account exactly predicted the pattern of results we found. Indeed, irrespective of the 
proximity of the referent to the speaker, the ERP results indicate that addressees preferred a proximal 
demonstrative for the referents within the dyad. However, the dyad-oriented account cannot explain why 
participants did not prefer a proximal demonstrative for the object close to the speaker in the lateral 
orientation of objects, in both experiments. This object was located in the space in between speaker and 
participant, and did not yield a preference for a proximal demonstrative, even when the bodily 
orientations of speaker and addressee were aligned as in Experiment 2. We here propose a shared-space 
account of demonstrative reference, which can explain these findings. 
The shared-space account underlines that in human interaction physical space is transformed into 
meaningful space (Enfield, 2003, p. 88; Hanks, 1990; Kendon, 1977; 1990; 1992; Scheflen & Ashcraft, 
1976). In the case of demonstrative reference, this means that at the time of a certain referential 
utterance during a conversation, interlocutors may experience some part of the extra-linguistic space as 
being shared (somewhat similar to Enfield’s here-space), which would elicit the use of proximal 
demonstratives for referents within the shared space. Being in a face-to-face situation with an alignment 
of bodily orientations, as in a conversational dyad, the space within the dyad is likely to be experienced 
as shared (Jungbluth, 2003). However, the presence of another possible referent in the same physical 
(lateral) axis as the actual referent may create a boundary that separates speaker and addressee and as 
such eliminates the experience of sharing space, consequently leading to a preference for a distal 
demonstrative or to no particular preference at all. This lateral barrier may have been experienced as 
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more salient in Experiment 2 compared to Experiment 1, because it was orthogonal with the sagittal axis 
in the former, therefore leading to a stronger preference for a distal demonstrative for objects located on 
the lateral axis in Experiment 2. Physical boundaries may also play a role in eliminating the construal of 
shared space. In retrospect, this explains why participants in a building task reported by Clark and Krych 
(2004) used significantly more distal than proximal demonstratives in referring to their building blocks 
when there was a physical barrier in between of the two partners. Indeed, this preference decreased 
drastically when the physical barrier was removed. The shared-space account does not claim that the 
space interlocutors share can uniquely be in between of their aligned bodies. Instead, we propose that 
interlocutors in a conversation build up shared space throughout the course of a conversation, taking into 
account previous interactions and mutually shared knowledge.  
The shared-space account moves away from egocentric explanations of deixis and pleads for a 
sociocentric approach instead (cf. Clark & Bangerter, 2004; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Jungbluth, 
2003; Weinrich, 1988). It underlines that referring is a collaborative and cooperative process (Clark, 
1996; Clark & Bangerter, 2004; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) in which speakers are not blind to their 
addressees. Indeed, speakers actively take into account the location and bodily orientation of their 
addressee in interaction (Kendon, 1990). Kendon (1990; 1992) underlines that interlocutors often use 
their bodies to separate their shared space of engagement from the outside world, creating a so-called 
joint transactional segment. Özyürek (2000; 2002) showed that speakers also take into account the 
location and orientation in space of their addressees, and as such the shared space between speaker and 
addressee, when designing their co-speech representational gestures. Liddell (1995; 2000) showed that 
signers of American Sign Language take into account the location of their addressee in determining the 
orientation and direction of pronouns and indicating verb signs. Here we show that also in demonstrative 
reference the bodily orientation of speaker and addressee plays an important role and that mutual 
awareness of this is likely. As such, we follow Enfield (2003, p. 115) in arguing that all demonstratives 
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are both speaker-anchored and addressee-anchored. This also fits well with a large body of work 
indicating that in general, speakers take into account characteristics of their specific recipient or the 
specific communicative situation when designing their communicatively intended message as 
transmitted via speech (e.g., Clark, 1996; Brennan & Hanna, 2009), co-speech iconic gestures (e.g., 
Alibali, Heath, & Myers, 2001), and/or pointing gestures (e.g., Chapter 4 of this thesis).  
Demonstrative systems are often said to contain or consist of proximal and distal demonstratives 
(e.g., Diessel, 2005). However, if physical proximity or distance is not the driving force behind a 
speaker’s choice for a particular demonstrative, this terminology becomes confusing. Nevertheless, the 
terms proximal and distal hold when interpreted as referring to psychologically proximal and distal 
objects, instead of referring to physically proximal and distal objects. Referents within the shared space 
would then be psychologically proximal and referents outside of the shared space psychologically distal. 
Demonstratives may indeed fit well within a construal-level theory of psychological distance (Bar-Anan, 
Liberman, Trope, & Algom, 2007; Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & Liberman, 2010) provided that 
such a theory adopts a sociocentric approach to replace its egocentric starting point.  
The current study investigated demonstrative determiners in adnominal use. Future studies are 
needed to investigate whether the shared-space account also holds for demonstrative adverbs (here and 
there in English), in cases where demonstratives are used as pronouns and in different functions (see 
e.g., Kirsner, 1993; Levinson, 2004), and whether it plays a role in the choice of referring expression 
from the continuum between definite descriptions and zero anaphora or dropped pronouns.  
Finally, the present study confirmed a previous finding by Friedrich and Friederici (2010), who 
showed that hearing an incorrect label to a visually presented object elicits an N400 effect. Here we 
extend this finding to triadic referential situations in which speakers may correctly or incorrectly refer to 
objects in the extra-linguistic space surrounding them. The present study allowed for a descriptive 
comparison of the timing, directionality and topography of ERP effects on the demonstrative and on the 
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noun to the same visual materials. Demonstrative effects were found to take place in similar time-
windows as the ‘canonical’ N400 effects on the noun, although the latter effects were larger and lasted 
longer. Arguably this is due to the demonstrative violations being more subtle and more reversible in 
that listeners can still relatively easily derive speaker meaning independently of the type of 
demonstrative used. In addition, both the effect on the noun and the effect on the demonstrative had a 
similar negative directionality, which led us to interpret a more negative wave as reflecting a higher 
processing cost (cf. Stevens & Zhang, 2013). Finally, the effects of the demonstrative had a slightly 
more anterior topographical distribution in an early time-window, which is not uncommon for N400 
effects to picture stimuli (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011), compared to the widespread N400 effects of the 
noun. Alternatively, differences in word class (demonstrative determiner versus noun) may underlie this 
finding. A comparison of the underlying neural circuitry for demonstratives and co-referential nouns by 
using imaging techniques with a higher spatial resolution than EEG is an exciting avenue for future 
research. 
 To conclude, our study contrasted and tested two theoretical views on demonstrative reference. 
A dyad-oriented account was most but not perfectly in line with our data. We therefore proposed a 
shared-space account, which embodies a sociocentric approach to deixis and underlines that, in 
demonstrative reference, the psychological proximity of a referent may be more important than its 
physical proximity. 
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Abstract 
In everyday human communication, we often express our communicative intentions by manually 
pointing out referents in the material world around us to an addressee, often in tight synchronization 
with referential speech. The present study investigated whether and how the kinematic form of index-
finger pointing gestures is shaped by the gesturer’s communicative intentions, and how this is modulated 
by the presence of concurrently produced speech. Furthermore we explored the neural mechanisms 
underpinning the planning of communicative pointing gestures and speech. Two experiments were 
carried out in which participants pointed at referents for an addressee while the informativeness of their 
gestures and speech was varied. Kinematic and electrophysiological data were recorded online. It was 
found that participants prolonged the duration of the stroke and post-stroke hold phase of their gesture in 
order to be more communicative, in particular when the gesture was carrying the main informational 
burden in their multimodal utterance. Frontal and P300 effects in the event-related potentials suggested 
the importance of intentional and modality-independent attentional mechanisms during the planning 
phase of informative pointing gestures. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the 
complex interplay between action, attention, intention, and language in the production of pointing 
gestures, a communicative act core to human interaction. 
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Electrophysiological and kinematic correlates of communicative intent in the planning and production of 
pointing gestures and speech 
 
"... since the motions of the body are  
obvious and external while those of the  
soul are invisible and hidden"  
(Petrarch 1336/1898, p.312) 
 
Human communication in everyday life is canonically driven by a speaker's communicative 
intentions to convey meaning to an addressee, and dependent on the successful recognition of such 
intentions by that addressee (Bara, 2010; Grice, 1975; Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Ontogenetically, one of 
the first ways in which we express our communicative intent is by producing pointing gestures to the 
things around us (e.g., Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998). Such pointing gestures are a foundational 
building block of human communication (Kita, 2003) and pave the way for the acquisition of language 
(Bates, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1975; Butterworth, 2003; Csibra, 2010; Moore & D’Entremont, 2001; 
Iverson & Goldin-Meadow, 2005). Throughout life, in concert with speech, they allow us to directly 
connect our communication to the material world around us (Bangerter, 2004; Clark, 2003; Enfield, 
Kita, & De Ruiter, 2007; Kita, 2003). Cognitive models of speech and gesture production generally 
acknowledge the role of one’s communicative intentions in driving the production of co-speech gesture 
(De Ruiter, 2000; Kita & Özyürek, 2003; Melinger & Levelt, 2004; but see Krauss, Chen, & Gottesman, 
2000). Here we investigate whether and how the kinematics of pointing gestures are indeed shaped by 
one’s communicative intentions, and whether this is modulated by the presence of concurrently 
produced speech. In addition, we explore the neural and cognitive mechanisms involved in the planning 
of intentionally communicative pointing gestures and speech. To set the stage for a description of two 
experiments, we will first discuss previous research on communicative actions and intentions in general, 
and then pointing gestures and speech more specifically. 
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In everyday life, our hands and arms rarely rest. As humans, we interact with the world around 
us through manipulating and acting upon objects, and on many occasions, we do not do so just by 
ourselves but in the context of joint activities involving the presence of others (e.g., Vesper & 
Richardson, 2014). Crucially, those others have been shown to influence the way we perform 
instrumental actions (see Becchio, Manera, Sartori, Cavallo, & Castiello, 2012). For example, the 
movement kinematics of actions such as reaching for and grasping an object have been found to be 
shaped by the actor’s communicative intentions (Sartori, Becchio, Bara, & Castiello, 2009). In turn, 
observers may derive and anticipate the actor’s intentions by attuning to such subtle kinematic 
parameters in the actor’s movement (Sartori, Becchio, & Castiello, 2011). Research in the domain of 
(representational) co-speech hand gestures (e.g., Özyürek, 2002; see also Gerwing & Bavelas, 2004; 
Holler & Stevens, 2007) and interpersonal signaling in communicative actions more broadly (Vesper & 
Richardson, 2014) suggest that the close link between action and intention may not be restricted to 
instrumental or representational actions (see Pierno, Tubaldi, Turella, Grossi, Barachino, et al., 2009). 
Preliminary indications indeed suggest a relation between the kinematics of pointing gestures and the 
speaker-gesturer’s communicative intent (Cleret de Langavant, Remy, Trinkler, McIntyre, Dupoux et 
al., 2011; Enfield et al., 2007). The fieldwork by Enfield and colleagues (2007), for instance, suggests 
that the size of a pointing gesture may depend on whether it is intended to carry informationally 
foregrounded or backgrounded information in the speaker's utterance. However, whether, and if so how, 
the kinematics of pointing gestures, like instrumental actions, are shaped by context-specific 
communicative intentions remains largely unclear. 
Pointing gestures often come with concurrent deictic speech such as spatial demonstratives (e.g., 
“this” and “that” in English). Speech and gesture are temporally tightly interconnected in the production 
of referring expressions (e.g., Chu & Hagoort, 2014; Kendon, 2004; Levelt, Richardson, & La Heij, 
1985; McNeill, 1992) and can be used independently or simultaneously to single out a referent 
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(Bangerter, 2004), i.e. an object, person, or event on which one wishes to focus the attention of one's 
addressee by referring to it. Previous work has investigated whether the presence of speech as a second 
modality changes the kinematics of a corresponding gesture. Chieffi, Secchi, and Gentilucci (2009) 
found no kinematic difference between a condition in which participants manually pointed to a remote 
referent and a condition in which they did the same but also concomitantly produced congruent deictic 
speech (‘there’). In contrast, Gonseth, Vilain, and Vilain (2013) found that pointing gestures produced 
without corresponding speech had a lower velocity and a longer post-stroke hold phase compared to 
when deictic speech was concomitantly produced. This discrepancy in findings asks for further 
investigation.  
The current study also aims to advance our understanding of the neural mechanisms involved in 
the planning and production of pointing gestures. Both in infants and adults, frontal markers of neuronal 
activity have been identified as being involved in the production of pointing gestures establishing a joint, 
interpersonal focus of attention on a referent (Cleret de Langavant et al., 2011; Henderson, Yoder, Yale, 
& McDuffie, 2002; Mundy, Card, & Fox, 2000). This frontal activation has been interpreted as 
reflecting the involvement of intention-related ‘mentalizing’ networks (e.g., Brunetti, Zappasodi, 
Marzetti, Perrucci, Cirillo, et al., 2014). Using magnetoencephalography (MEG), Brunetti et al. (2014) 
found enhanced activity in dorsal regions of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC – in medial frontal 
cortex) for declarative pointing (“pointing to share attention to an object - interpersonal”, in their 
manipulation) compared to imperative pointing (“pointing to request an object - instrumental” in their 
manipulation), and argue that this difference reflects enhanced mentalizing activity. Central to the 
difference between the two conditions is the explicit assumption that imperative pointing has only an 
instrumental purpose. This is problematic though, because arguably also in imperative pointing the 
person gesturing considers her addressee as a mental, intentional agent when requesting an object by 
pointing (see Southgate, Van Maanen, & Csibra, 2007). Therefore in the current study we compare two 
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situations that are both communicative and differ only in the communicative intent of the speaker-
gesturer. Furthermore, it is an open question whether also other (e.g., attentional) neuronal mechanisms 
are involved in the planning and production of communicative pointing, and whether (and if so, how) 
the presence of concomitantly produced speech interacts with possible intentional and attentional 
mechanisms involved.  
In the current study, we adapted a paradigm introduced by Levelt et al. (1985) in which 
participants produce pointing gestures in an experimental setting (see also Chu & Hagoort, 2014; De 
Ruiter, 1998). In our manipulation, participants were asked to point with their index-finger at one of four 
circles that lit up on a screen with or without producing concurrent speech. Index-finger kinematics, 
speech, and electroencephalogram (EEG) were continuously recorded. Crucially, as a proxy of the 
participants’ communicative intent in the current study, we manipulated the informativeness of the 
pointing gestures. The notion of informativeness has been used successfully in previous studies to tap 
into communicative intentions involved in speech production (e.g., Willems, De Boer, De Ruiter, 
Noordzij, Hagoort, & Toni, 2010). Everyday pointing gestures canonically occur in a context in which 
interlocutors share a joint attentional frame in which one person directs the attention of another person 
towards a location, event, or other entity in the perceptual environment, usually precisely to be 
informative about these referents (Tomasello et al., 2007). In the current study, in line with findings on 
communicative actions more broadly (Vesper & Richardson, 2014), participants may alter the kinematic 
properties of their movements in order to make them more informative, for instance by slowing down 
the movements. Alternatively, different intentions may lead to different patterns of neural activity (see 
below), but lack behavioral consequences as reflected in the kinematic properties of the pointing 
movements (cf. Brunetti et al., 2014). 
The current approach allows for time-locking event-related potentials (ERPs) not only to the 
onset of the gesture, but also to the presentation of the stimulus/referent. Several effects can be predicted 
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on the basis of previous work. Potential frontal effects in the current study may reflect participants’ 
communicative intentions in planning their pointing gestures (cf. Brunetti et al., 2014; Cleret de 
Langavant et al., 2011; Henderson et al., 2002). Furthermore, upon the intention to produce a more 
informative gesture, participants may allocate more attentional resources to the task. P3b amplitude may 
be modulated by task-related cognitive demands that drive attentional resource allocation, such that its 
amplitude is smaller when a task requires greater amounts of attentional resources (Polich, 2007), in 
particular when attentional resource allocation is under voluntary control and perceptual quality of the 
stimuli does not differ across conditions (Kok, 2001), as in our set-up. Smaller amplitude of the 
stimulus-locked P3b in our study may therefore index that participants voluntarily allocate more 
attentional resources when planning a more informative gesture for their addressee. A final possibility is 
that the readiness potential (or ‘Bereitschaftspotential’; Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965) is sensitive to our 
manipulation of communicative intent, which would be marked directly preceding the onset of the 
pointing gesture’s execution as measured over contra-lateral, central electrode sites. Hence, in addition 
to investigating the effects of communicative intent on pointing gesture production, we also consider 
specific ERP components during the course of planning informative pointing gestures, including the 
P3b. 
We present two experiments that aim to further our understanding of the basic human 
communicative act of producing pointing gestures to a visible referent. On the basis of the theoretical 
considerations outlined above, Experiment 1 investigates i) whether and how communicative intentions 
shape the kinematic properties of manual pointing gestures, ii) whether and how this is modulated by the 
presence of speech as a second modality, and iii) the neural mechanisms underlying the communicative 
intent involved in planning pointing gestures and speech. In everyday multi-modal referential 
communicative acts, the informational burden can be distributed differentially over the spoken and 
gestural modalities (e.g., Enfield et al., 2007). Therefore, Experiment 2 tests to what extent the 
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kinematic and electrophysiological findings obtained in Experiment 1 are modality-independent, i.e. 
whether they generalize to situations in which speech, rather than gesture, carries the informational 
burden in identifying a referent for an addressee in a multimodal utterance. 
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four native speakers of Dutch (12 female; mean age 20.6), studying at Radboud 
University Nijmegen, participated in the experiment. They were all right-handed as assessed by a Dutch 
translation of the Edinburgh Inventory for hand dominance (Oldfield, 1971). Data from two additional 
participants were discarded due to a large number of trials that contained movement artifacts. 
Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no language or hearing impairments or history of 
neurological disease. They provided written informed consent and were paid 20€ for participation. 
 
Experimental Design and Set-up 
Participants were seated at a distance of 100 cm from a computer screen that was placed back-to-
back with another computer screen (henceforth: the back screen). Stimuli were four white circles in a 
horizontal line on the top of the screen the participant viewed, mirroring four circles on the back screen. 
The circles could light up in either blue or yellow. A second participant (a confederate; henceforth: the 
addressee) looked at the back screen and the participant’s pointing gesture via a camera. Figure 1 shows 
the addressee’s view via the camera (converted to a grayscale image). On all trials, participants referred 
to the circle that lit up. The addressee noted on a paper form which of the four circles the participant 
referred to on each trial (in speech and/or gesture). In order to make the deictic act more informative in 
one case but less informative in the other, the following set-up was used. In both conditions, via a 
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camera, the addressee observed the pointing gesture of the participant, as well as the circles on the back 
screen providing the corresponding view of the four circles the participant was seeing. This way, the 
addressee saw which of the four circles the participant pointed at. Before the arrival of the addressee, the 
experimenter showed the participant the computer to be used by the addressee and demonstrated that the 
addressee could see the participant’s pointing gestures referring to circles on the computer screen. In this 
way, the participant knew that the addressee would look at the participant's gestures and to the circles 
presented on the back screen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Left panel: A participant pointing at a circle while EEG, motion tracking kinematics, and 
speech were continuously recorded. Right panel: The addressee's view of the back screen and the 
pointing participant during a less informative trial. 
 
We manipulated the informativeness of the gesture (More Informative versus Less Informative) 
as well as the modality of the deictic act (Gesture-only versus Gesture + Speech) in a 2x2 within 
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participants design. In the more informative condition, a circle turned blue or yellow only on the 
participant’s screen but not on the back screen. Therefore the participant’s pointing gesture was the only 
source of information on which the addressee could base his/her decision in selecting the circle referred 
to by the participant. In the less informative condition, the respective circle would light up on both the 
participant’s and the addressee’s screen. Thus, the participant’s pointing gesture was less informative, 
because the addressee saw the respective circle light up on the back screen at the same moment as the 
participant saw the corresponding circle light up (i.e., even before the onset of the participant’s pointing 
gesture and/or speech). The participant received written instructions on the screen before each block, 
specifying whether during that block the addressee would or would not also see circles light up during 
that block. We decided to not have the addressee give feedback to the participant during the experiment 
and keep the gesturer’s head out of the camera's shot to avoid differences in feedback across conditions 
and participants (cf. Campisi & Özyürek, 2014; Holler & Wilkin, 2011) and control for the deictic 
function of eye gaze. 
The modality factor was manipulated by having participants use either one or two modalities in 
referring to the circles. In gesture only blocks (G-only), participants pointed to a circle when it turned 
blue or yellow without producing speech. In gesture + speech blocks (G+S) participants pointed to the 
circle and said either die blauwe cirkel (“that blue circle”) or die gele cirkel (“that yellow circle”), 
depending on the color of the circle. Note that, because any of the four circles could turn blue or yellow 
on any trial, the speech, which only ever referred to color but never to location, was never informative 
(neither in the more informative nor the less informative blocks) in this Experiment. The rationale for 
this was that we were interested in the possible effect of the mere presence of speech as a second 
modality, in addition to the informativeness of the deictic act that was manipulated separately in the 
gesture. Figure 2 gives an overview of the manipulation. 
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Figure 2. Overview of the design of the Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Each trial started with a fixation cross, displayed for 500 ms, followed by the presentation of four 
white circles. After a jittered period of 500-1000 ms, one of the circles turned yellow or blue. At this 
point, the participant was allowed to release her finger from a button, pointed to the blue or yellow 
circle, and (in the G+S blocks), in speech, referred to the color of the circle. The experiment consisted of 
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16 blocks of 20 trials each. Every condition in the experiment was represented by four blocks. The order 
of presentation of blocks was counterbalanced across participants. In half of the trials a circle lit up 
yellow, in the other half it lit up blue. Each block of 20 trials consisted of ten circles lighting up yellow 
and ten lighting up blue, equally distributed over the four circles and the four conditions throughout the 
experiment, in a randomized way.  
 
Procedure 
On arrival of the participant, the experimenter explained that a second participant (i.e., the 
confederate addressee) would perform a behavioral task on the basis of the participant’s gestures. The 
experimenter showed the participant the computer and form to be used by the addressee and 
demonstrated that the addressee could view the participant’s pointing gestures referring to circles on the 
computer screen.  
 In order to keep participants motivated, it was emphasized that they were in a joint activity with 
the addressee and that the success of this joint activity depended on how well they worked together. The 
participant was then seated in a comfortable chair in the experiment room. The height of the screen was 
adjusted to the height of the eyes of the participant. The button used by the participant was placed at the 
height of the participant’s elbow, 23 cm in front of the participant calculated from the vertical axis 
corresponding to the position of the participant’s eyes. Participants were instructed to always rest their 
finger on this button, except when making the pointing gesture, which allowed calculating the duration 
and onset of the pointing gesture. An active, wireless sensor was placed on the participant’s right index 
finger nail to allow for motion tracking of the pointing movements. Participants’ electroencephalogram 
(EEG) was recorded continuously throughout the experiment (see below).  
After montage of the motion tracking sensor the experimenter picked up the confederate 
addressee. The addressee was shown the room in which the participant performed the task, greeted the 
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participant, and was seated in a chair in front of a computer in a room adjacent to the participant’s room. 
Thirty-two test-items (eight per condition) preceded the main experiment as a practice set. Participants 
received specific instructions to point with or without speech before each block. In addition, before each 
block, the participant was instructed whether the addressee could also see the same circles light up at the 
back screen or not during that block. Participants were asked to only move their hand and arm when 
pointing. During the experiment, participants were allowed to have a short break after every fourth 
block. Before and during the experiment, the communication between experimenter and addressee was 
minimal and fully scripted, in order to be consistent across participants. The addressee provided no 
feedback to the participant during the experiment. After the experiment, the addressee was thanked for 
participation and left the room. After filling out a post-test questionnaire, participants were debriefed, 
financially compensated, and thanked for participation. The results of the post-test questionnaire 
revealed that all participants thought the confederate addressee was another (naive) participant who 
performed well on his task. 
 
Kinematic and speech recording and analysis 
Behavioral and kinematic data were acquired throughout the experiment using experimental 
software (Presentation, Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc) and a 60 Hz motion tracking system and 
DTrack2 tracking software (both Advanced Realtime Tracking, Weilheim, Germany). In line with 
previous work (Chu & Hagoort, 2014; Levelt et al., 1985) we focused on different kinematic aspects of 
the pointing movements, including the gesture initiation time, the stroke duration, the apex time, the 
hold duration, the incremental distance traveled by the pointing finger, and the velocity of the 
movement. Praat software (version 5.2.46; Boersma & Weenink, 2009) was used to calculate offline the 
speech duration, and the maximum loudness and mean loudness of speech. Table 1 gives an overview of 
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how the kinematic and speech-related dependent variables were defined and calculated (cf. Chu & 
Hagoort, 2014; Levelt et al., 1985).  
 
Electrophysiological recording and analysis 
Throughout the experiment, the participant’s electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded 
continuously from 59 active electrodes (Brain Products, Munich, Germany) held in place on the scalp by 
an elastic cap (Neuroscan, Singen, Germany). In addition to the 59 scalp sites, three external electrodes 
were attached to record participants electrooculogram (EOG), one below the left eye (to monitor for 
vertical eye movement/blinks), and two on the lateral canthi next to the left and right eye (to monitor for 
horizontal eye movements). Finally, one electrode was placed over the left mastoid bone and one over 
the right mastoid bone. All electrode impedances were kept below 20 KΩ.  The continuous EEG was 
recorded with a sampling rate of 500 Hz, a low cut-off filter of 0.01 Hz and a high cut-off filter of 200 
Hz. EEG was filtered offline (high-pass at 0.01 Hz and low-pass at 40 Hz). All electrode sites were 
referenced online to the electrode placed over the left mastoid and re-referenced offline to the average of 
the right and left mastoids. 
Markers were sent from the computer presenting the stimuli to the computer recording the EEG, 
at light onset and at gesture initiation. Using Brain Vision Analyzer software (Brain Products, Munich, 
Germany), event-related potentials (ERPs) were time-locked to light onset (i.e., stimulus-locked) and to 
gesture initiation (i.e., the onset of the pointing gesture; henceforth called “gesture-locked”). In the 
stimulus-locked ERPs, the 100 ms pre-stimulus period was used as a baseline. In the gesture-locked 
ERPs, the period 700 to 600 ms before gesture initiation was used as a baseline, because this time-
window reliably preceded stimulus onset (see Gesture Initiation Time in Table 2), such that the gesture-
locked ERP would globally reflect the time between stimulus onset and gesture initiation. Note that in 
both the stimulus-locked and the gesture-locked ERPs we thus look at the activity preceding the onset of   
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Table 1. Definition of the (behavioral) kinematic and speech-related dependent variables in Experiments 1 and 2, as calculated for each 
experimental trial. 
 
Variable   Definition   
 
Kinematic Dependent Variables 
Gesture Initiation Time (ms) Gesture Onset – Light Onset 
Stroke Duration (ms)  Gesture Apex – Gesture Onset 
Apex Time (ms)  Gesture Apex – Light Onset 
Hold Duration (ms)  Retraction Time – Gesture Apex 
Incremental Distance (cm) The amount of distance travelled by the pointing index-finger between Gesture Onset and Gesture Apex 
Velocity (cm/s)  Apex Time / Incremental Distance 
 
Speech-related Dependent Variables 
Speech Duration (ms)  Speech Offset – Speech Onset 
Speech Onset Time (ms) Speech Onset – Light Onset 
Synchronization Time (ms) Speech Onset Time – Apex Time 
Maximum Loudness (db) The maximum loudness of speech during an utterance 
Mean Loudness (db)  The average loudness of speech across an utterance 
 
Other variables used in calculations above 
Light Onset   The moment in time a circle lit up 
Gesture Onset   The moment in time the participant’s finger left the button in order to point 
Gesture Apex   The moment in time where the pointing index-finger was at least 7 cm from the button and moved forward  
    only less than 2 mm for two consecutive samples 
Speech Onset   The moment in time the participant started speaking 
Speech OffSet   The moment in time the participant stopped speaking 
Retraction Time  The moment in time where the pointing index-finger moved back in the direction of the button for at least 2 
    mm in two consecutive samples 
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the gesture. Trials containing muscular artifacts were removed from further analysis (5.5% of the total 
stimulus-locked dataset; 13.7% of the total gesture-locked dataset). The amount of removed trials was 
similar across the different levels of the Informativeness and Modality factors. Subsequently, ICA was 
used to correct for ocular artifacts (extended infomax procedure, cf. Lee, Girolami, & Sejnowski, 1999). 
The mean amplitudes of the ERP waveforms for each condition per subject were entered into repeated 
measures ANOVAs in a time-window analysis of 100-ms time windows after stimulus onset (0-400 ms) 
or before gesture initiation (-600 ms until gesture onset) respectively. A subset of five regions of interest 
was selected for the analyses (see Figure 3) based on previous, related work outlined in the Introduction. 
An anterior ROI was selected on the basis of the findings in Henderson et al. (2002). A potential 
modulation of the readiness potential as a function of our Informativeness manipulation would be 
reflected in an effect over left central but not right central electrode sites because all participants were 
right-handed and pointing with their right index-finger. Therefore a left middle and a right middle ROI 
were selected. Finally, a possible P300 (P3b) effect would occur in posterior electrode sites, possibly 
right-lateralized (Polich, 2007), which led to the selection of a left posterior and a right posterior ROI. In 
sum, the ERP analyses thus contained the independent variables Informativeness (More Informative 
versus Less Informative), Modality (Gesture-only versus Gesture+Speech), and Region of Interest (ROI: 
Anterior, Left Middle, Right Middle, Left Posterior, Right Posterior). The Greenhouse and Geisser 
(1959) correction was applied when appropriate. Corrected degrees of freedom are reported. 
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Figure 3. Electrode montage. Five regions of interest were used in the analysis of the 
electrophysiological data: anterior (A), left middle (LM), right middle (RM), left posterior (LP), and 
right posterior (RP).  
 
Results 
Behavioral Results 
Trials on which the Gesture Initiation Time was below 100 ms or above 2000 ms were 
considered errors and excluded from all analyses (0.7% of total dataset). In addition, trials containing 
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hesitations or errors in the participant’s speech were removed from further analyses (0.2% of all data). 
Separate analyses of variance were performed for each dependent variable with Informativeness (More 
Informative versus Less Informative) and Modality (Gesture-only versus Gesture + Speech) as within-
subject factors. The analyses performed on the Gesture Initiation Time and the Incremental Distance did 
not yield any significant main or interaction effects (all p’s >.05). 
The analysis of the Stroke Duration yielded a significant main effect of Informativeness, F (1,23) 
= 10.97, p = .003, p
2
 = .32. This effect reflected that the duration of the stroke was significantly longer 
in the More Informative condition (M = 837 ms) than in the Less Informative condition (M = 823 ms). 
No significant main effect of Modality was found. There was no significant interaction between the two 
factors.  
The analysis of the Apex Time showed a significant main effect of Informativeness, F (1,23) = 
8.15, p = .009, p
2
 = .26. This effect denoted that the apex was reached significantly later in the More 
Informative condition (M = 1379 ms) than in the Less Informative condition (M = 1359 ms). No 
significant main effect of Modality was found. There was no significant interaction between the two 
factors.  
The analysis on the mean Velocity yielded a significant main effect of Informativeness, F (1,23) 
= 5.75, p = .025, p
2
 = .20. The velocity of the pointing gesture was significantly lower in the More 
Informative condition (M = 38.2 cm/s) than in the Less Informative condition (M = 38.7 cm/s). Again, 
no significant main effect of Modality or interaction between the two factors was found.  
The analysis performed on the Hold Duration yielded a significant main effect of 
Informativeness, F (1,23) = 10.17, p = .004, p
2
 = .31. The Hold Duration was significantly longer in the 
More Informative condition (M = 1235 ms) compared to the Less Informative condition (M = 1143 ms). 
No significant main effect of Modality was found and there was no significant interaction between the 
two factors.  
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An analysis on the Speech Onset Time (G+S conditions only) revealed a significant main effect 
of Informativeness, F (1,23) = 6.79, p = .016, p
2
 = .23. This effect reflected that the speech onset on 
average took place significantly later in the More Informative condition (M = 1385 ms) than in the Less 
Informative condition (M = 1351 ms).  
Finally, an analysis on the Synchronization Time in the G+S conditions did not show a 
significant main effect of Informativeness (p = .16), indicating that the onset of the speech and the apex 
of the gesture were aligned similarly across conditions and independently from the informativeness of 
the gesture. The Maximum Loudness and Mean Loudness of the speech did not differ significantly 
across Informativeness, nor did the Speech Duration (all p’s >.05).  
In sum, participants prolonged the duration of the stroke and the hold-phase of their pointing 
gesture in order to be more informative, which led to a gesture with a lower velocity and delayed the 
moment at which the apex was reached. Table 2 summarizes all behavioral results from Experiment 1.  
 
Electrophysiological results 
Trials defined as errors or outliers in the behavioral analyses were also excluded from the ERP 
analyses. Separate ERPs were computed for each condition in the experiment. By-participant analyses 
(both stimulus-locked and gesture-locked) were performed with Informativeness, Modality, and ROI as 
independent variables. Only significant effects at the 5% level are reported, unless explicitly stated 
otherwise. 
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Table 2. Overview of the behavioral results per condition in Experiment 1. Duration in ms is displayed for Gesture Initiation Time (GIT), 
Stroke Duration (Stroke), Apex Time (Apex), Hold Duration (Hold), Speech Duration (SpeechDur), Speech Onset Time (SOT), and 
Synchronization Time (Sync). Further, the Incremental Distance in cm (Dist), Velocity in cm/s (Velocity), and the maximum and mean 
loudness of the speech (Max_Loudness and Mean_Loudness) in db are provided. The standard error of the mean is indicated between 
parentheses. An asterisk next to a variable’s name indicates a significant main effect of Informativeness in the analysis. 
 
Condition  GIT  Stroke* Apex*  Dist Velocity*  Hold*   
 
More Informative 
Gesture-only  534 (21) 834 (30)     1368 (42)    51 (1)   38.5 (1)        1252 (135)           
Gesture + Speech 550 (22) 840 (27)     1389 (39)    51 (1)   37.8 (1)       1219 (121)        
    
Less Informative 
Gesture-only  532 (22)     819 (29)     1351 (41)    51 (1)   39.0 (1)        1138 (116)         
Gesture + Speech 541 (24)     826 (27)     1367 (40)    51 (1)   38.5 (1)        1149 (106)       
 
 
 
Condition  SpeechDur SOT*  Sync  Max_Loudness Mean_Loudness  
 
More Informative 
Gesture-only      
Gesture + Speech 1167 (35) 1385 (65)     4 (54)     82.0 (1)  70.8 (1) 
    
Less Informative 
Gesture-only             
Gesture + Speech 1155 (36) 1351 (66)     16 (54) 82.2 (1)  70.8 (1) 
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Stimulus-locked analysis. The omnibus stimulus-locked analysis firstly revealed a significant 
Informativeness x ROI interaction effect in time-windows 200-300 ms, F (2,52) = 4.58, p = .012, p
2
 = 
.17, and 300-400 ms, F (2,45) = 3.39, p = .044, p
2
 = .13 after stimulus onset. Follow-up analyses 
showed a significant main effect of Informativeness in the 300-400 ms time-window in the right 
posterior ROI only, F (1,23) = 5.53, p = .028, p
2
 = .19. This effect reflected a significantly more 
positive ERP wave for the More Informative condition compared to the Less Informative condition. We 
will refer to this effect as a P300 or P3b effect (cf. Polich, 2007). There was a trend towards a similar 
effect of Informativeness in the 200-300 ms time-window in the right posterior ROI, F (1,23) = 3.14, p = 
.090, p
2
 = .12. 
Second, the omnibus analysis revealed a significant main effect of Modality in the 100-200 ms 
time-window, F (1,23) = 6.27, p = .020, p
2
 = .21, the 200-300 ms time-window, F (1,23) = 4.77, p = 
.039, p
2
 = .17, and the 300-400 ms time-window, F (1,23) = 11.17, p = .003, p
2
 = .33. These main 
effects of Modality reflected a significantly more positive ERP wave for the Gesture+Speech condition 
compared to the Gesture-only condition. No Informativeness x Modality interaction effect was found in 
any time-window (all F’s ≤ 1). Figure 4 graphically presents the stimulus-locked ERP results.    
 
  Gesture-locked analysis. The omnibus analysis locked to the onset of the gesture revealed a 
significant Informativeness x ROI interaction effect in the -100-0 ms time-window, i.e. directly 
preceding gesture initiation, F (3,66) = 6.09, p = .001, p
2
 = .21. Follow-up analyses yielded a 
significant main effect of Informativeness in this time-window in the anterior ROI only, F (1,23) = 5.03, 
p = .035, p
2
 = .18. This effect reflected a significantly more negative ERP-wave for the Less 
Informative condition compared to the More Informative condition (see Figure 5). We will refer to this 
effect as a frontal marker of informativeness / communicative intent. No such effect was found in any 
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other ROI (all F’s ≤ 1). No main effect of Modality or Informativeness x Modality interaction effects 
were found (all F’s < 1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Grand average waveforms and topographic plots corresponding to the voltage difference 
between conditions in subsequent time-windows in the stimulus-locked ERP analysis in Experiment 1 for 
A) The main effect of Informativeness (collapsed over Modality) and B) the main effect of Modality 
(collapsed over Informativeness).The electrode site used for the waveforms is indicated in the 
corresponding topographic plots.    
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Figure 5. Top panel: Grand average waveforms and topographic plot corresponding to the voltage 
difference between conditions for the main effect of Informativeness (collapsed over Modality) in the 
gesture-locked ERP analysis in Experiment 1 in the time-window directly preceding gesture initiation in 
the anterior column. Bottom panel: The readiness potential and its locus over the scalp across all 
gesture-locked trials. The electrode site used for the waveforms is indicated in the topographic plots.     
 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 revealed behavioral and electrophysiological correlates of communicative intent in 
the planning and production of index-finger pointing gestures.  
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Behaviorally, participants prolonged the duration of the stroke of their pointing gesture in order 
to be more informative, which led to a gesture with a lower velocity and delayed the moment at which 
the apex was reached. In addition, the post-stroke hold-phase of the gesture was maintained for longer. 
The kinematic properties of participants’ pointing gestures were not affected by the concurrent 
production of speech (in line with Chieffi et al., 2009) and similar kinematic effects of communicative 
intent were found in situations where people only used gesture to communicate compared to situations 
where speech and gesture were simultaneously produced. In addition, participants temporally aligned the 
onset of their deictic linguistic expression with the moment the pointing gesture reached its apex, 
regardless of whether the gesture was more or less informative. No effect of participants’ 
communicative intentions was found in the quality of the (largely informationally redundant) speech 
itself. We will discuss the theoretical implications of these findings in the General Discussion. 
Neurophysiologically, the stimulus-locked ERPs showed a (parietal) P3b effect with smaller 
amplitude for the more informative condition, independent of modality. As outlined in the Introduction, 
P3b amplitude may be modulated by task-related cognitive demands that drive attentional resource 
allocation, such that its amplitude is smaller when a task requires greater amounts of attentional 
resources (Polich, 2007). Smaller amplitude of the stimulus-locked P3b in the more informative 
condition may therefore reflect that participants voluntarily allocated more attentional resources when 
planning a more informative gesture for their addressee. Furthermore, the gesture-locked waveforms 
showed a frontal marker of communicative intent directly preceding the onset of the pointing movement. 
As shown in Figure 5, they resembled the readiness potential (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965), but had a 
clearly different distribution over the scalp (i.e., more anterior and less lateralized). The frontal locus of 
this effect is reminiscent of the locus of electrophysiological findings in infant studies tapping into 
developing joint attentional mechanisms related to pointing in infancy (e.g., Henderson et al., 2002). 
More generally, in the planning and production of pointing gestures, frontal effects have been 
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interpreted as reflecting the involvement of intention-related ‘mentalizing’ networks (e.g., Brunetti et al., 
2014). Our effect modulating the readiness potential (see Figure 5) thus suggests an interaction between 
planning a motor program and activation of the mentalizing network (Amodio & Frith, 2006).  
It is an open question to what extent the kinematic and electrophysiological findings obtained in 
Experiment 1 are specific to situations in which the gesture is carrying the main informational burden in 
a multimodal speech act. It is possible that whenever speech itself is informative enough to single out a 
referent, people no longer design the kinematics of their concomitant gesture to be maximally 
informative (Bangerter, 2004; Cooperrider, 2011; see also Enfield, Kita, & De Ruiter, 2007), although 
they may still have a similar communicative intention. We tested this possibility in a second experiment, 
presented below, in which participants crucially had to refer to the color of the circle that lit up, and the 
addressee's task was to note down the color of the circle. Because the color and not the location of the 
circle was now the important aspect of the stimulus, in this case the speech modality and not the gestural 
modality carried the informational burden. This manipulation thus allowed us to investigate whether the 
extent to which people modify the kinematic characteristics of their pointing gesture on the basis of their 
communicative intentions is dependent on how they distribute the informational burden over two 
modalities (speech and gesture). In Experiment 2, therefore, the informativeness of the deictic act was 
thus manipulated in the speech modality, which was either paired with a redundant pointing gesture 
(bimodal condition) or not (unimodal condition).  
Furthermore, Experiment 2 will show whether the intentional and attentional neurophysiological 
markers that we found in Experiment 1 are specific to cases where pointing gestures carry the main 
informational burden or whether they are modality-independent instead. A frontal speech-locked ERP 
effect of Informativeness may suggest a common intention-related mechanism in the planning of both 
referential gesture and speech. Moreover, if the stimulus-locked P3b effect indeed reflects (voluntary) 
attentional resource allocation, it will be independent of whether participants' task is to refer to the 
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spatial location (as in Experiment 1) or color (as in Experiment 2) of the entity they point at and attend 
to.  
 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four new participants (12 female; mean age 21.7) matching the criteria from Experiment 
1 took part in Experiment 2. Data from six additional participants were obtained but had to be discarded 
due to technical failure during the experiment or due to the presence of a large number of trials that 
contained movement artifacts. All participants provided written informed consent and were paid 20€ for 
participation. 
 
Experimental Design and Set-up 
Similar to Experiment 1, stimuli were four white circles in a horizontal line on the top of the 
screen, mirroring four circles on the back screen. Each circle could light up in blue or yellow. Again, the 
addressee (the same confederate as in Experiment 1) looked at the back screen (providing the 
corresponding view of the four circles the participant was seeing) and the actual participant via a 
camera. On all trials, participants referred to the circle that lit up. In contrast with Experiment 1, the 
addressee noted on a paper form the color of the circle that lit up (and not the location). In addition, the 
addressee listened to the participant’s speech via speakers in the addressee’s room. 
The informativeness of the speech (More Informative versus Less Informative) as well as the 
modality of the deictic act (Speech-only versus Gesture + Speech) were manipulated in a 2x2 within 
participants design. In the More Informative condition, a circle turned blue or yellow only on the 
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participants’ screen but not on the back screen. In order to make the pointing gesture in the Speech + 
Gesture condition redundant, the location of the circle that lit up was marked by a cross in the More 
Informative condition on the back screen only (see Figure 2). The participant’s speech was the only 
source of information on which the addressee had to base his decision in determining the color of the 
circle referred to by the participant. In the Less Informative condition, the corresponding circles would 
light up on both the participant’s and the addressee’s screen. This rendered the participant’s speech less 
informative in this condition, because the addressee saw the respective circle light up in either blue or 
yellow on the back screen at the same moment as the participant saw the corresponding, same color 
circle light up.  
The modality factor was manipulated by having participants use either one or two modalities in 
referring to the circles. In speech only blocks (S-only), when a circle lit up participants said de blauwe 
cirkel (“the blue circle”) or de gele cirkel (“the yellow circle”), depending on the color of the circle, 
without producing a pointing gesture. In Gesture + Speech blocks (G+S) participants uttered the same 
phrase but now also produced an index-finger pointing gesture towards the location of the circle that lit 
up. Note that, because on all trials the location of the circle was known by the addressee and because the 
location of the circle was irrelevant for the task performed by the addressee in Experiment 2, the gesture 
was never informative (neither in the More Informative nor in the Less Informative blocks). The 
rationale for this was that we were interested in the possible effect of the mere presence of gesture as a 
second modality, independently from the informativeness of the deictic act that was manipulated 
separately in the speech modality. The trial structure was the same as in Experiment 1. 
 
Procedure 
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The experimental procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. Again, the results of the post-test 
questionnaire revealed that all participants thought the confederate addressee was another (naive) 
participant who performed well on his task. 
 
Kinematic, electrophysiological, and speech recordings 
 The kinematic, electrophysiological, and speech recordings were done similarly to Experiment 1. 
EEG was recorded continuously and ERPs were time-locked separately to light onset (i.e., stimulus-
locked), gesture initiation (in the G+S blocks; “gesture-locked”), and voice onset (in the S-only blocks; 
“speech-locked”). The stimulus-locked preprocessing and ERP analyses were the same as in Experiment 
1. The gesture-locked analysis was also the same as in Experiment 1 except for the absence of the 
Modality factor due to gesture being produced only in G+S blocks in this experiment. An additional 
analysis in 100-ms time-windows preceding the speech was carried out on ERPs time-locked to speech 
onset during S-only blocks. Separate analyses were carried out for 100-ms time-windows during the 900 
ms preceding speech onset. The 1000 ms to 900 ms time-window preceding speech onset was used as a 
baseline period, because this time-window reliably preceded speech onset time in the S-only blocks 
(regardless of Informativeness). Trials containing muscular artifacts were removed from further analysis 
(7.4% of the total stimulus-locked dataset; 17.1% of the total gesture-locked dataset; 8.2% of the total 
speech-locked dataset). The amount of removed trials was similar across the different levels of 
Informativeness and Modality. Inspection of the EEG data confirmed that it was not feasible to further 
look into speech-locked ERPs in the G+S blocks due to the concurrent pointing gesture creating 
movement artifacts prior to speech onset (gesture onset systematically preceded voice onset).  
 
Results 
Behavioral Results 
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Trials on which the Gesture Initiation Time or the Speech Onset Time was below 100 ms or 
above 2000 ms were considered errors and excluded from all analyses (0.5% of total dataset). In 
addition, trials containing hesitations or errors in the participant’s speech were removed from further 
analysis (0.3% of all data).  
First, separate analyses of variance were performed on the Speech Duration and the Speech 
Onset Time with Informativeness (More Informative versus Less Informative) and Modality (Speech-
only or Gesture+Speech) as within-subject factors. The analysis of the Speech Onset Time revealed a 
significant main effect of Modality, F (1,23) = 87.49, p = .001, p
2
 = .79, with the speech onset being 
significantly later in the G+S condition (M = 976 ms) compared to the S-only condition (M = 706 ms). 
The analysis of the Speech Duration yielded a significant main effect of Modality, F (1,23) = 5.74, p = 
.025, p
2
 = .20 driven by the speech duration being significantly longer in the G+S condition (M = 1111 
ms) compared to the S-only condition (M = 1095 ms).  
Both the analysis of the Maximum Loudness of the speech and the analysis of the Mean 
Loudness of the speech showed a significant main effect of Modality, F (1,23) = 16.55, p = .001, p
2
 = 
.42 and F (1,23) = 8.73, p = .007, p
2
 = .28 respectively. This indicated that participants spoke louder in 
the bimodal compared to the unimodal conditions. In all these analyses, no significant main effect of 
Informativeness was found and there was no significant interaction between the two factors. 
In the G+S conditions, participants manually pointed at the circle on the screen while 
linguistically referring to it. Repeated measures analyses of variance with Informativeness as the single 
within-subject factor were carried out on the same dependent variables as in Experiment 1. The analysis 
of the Stroke Duration showed a significant main effect of Informativeness, F (1,23) = 5.42, p = .029, 
p
2
 = .19. This effect denoted that the duration of the stroke was significantly longer in the More 
Informative condition (M = 707 ms) than in the Less Informative condition (M = 698 ms). Analyses of  
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Table 3. Overview of the behavioral results per condition in Experiment 2. Duration in ms is displayed for Gesture Initiation Time (GIT), 
Stroke Duration (Stroke), Apex Time (Apex), Hold Duration (Hold), Speech Duration (SpeechDur), Speech Onset Time (SOT), and 
Synchronization Time (Sync). Further, the Incremental Distance in cm (Dist), Velocity in cm/s (Velocity), and the maximum and mean 
loudness of the speech (Max_Loudness and Mean_Loudness) in db are provided. The standard error of the mean is indicated between 
parentheses. An asterisk next to a variable’s name indicates a significant main effect of Informativeness in the analysis. 
 
Condition  GIT  Stroke* Apex  Dist Velocity  Hold   
 
More Informative 
Speech-only               
Gesture + Speech 552 (27) 707 (24) 1259 (39) 42 (1) 34.3 (1)  592 (78)   
    
Less Informative 
Speech-only            
Gesture + Speech 548 (26) 698 (25) 1247 (38) 42 (1) 34.5 (1)  576 (76)  
 
 
 
Condition  SpeechDur SOT  Sync  Max_Loudness Mean_Loudness  
 
More Informative 
Speech-only  1095 (39) 711 (31)   78.6 (1)  66.1 (1) 
Gesture + Speech 1114 (43) 977 (46) 28 (3)  79.5 (1)  66.5 (1) 
    
Less Informative 
Speech-only  1095 (42) 702 (32)   78.5 (1)  65.8 (1)        
Gesture + Speech 1108 (44) 976 (48) 27 (3)  79.2 (1)  66.5 (1)  
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Gesture Initiation Time, Apex Time, Incremental Distance, Velocity, Hold Duration, and 
Synchronization Time did not yield any significant effect (all p’s >.05). Table 3 summarizes all 
behavioral results from Experiment 2. 
 
Electrophysiological Results 
Trials defined as errors or outliers in the behavioral analyses were also excluded from the ERP 
analyses. Separate ERPs were computed for each condition in the experiment. By-participant analyses 
were performed with Informativeness and ROI as independent variables. In the stimulus-locked analysis 
Modality was added as a factor. Only significant effects at the 5% level are reported, unless explicitly 
stated otherwise. 
Stimulus-locked analysis. The omnibus stimulus-locked analysis firstly revealed a significant 
Informativeness x ROI interaction effect in the 200-300 ms time-window, F (2,42) = 3.32, p = .049, p
2
 
= .13, and in the 300-400 ms time-window, F (2,40) = 4.37, p = .024, p
2
 = .16. Follow-up analyses 
revealed that these interactions reflected a significant main effect of Informativeness in the right 
posterior ROI in the 200-300 ms time-window, F (1,23) = 8.87, p = .007, p
2
 = .28, and in the 300-400 
ms time-window, F (1,23) = 7.19, p = .013, p
2
 = .24. We will again refer to this effect as a P300 or P3b 
effect (cf. Polich, 2007). A trend towards such a main effect of Informativeness was found in the left 
posterior ROI in the 300-400 ms time-window, F (1,23) = 3.68, p = .068, p
2
 = .14. No main effects of 
Informativeness were found in the other ROIs (all F’s < 1). 
Secondly, the omnibus analysis revealed a significant Modality x ROI interaction effect in the 
100-200 ms time-window, F (3,59) = 3.11, p = .040, p
2
 = .12, in the 200-300 ms time-window, F (2,56) 
= 12.88, p = .001, p
2
 = .36, and in the 300-400 ms time-window, F (3,66) = 24.73, p = .001, p
2
 = .52. 
Follow-up analyses revealed a significant main effect of Modality that reached significance in the 200-
300 ms time-window in the left middle ROI only (p < .001) before becoming significant in the middle 
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ROIs in the 300-400 ms time-window as well (all p’s <.01), but not in the two posterior ROIs (both F’s 
<1). Figure 6 shows the effects of Informativeness and Modality in the stimulus-locked analysis. 
 
Figure 6. Grand average waveforms and topographic plots corresponding to the voltage difference 
between conditions in subsequent time-windows in the stimulus-locked ERP analysis in Experiment 2 for 
A) The main effect of Informativeness (collapsed over Modality) and B) the main effect of Modality 
(collapsed over Informativeness). The electrode site used for the waveforms is indicated in the 
corresponding topographic plots.       
 
Gesture-locked analysis. The omnibus gesture-locked analysis showed a significant 
Informativeness x ROI interaction effect in the time-window 200-100 ms preceding gesture initiation, F 
(2,52) = 4.15, p = .017, p
2
 = .15. However, this effect did not reflect a significant main effect of 
Informativeness in any of the ROIs separately (all p’s >.14) 
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Speech-locked analysis. The only significant effect in the omnibus analysis locked to speech-
onset was a significant Informativeness x ROI interaction effect in the time-window 500-400 ms 
preceding speech onset, F (2,48) = 3.18, p = .049, p
2
 = .12. This effect reflected a trend towards a main 
effect of Informativeness in the anterior ROI in this time-window, F (1,23) = 3.78, p = .064, p
2
 = .14 
which was absent in other ROIs (all F’s < 2.4). The anterior finding reflected a more negative ERP wave 
for the More Informative condition compared to the Less Informative condition (see Figure 7). 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Grand average waveforms and topographic plot corresponding to the voltage difference 
between conditions in the speech-locked ERP analysis in Experiment 2 for the main effect of 
Informativeness. The electrode site used for the waveforms is indicated in the corresponding 
topographic plot.     
 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 revealed that the kinematic effects obtained in Experiment 1 were largely specific 
to situations in which gesture carried the main informational burden. Unlike in Experiment 1, in 
Experiment 2 no effects of Informativeness were found in the time in which apex was reached or in the 
duration of the post-stroke hold phase. However, a small effect of Informativeness was found in the 
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duration of the stroke of the gesture, with a longer stroke in case of more informative speech. Similar to 
Experiment 1, no effects of Informativeness were found in the speech that participants produced. In 
comparison with the speech-only condition, the concurrent production of a gesture delayed the onset of 
speech, prolonged the speech duration, and enhanced its loudness. The stimulus-locked ERP data 
replicated the P300 effect obtained in Experiment 1, hence suggesting that this effect is modality-
independent
1
. A trend towards a frontal ERP effect of Informativeness was found preceding the onset of 
speech. We will discuss the theoretical implications of the findings of both experiments in the General 
Discussion. 
 
General Discussion 
Two experiments were carried out to further our understanding of how our intentions shape our 
actions in the specific case of the planning and production of pointing gestures and speech to single out a 
visible referent, a core everyday human communicative act (Kita, 2003; Tomasello, 2008). Specifically, 
we investigated whether, and if so how, the kinematics of pointing gestures are shaped by one’s 
communicative intentions, and whether this is modulated by the presence of concurrent speech. In 
addition, we explored the neural and cognitive mechanisms involved in the planning of communicative 
pointing gestures and speech. 
Behaviorally, the first experiment showed that the kinematics of a pointing gesture vary as a 
function of the speaker-gesturer’s communicative intent. Specifically, the duration of the stroke (and as 
such its velocity and the moment the apex is reached) was used in order to be informative. Presumably 
                                                          
1
 An additional repeated measures ANOVA with the between-subject factor Experiment (2: Exp1, Exp2) and the within-
subject factors ROI (2, left posterior, right posterior), and Time-Window (2: 200-300 ms, 300-400 ms) was performed on the 
the P3b effect (less informative average ERP minus more informative average ERP), calculated for each subject in both time-
windows. This analysis did not show any significant main or interaction effect of Experiment, indicating that the size of the 
P3b effect did not differ statistically across the two experiments. 
 Communicative intent in pointing gestures and speech 
 
151 
 
this was done in order to be as precise as possible in pointing at a target, which could be achieved by 
pointing more slowly. An additional benefit would then be that the addressee would have more time to 
identify towards which referent the gesture was heading. In addition, participants prolonged the post-
stroke hold-phase of their pointing gesture presumably in order to assure that the addressee had enough 
time to identify which referent she pointed to. The fact that people slow down their movement in order 
to be more informative generalizes to instrumental actions such as reach-to-grasp movements (Becchio 
et al., 2012) and communicative manual actions more broadly (Vesper & Richardson, 2014). 
Presumably, the duration of different sub-components of the pointing gesture is not the only parameter 
people may use in order to communicate effectively, as previous work suggests that also the endpoint 
location and trajectory of a pointing gesture may be varied in relation to the location of the addressee 
(Cleret de Langavant et al., 2011).  
In line with a previous study (Chieffi et al., 2009), in Experiment 1, the presence of speech as a 
second modality did not influence pointing gestures’ kinematics. Other studies did find effects of the 
presence of speech on the kinematics of concurrently produced gestures. Gonseth et al. (2013) reported a 
slower gesture and a longer post-stroke hold-phase in cases where a pointing gesture was produced 
without speech compared to when it was produced with concurrent speech. Bernardis and Gentilucci 
(2006) found that participants shortened various movement phases of their symbolic gestures (e.g., a 
hand with protruding index-finger moving from left to right meaning ‘NO’) when the gesture was 
produced with meaningful speech compared to when it was produced in isolation. An explanation for the 
absence of an influence of speech production on gesture kinematics in our study is that speech was 
purposefully kept very simple, non-informative and repetitive across our first experiment. Increasing 
variation in speech (as in Gonseth et al., 2013) or adding a stronger symbolic component to it (as in 
Bernardis & Gentilucci, 2006) may lead to a stronger influence of speech on gesture kinematics.  
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The second experiment further specified that the influence of one’s communicative intentions on 
the kinematics of one’s pointing gestures is reduced in situations in which one’s speech is carrying the 
informational burden in a multimodal referential act. For instance, participants did not use the duration 
of the hold phase of their gesture to be more informative in Experiment 2. Thus, when speech suffices in 
transmitting the required information in a certain context, one does not need to exploit the kinematics of 
one’s gesture to the same extent as when the gesture carries the informational burden. Nevertheless, a 
small modulation of the duration of the gesture’s stroke as a function of participants’ communicative 
intentions was found in both experiments (i.e. a longer stroke duration to be more informative). This 
confirms that speech and gesture are two highly intertwined modalities in the exophoric use of 
referential expressions and suggests that, even when speech is carrying the most relevant information in 
a multimodal referential act, one’s more global communicative intentions also “flow” into the gestural 
modality. In contrast, participants neither exploited the loudness and duration of their speech to be more 
informative in Experiment 2 (see Willems et al., 2010, for a similar finding). One possible explanation is 
that in the current task the speech content itself was informative enough such that there was no need to 
change any acoustic or durational parameters to be more informative.  
 In both our experiments, participants temporally aligned the onset of their deictic linguistic 
expression with the moment the pointing gesture reached its apex, regardless of whether the gesture was 
more or less informative. This finding is in line with previous studies showing such temporal alignment 
of pointing and speech (e.g., Chu & Hagoort, 2014; Levelt et al., 1985; McNeill, 1992) and with models 
of speech and gesture production that underline the tight synchronization of speech and gesture (e.g., De 
Ruiter, 2000; Krauss et al., 2000). Previous experimental studies used artificial exogenous factors (such 
as the application of a load to a cord attached to a participant’s wrist during the execution of a gesture; 
Levelt et al., 1985) to investigate its effects on speech-gesture synchronization. Here, we show that also 
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when characteristics of the gesture vary for endogenous reasons (i.e. communicative intentions), the 
temporal synchrony between speech and pointing gestures is maintained. 
In general, our results fit well with models of speech and gesture production that allow for a role 
of the speaker-gesturer’s communicative intent in modulating the exact form of a gesture, such as the 
Sketch model (De Ruiter, 2000) and the Interface model (Kita & Özyürek, 2003). However, these 
models do not specify the exact sub-components of pointing gestures that people may vary on the basis 
of their communicative intentions. Our results suggest that duration (and as such the velocity of the 
stroke and the moment apex is reached) is a free parameter that people use in the execution of their 
pointing gestures, and further specify in which specific components (i.e. stroke or post-stroke hold) of 
the gesture duration is indeed varied. Even when speech is carrying the informational burden in a 
multimodal referential act, people’s communicative intentions may lead to such use of the gesture’s 
movement duration, as evidenced in Experiment 2. Our data cannot be explained by models of speech 
and gesture production that question whether the speaker’s communicative intent plays a role in shaping 
the form of a gesture (e.g., Krauss et al., 2000).  
Neurophysiologically, we observed in both experiments a stimulus-locked P3b effect preceding 
the production of gesture and/or speech. We argued that P3b amplitude may be modulated by task-
related cognitive demands that drive attentional resource allocation, such that its amplitude is smaller 
when a task requires greater amounts of attentional resources (cf. Polich, 2007). Smaller amplitude of 
the stimulus-locked P3b in the more informative conditions in Experiment 1 may therefore reflect that 
participants voluntarily (Kok, 2001) allocated more attentional resources to the task when planning a 
more informative gesture for their addressee, independent of whether they concurrently produced 
speech. Experiment 2 clarified that this effect is not specific to the planning of pointing gestures, and 
also generalizes to situations in which referential speech is planned to describe a referent for one's 
addressee.  This finding also confirms that the effect does not index differential visual attention paid to 
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the spatial location or physical properties (e.g. color) of a referent, but rather in our study reflects the 
allocation of domain-general attentional resources that may be used to successfully plan an action on the 
basis of one's (communicative) intentions.  
The gesture-locked frontal ERP marker of communicative intent directly preceding the onset of 
the pointing gesture was specific to the case where the gesture carried the informational burden (i.e. 
Experiment 1). The locus of this effect modulating the readiness potential is reminiscent of a previous 
study investigating pointing by infants, which also identified a fronto-central marker of communicative 
intent measured using EEG (Henderson et al., 2002). Several other studies have also linked frontal 
effects in ERPs to ‘mentalizing’ or theory-of-mind related activations (e.g., Liu et al., 2004; Sabbagh, 
2004) and recent neuroimaging studies relate activity in neuronal structures in frontal cortex to the 
mentalizing involved in the production and comprehension of communicative pointing (e.g., Brunetti et 
al., 2014). The fact that our effect reflects a modulation of the readiness potential (Kornhuber & Deecke, 
1965) over fronto-central areas suggests an interaction between planning the execution of a motor 
program and activation of the mentalizing network (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 
2009; Willems et al., 2010). In sum, these findings underline that both intentional and modality-
independent attentional mechanisms are active when one plans the execution of a communicative, 
referential pointing gesture for an addressee.  
Finally, a speech-locked trend towards an effect of participants' communicative intentions was 
found 500 - 400 ms preceding the onset of their speech. Interestingly, it had an opposite directionality 
compared to the frontal gesture-locked effect of participants' communicative intentions. Future research 
is needed to verify whether the speech finding is robust. Note that, on the basis of models of speech 
production, the timing of the effect is where one would expect an influence of one's intentions in the 
speech production process (e.g., Indefrey & Levelt, 2004). The current study shows that it is worthwhile 
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and feasible to investigate the intentions behind speech (and gesture) production, a crucial component of 
the speech production process. 
 To conclude, we have shown that people shape the exact kinematics of their pointing gesture as a 
function of their specific communicative intentions, in tight temporal alignment with their speech, and 
particularly when the gestural modality carries the informational burden. Furthermore we have shown 
that both intentional and modality-independent attentional neural mechanisms are active in planning the 
execution of a communicative pointing gesture. These findings contribute to a better understanding of 
the complex interplay between action, attention, intention, and language in the core human 
communicative act of planning and producing referential utterances using speech and gesture. 
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The Neural Integration of Pointing Gestures and Speech in a Visual Context: An 
fMRI Study  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on: Peeters, D., Snijders, T. M., Hagoort, P., & Özyürek, A. (under review). The neural integration of 
pointing gestures and speech in a visual context: An fMRI study. 
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Abstract 
Comprehension of pointing gestures is ontogenetically and phylogenetically fundamental to 
human communication. However, the neural mechanisms that subserve the integration of 
pointing gestures and speech in a visual context in comprehension are unclear. Here we present 
the results of an fMRI study in which participants watched static images of an actor pointing at 
an object while they listened to her referential speech. Both a mismatch paradigm and a bimodal 
enhancement manipulation were employed. It was found that bilateral auditory and visual areas 
and left premotor regions were involved in the concomitant perception of speech, gesture and 
referent, whereas left inferior frontal gyrus subserved the semantic unification of referential 
gesture and speech in a triadic context. These findings suggest an important role for primary 
areas in audiovisual binding and confirm the importance of left inferior frontal gyrus in 
semantically integrating information from multiple modalities across semiotic domains. 
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The Neural Integration of Pointing Gestures and Speech in a Visual Context: An fMRI Study  
 
"While all gestures cry out for attention,  
pointing gestures immediately deflect 
that attention elsewhere” (Cooperrider, 2011, p.7) 
 
 
 Pointing gestures are a fundamental part of human communication (Kita, 2003). By 
producing them in everyday life we connect our communication to entities in the world around 
us (Clark, 2003). In establishing a triadic link between child, caregiver, and referent, they play a 
crucial role in language acquisition (Butterworth, 2003; Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998; 
Iverson & Goldin-Meadow, 2005; Tomasello, Carpenter, & Liszkowski, 2007) and impairments 
in the production and comprehension of pointing gestures are an early marker of the 
neurodevelopmental disorder autism (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1989). From a phylogenetic viewpoint, 
it has been claimed that (declarative) pointing is a uniquely human form of communication in a 
natural environment (Call & Tomasello, 1994; Kita, 2003; Tomasello et al., 2007).  
Previous neuroimaging work investigating the comprehension of index-finger pointing 
gestures has presented the gestures in a context that lacked both a larger visual triadic context 
and co-occurring speech (e.g. Materna, Dicke, & Thier, 2008; Sato, Kochiyama, Uono, & 
Yoshikawa, 2009). However, in everyday human referential communication pointing gestures 
often occur in a context in which one perceives not only the person pointing but also the referent 
she points at and the speech she may concomitantly produce. It is currently unclear how in such 
situations input from different modalities (visual: speaker, pointing gesture, referent; auditory: 
speech) is integrated in the brain. The lack of empirical neurocognitive research in this domain is 
surprising, because comprehending and integrating our interlocutors’ referential (i.e. deictic) 
gesture and speech in a visual context is often critical to understand what they are talking about 
and a core feature of everyday communication (Bühler, 1934; Clark, 1996; Kendon, 2004). The 
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current study therefore investigates the neural mechanisms underlying the audiovisual 
(multimodal) and semantic integration of manual pointing gestures with speech in a visual, 
triadic context.   
 The majority of studies investigating the neural integration of gestures with co-occurring 
speech have focused on iconic co-speech gestures, i.e. hand movements that visually resemble 
the meaning of the linguistic part of the utterance they accompany (Kendon, 2004; McNeill, 
1992), such as when moving up and down one’s hand while talking about a basketball game. 
Previous work has shown that recipients semantically process these everyday communicative 
actions (e.g., Kita & Özyürek, 2003; Özyürek, Willems, Kita, & Hagoort, 2007). Critically, 
previous studies investigating the neural integration of such iconic gestures with speech differ in 
the functional roles they attribute to i) the (posterior portions of the) superior temporal sulcus 
(STS), the superior temporal gyrus (STG) and the middle temporal gyrus (MTG), and ii) the left 
inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) in the integration of audiovisual and semantic information from 
gesture and speech in comprehension (for overviews, see Andric & Small, 2012; Dick, Mok, 
Beharelle, Goldin-Meadow, & Small, 2014; Marstaller & Burianová, 2014; Özyürek, 2014). 
It is relatively uncontroversial that LIFG, more specifically its pars triangularis, plays a 
role in the integration of speech and gesture (e.g. Dick et al., 2014; Skipper, Goldin-Meadow, 
Nusbaum, & Small, 2007; Willems, Özyürek, & Hagoort, 2007; 2009; but see Holle, Obleser, 
Rueschemeyer, & Gunter, 2010), possibly in interplay with MTG (Dick et al., 2014; Green, 
Straube, Weis, Jansen, Willmes, et al., 2009). Willems et al. (2007) were the first to study the 
integration of speech and gesture using fMRI. In an orthogonal design, the ease of integration of 
linguistic and gestural information into a preceding sentence context was manipulated. An 
increase in activation in LIFG was found when words and/or gestures were incongruent 
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(“mismatch conditions”) compared to when they were congruent (“match condition”) with 
preceding speech (see also Özyürek et al., 2007). Such findings confirm LIFGs status as a 
multimodal integration site that plays a crucial role in the semantic unification of information 
from different modalities (Hagoort, 2005; 2013). Such accounts argue, however, that LIFG is a 
node in a larger network that subserves the integration of gesture and speech, and also attribute a 
role to STS/STG and MTG in the perception and integration of speech-gesture combinations 
(e.g. Dick et al., 2014; Willems et al., 2009). 
However, the specific functional role of the posterior part of the STS and the adjacent 
STG and MTG in the larger speech-gesture integration process is unclear. Holle et al. (2008; 
2010) argue that left pSTS subserves the integration of gesture and speech at a semantic 
(conceptual) level. Holle et al. (2008) presented participants with videos in which a speaker 
uttered sentences that contained an ambiguous word (e.g. He looked at the pass) that was 
combined with either a gesture related to the more frequent meaning of the word, a gesture 
related to its less frequent meaning, or a grooming (control) movement. The authors report 
enhanced activity in left posterior STS for co-speech gestures compared to grooming movements 
and conclude that this activation reflects “multimodal semantic interaction between a gesture and 
its co-expressive speech unit” (Holle et al., 2008, p. 2022). In sharp contrast, Dick et al. (2014) 
recently argued that pSTS is not involved in semantic integration per se, but rather in connecting 
information from visual and auditory modalities in general. Willems et al. (2009) argue that 
pSTS/MTG shows enhanced activation when different sources of information converge on a 
common memory representation, as in the case of perceiving pantomimes and concurrent, 
matching speech (see also Hagoort, Baggio, & Willems, 2009), in contrast with higher-order 
semantic unification subserved by LIFG. 
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As outlined above, in the current study we focus on a different type of gesture, namely 
(deictic) pointing gestures. Unlike iconic gestures, pointing gestures in exophoric use canonically 
create a vector towards a referent to shift the gaze of an addressee and establish a joint focus of 
attention (Kita, 2003). Furthermore, whereas speech and iconic gestures often allow 
communicating about entities that are not immediately physically present (“displacement”, 
Hockett, 1960; Perniss & Vigliocco, 2014), pointing gestures in exophoric use play a crucial role 
in referential communication about entities that speaker and addressee may perceive in the 
immediate extra-linguistic context of a conversation. Therefore, the integration of speech and 
pointing gestures towards a referent need not necessarily recruit the same neural and cognitive 
mechanisms as in the integration of speech with iconic or other type of gestures (e.g., Hubbard, 
Wilson, Callan, & Dapretto, 2009; Quandt, Marshall, Shipley, Beilock, & Goldin-Meadow, 
2012).  
Although it is currently unknown which cortical areas are involved in integrating pointing 
gestures and speech, a number of studies have looked at the neural correlates of comprehending 
pointing gestures in isolation and at their integration with other cues such as the gesturer’s gaze 
direction (e.g., Brunetti, Zappasodi, Marzetti, Perrucci, Cirillo, et al., 2014; Conty, Dezecache, 
Hugueville, & Grèzes, 2012; Gredebäck, Melinder, & Daum, 2010; Materna et al., 2008; Sato et 
al., 2009). Sato et al. (2009), for instance, showed that the perception of a (meaningless) pointing 
hand, compared to a non-directional closed hand, elicits enhanced activation in a network of 
mainly right-hemisphere regions, including right IFG, right angular gyrus, right parietal lobule, 
right thalamus, and bilateral lingual gyri. Materna et al. (2008) suggest that bilateral posterior 
STS is involved in following the direction of a pointing finger. Conty et al. (2012) show that 
integration of pointing gestures and gaze direction in comprehension recruits parietal and 
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supplementary motor cortices in the right hemisphere. All in all, these findings suggest an 
extensive right-hemisphere dominant network that is activated when one perceives a manual 
pointing gesture that shifts one’s attention.   
 Finally, Pierno, Tubaldi, Turella, Grossi, Barachino, et al. (2009) compared the 
observation of a static image of a hand pointing at an object to the observation of a hand grasping 
an object and to a control condition of a hand resting next to an object. Compared to the control 
condition, the perception of the pointing hand and object elicited enhanced activation in left 
MTG, left parietal areas (postcentral gyrus and supramarginal gyrus) and left middle occipital 
gyrus. However, the pointing condition did not recruit significant differential activity compared 
to the grasping condition. Nevertheless these results suggest that, in addition to the right-
lateralized network involved in perceiving a pointing hand, a left-lateralized set of cortical areas 
may be involved in visually integrating a pointing hand and an object.   
 
The present study 
In the present study, we investigated which cortical regions subserve the integration of 
pointing gestures with speech in a visual, everyday context. In an event-related functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, participants were presented with images of a speaker 
who pointed at one of two different objects as they listened to her speech. We employed a 
mismatch paradigm, such that speech either referred to the object the speaker pointed at or to the 
other visible object. As such, speech and gesture were individually always correct, but there was 
congruence or incongruence when semantically integrated in the larger visual context. Thus, the 
mismatch-match comparison taps into the semantic integration/unification of pointing gestures 
and speech. In addition we included two unimodal runs (audio-only and visual-only; cf. Willems 
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et al., 2009) to test for possible bimodal enhancement (audiovisual > audio-only + visual-only). 
Both mismatch paradigms and bimodal-unimodal comparisons have been successfully used in 
the past to study the integration of iconic gestures and speech (e.g. Dick et al., 2014; Willems et 
al., 2009) and audiovisual integration more broadly (e.g., Belardinelli, Sestieri, Di Matteo, 
Delogu, Del Gratta, et al., 2004; Calvert, Campbell, & Brammer, 2000). 
Because this is the first study investigating the neuronal integration of pointing gestures 
with speech in comprehension, predictions were derived on the basis of previous speech-gesture 
integration studies that used iconic gestures in their stimulus materials. If LIFG plays a key role 
in the semantic integration of gesture and speech (Dick et al., 2014; Skipper et al., 2007; Willems 
et al., 2009), it should show enhanced activation in the mismatch compared to the match 
condition. This is in line with a view of LIFG as a modality-independent multimodal integration 
site, with its pars triangularis specifically involved in semantic unification of information from 
different input streams (e.g. Hagoort, 2013; Willems et al., 2007).  
Furthermore, if pSTS is mainly involved in “connecting information from the visual and 
auditory modalities” (Dick et al. 2014, p. 914), it should be sensitive to the bimodal enhancement 
comparison. Similarly, if pSTS/MTG is involved in mapping different sources of information 
onto a common memory representation (Hagoort et al., 2009; Willems et al., 2009), then it 
should also show enhanced activation in the bimodal (match) condition compared to the sum of 
unimodal conditions, because in the bimodal condition speech and object match whereas in the 
unimodal conditions speech and gesture are presented in isolation. Conversely, if multimodal 
semantic integration of gesture and speech recruits the posterior part of the STS region (Holle et 
al., 2008; 2010), then this region should show enhanced activation in the mismatch-match 
comparison.  
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Finally, we included two conditions in which one of the two objects in the images was 
highlighted by an attentional cue in the absence of gesture. This allowed investigating whether 
the possible role of LIFG in semantic unification of speech and pointing gesture in a triadic 
context was dependent on the perceived communicative intentions of the gesturer. Research by 
Kelly and colleagues suggests that speech-gesture integration differs from the integration of 
gestures with actions more broadly because the former are generally viewed as more intended to 
accompany the speech signal compared to the latter (e.g., Kelly, Healey, Özyürek, & Holler, 
2014). Pointing gestures are shaped by the communicative intentions of the gesturer (Chapter 4 
of this thesis), and in that sense differ from other cues in the environment that may shift our 
attention.  Therefore the integration of pointing gestures with speech may differ from the 
integration of other attentional cues with concurrently perceived speech. In sum, the current 
study thus aims to shed more light on the functional roles of different cortical areas involved in 
speech-gesture integration by investigating the integration of speech with a novel type of gesture, 
namely index-finger pointing. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-three right-handed (Oldfield, 1971) native speakers of Dutch (18 female; mean 
age 23.6, range 18-29) participated in the experiment. Data from three additional participants 
were discarded due to technical failure (n = 2) or drowsiness (n = 1). Participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, no language or hearing impairments or history of neurological 
disease. They provided written informed consent and were paid for participation.  
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Stimulus Materials and Experimental Design 
The experimental materials consisted of 40 spoken items in Dutch of the form “definite 
article + noun” (e.g., “het kopje”, the cup), 80 pictures in which a model (henceforth: the 
speaker) pointed (index-finger extended; Kendon, 2004) at one of two objects presented at a 
table in front of her (henceforth “target pictures”), and 80 pictures that were the same except that 
one of the two objects was framed by a green box and that the speaker did not point (henceforth 
“attentional pictures”). The 40 spoken items were spoken at a normal rate by a female native 
speaker of Dutch, recorded in a sound proof booth, and digitized at a sample frequency of 44.1 
kHz. They were equalized in maximum amplitude using Praat software (version 5.2.46; 
Boersma & Weenink, 2009) and had an average duration of 837 ms (SD = 155 ms). In half of the 
target pictures the speaker pointed at the object at her left and in the other half of the target 
pictures she pointed at the object at her right. Similarly, in half of the attentional pictures the 
object at her left was framed and in the other half the object at her right. The 40 different table-
top objects in the pictures were selected on the basis of a pre-test reported elsewhere (Chapter 3 
of this thesis) that confirmed that these objects elicited highly consistent labels (i.e. > 90% 
naming consistency for each object across 16 participants) across individuals from the same 
participant pool as the current participants.  
 The experiment consisted of three blocks. The speech-only block (AUDIO) consisted of 
the 40 spoken items. The picture-only block (VISUAL) consisted of 40 pictures in which the 
speaker pointed at an object. The mixed block consisted of 160 speech-picture pairs that made up 
four conditions. In the Bimodal Match (BM) condition, the spoken stimulus matched the object 
the speaker pointed at. In the Bimodal Mismatch (BMM) condition, the spoken stimulus did not 
match the object she pointed at but the other object. In the Attentional Match (AM) condition, 
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the spoken stimulus matched the framed object. In the Attentional Mismatch (AMM) condition, 
the spoken stimulus matched the object that was not framed. Each condition consisted of 40 
speech-picture pairs. Figure 1 shows a subset of pictures used in the experiment. 
 
 
Figure 1. Overview of the four conditions involved in the mismatch manipulation. 
 
Procedure 
The three blocks were presented sequentially with specific instructions preceding each 
block. The order of presentation of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants. All 
stimuli were presented in an event-related design and in a randomized order. Twelve different 
randomized lists were used. The speech-only block consisted of the presentation of the 40 spoken 
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stimuli. A trial in this block consisted of a fixation cross presented for a jittered duration of 2-6s 
followed by the presentation of the spoken stimulus. The picture-only block consisted of the 
presentation of 40 pictures in which the speaker pointed at one of the two objects. No speech was 
presented during this block. A trial in this block consisted of a fixation cross presented for a 
jittered duration of 2-6s followed by the presentation of the picture for 2s. The mixed block 
consisted of 160 target trials in which a fixation cross (jittered duration of 2-6s) was followed by 
the presentation of a picture (for 2s) with a concurrently presented spoken stimulus. The onset of 
the spoken stimulus was 50 ms after the onset of the picture presentation. In both the picture-
only block and the mixed block, the speaker pointed at the object at her left in half of the cases, 
and at the object at her right in the other half of the cases. In the mixed block, in half of the 
attentional pictures the object at the speaker’s left was framed and in the other half of the 
attentional pictures the object at her right. 
Pictures were presented on the screen using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral 
Systems) and speech was presented through nonmagnetic headphones that reduced scanner 
noise. Participants looked at the screen via a mirror mounted to the head coil. The size of the 
pictures on the screen was determined on the basis of judgments from two pilot subjects that did 
not participate in the main experiment. They confirmed that all objects, the speaker’s gesture, 
and the attentional markers, were clearly visible while focusing on the center of the screen.  
Participants in the main experiment were instructed to carefully listen to the speech and 
look at the pictures. They were asked to press a button with the middle finger of their left hand 
when an item (i.e. a spoken stimulus in the speech-only block, a picture in the picture-only block, 
and the picture-speech pair in the mixed block) was exactly the same on two subsequent trials. In 
the speech-only block and the picture-only block, four stimuli were repeated on two subsequent 
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trials. In the mixed block 16 stimuli were repeated on two subsequent trials. The second 
presentations of such items thus served as catch trials eliciting a button press and were excluded 
from further MRI analyses. 
The experiment was preceded by a practice session that consisted of three blocks of nine 
trials each (i.e. eight items of which one was repeated and served as a catch trial to familiarize 
participants with the task). Before the start of the practice block the scanner was switched on and 
a number of spoken stimuli were played in order to adjust the volume level of the spoken items. 
Participants were asked to indicate whether the volume should go up or down. The items used in 
this audio check and the items used in the practice blocks were not used in the main experiment.  
 
fMRI Data Acquisition 
Participants were scanned with a Siemens 3-T Skyra MRI scanner using a 32-channel 
head coil. The functional data were acquired in one run using a multiecho echo-planar imaging 
sequence (Poser, Versluis, Hoogduin, & Norris, 2006), in which image acquisition happens at 
multiple echo times (TEs) following a single excitation [time repetition (TR) = 2250 ms; TE1 = 
9 ms; TE2 = 19.5 ms; TE3 = 30 ms; TE4 = 40 ms; echo spacing = 0.51 ms; flip angle = 90 °]. 
This procedure broadens T2* coverage and improves T2* estimation (see Poser et al., 2006, for 
details). Each volume consisted of 36 slices of 3 mm thickness [ascending slice acquisition; 
voxel size = 3.3 x 3.3 x 3 mm; slice gap = 10 %; field of view (FOV) = 212 mm]. The first 30 
volumes preceded the start of the presentation of the first stimulus and were used for weight 
calculation of each of the four echoes. Subsequently, the 31
st
 volume was taken as the first 
volume in preprocessing. The functional run was followed by a whole-brain anatomical scan 
using a high resolution T1-weighted magnetization-prepared, rapid gradient echo sequence 
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(MPRAGE) consisting of 192 sagittal slices (TR = 2300 ms; TE = 3.03 ms; FOV = 256 mm; 
voxel size = 1 x 1 x 1 mm) accelerated with GRAPPA parallel imaging. 
 
Data Analysis 
Data were analyzed using statistical parametric mapping (SPM8; 
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/) implemented in Matlab (Mathworks Inc., Sherborn, MA, USA). The 
four echoes of each volume were combined to yield one volume per TR (Poser et al., 2006), after 
which standard pre-processing was performed [realignment to the first volume, slice acquisition 
time correction to time of acquisition of the middle slice, coregistration to T1 anatomical 
reference image, normalization to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space (EPI template), 
smoothing with an 8 mm full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel, and high-pass 
filtering (time-constant = 128 s)] (Friston, Holmes, Poline, Grasby, Williams, et al., 1995). 
Statistical analysis was performed in the context of the general linear model (GLM). 
Stimulus onset (i.e. the onset of the picture in all conditions, except the speech-only condition in 
which it was the onset of speech) was modeled as the event of interest for each condition. Each 
condition thus contained 40 events. The 6 condition regression parameters were convolved with 
a canonical hemodynamic response function. Additionally, 6 motion parameters from the 
realignment preprocessing step were included in the first-level model. 
A whole-brain analysis was performed by entering first-level contrast images of each of 
the six conditions > baseline for each participant into a flexible factorial model at second-level 
(with factors Condition [6] and Participant [23]). To test for possible bimodal enhancement, two 
analyses were performed. First, the bimodal match condition was compared to the sum of the 
unimodal conditions (BM > AUDIO + VISUAL). Contrast weights were balanced such that the 
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bimodal condition was weighted twice as strongly as each unimodal condition. This comparison 
indicates whether any areas are activated in the bimodal condition in addition to areas activated 
in the unimodal conditions (unimodal areas will also appear in this comparison as the bimodal 
condition is weighted twice). Second, a conjunction analysis, testing a logical AND (Nichols, 
Brett, Andersson, Wager, & Poline, 2005), was performed to subsequently verify whether any 
unimodal areas were activated more in the bimodal compared to the unimodal presentation of the 
stimuli. This analysis was implemented as (BM > AUDIO ∩ BM > VISUAL), inclusively 
masked with the conjunction of the unimodal conditions compared to zero, thus yielding the 
comparison 0 < AUDIO < BM > VISUAL > 0. Furthermore, two analyses were performed to 
compare audiovisual mismatch to audiovisual congruency. First, the bimodal mismatch condition 
was compared to the bimodal match condition (BMM > BM). Second, the attentional mismatch 
condition was compared to the attentional match condition (AMM > AM). 
Whole-brain correction for multiple comparisons was applied by combining a 
significance level of p = 0.001 (uncorrected at the voxel level) with a cluster extent threshold 
using the theory of Gaussian random fields (Friston, Holmes, Poline, Price, & Frith, 1996). All 
clusters are reported at an alpha level of p < 0.05 family-wise error (FWE) corrected across the 
whole brain (Hayasaka & Nichols, 2003).  
 We had the a priori hypothesis that LIFG would be recruited more in the BMM condition 
compared to the BM condition as this comparison arguably taps into semantic 
integration/unification of speech and gesture. However, it is unclear whether such a potential 
involvement of LIFG is specific to communicatively intended gestures and speech or, instead, 
generalizes to any semantic speech-referent relation as induced by an attentional cue (i.e. it 
would also show up in the AMM-AM comparison). Therefore, a region-of-interest (ROI) 
Chapter 5 
178 
 
analysis was performed in LIFG. The ROI was an 8 mm sphere around centre voxels in LIFG 
taken from a meta-analysis on a large number of neuroimaging studies of semantic processing 
(Vigneau, Beaucousin, Herve, Duffau, Crivello, et al., 2006; cf. Willems et al., 2009). MNI 
coordinates were [-42 19 14]. Contrast estimates were calculated for each participant at first-
level for the four conditions (AM, AMM, BM, BMM) using Marsbar 
(http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/). 
 
Results 
Behavioral performance 
Participants detected 91.5 % of all catch trials. These data were not further analyzed. 
 
Whole-brain analysis 
 We first tested for possible bimodal enhancement by comparing the bimodal congruent 
condition to the sum of the unimodal conditions: (BM > AUDIO + VISUAL). This analysis 
revealed increased activations in a network of areas including bilateral occipital areas, right STG 
and left STG/MTG, and left premotor areas (see Table 1 and Fig. 2). The reverse contrast 
(AUDIO + VISUAL > BM) did not yield any significant cluster that survived statistical 
threshold. Table 1 and Figure 2 present the results of this analysis, as well as the comparisons of 
the unimodal AUDIO and VISUAL conditions to baseline. The conjunction analysis (0 < 
AUDIO < BM > VISUAL > 0) failed to show any cluster that survived the statistical threshold 
(no voxels <.001 uncorrected). 
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Figure 2. Results from the whole brain analysis comparing (A) AUDIO > 0, (B) VISUAL > 0, 
and (C) BM > AUDIO + VISUAL. Results are displayed at p < .05, family-wise error corrected 
at the cluster-level.  
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Table 1. Results of the whole-brain analyses comparing unimodal to bimodal conditions. p-values are at the cluster-level, FWE-
corrected.  
Contrast   p k (extent) t-value  MNI coordinates  Region/Peak   
A > 0   .000 4665  13.19  -58 -16 0 left middle/superior temporal gyrus 
      13.08  -52 -18 6 
      12.90  -60 -30 10 
   .000 4088  15.96  60 -12 0 right superior temporal gyrus 
      13.78  64  -20 4  
      12.68  56 -24 6 
   .000 381  6.48  -52 -10 50 left postcentral gyrus 
   .007 238  5.24  52 0 48 right precentral gyrus 
 
 
V > 0   .000 7735  11.80  46 -80 2 right inferior/middle occipital gyrus, right inf. temporal gyrus 
      11.67  38 -74 -12 
      11.36  42 -54 -14 
   .000 6878  12.64  -42 -76 -2 left middle occipital gyrus, left fusiform gyrus,  
      10.45  -32 -52 -16 
      10.11  -32 -70 -12 
   .000 1187  6.75  -8 6 54 left supplementary motor area, right precentral gyrus 
      6.36  52 2 38 
      5.14  36 -4 50 
   .000 1165  6.10  -30 -8 50 left precentral gyrus 
      6.08  -44 -8 44 
      5.46  -24 -12 54 
 
BM > A + V  .000 12861  11.29  -14 -96 -8 left inferior occipital gyrus, left fusiform gyrus 
      11.08  -28 -84 -8 
      10.45  -20 -88 -10 
   .000 5116  9.94  60 -12 0 right superior temporal gyrus 
      9.20  52 -20 6 
      7.34  54 0 -8 
   .000 5068  8.22  -52 -16 6 left middle/superior temporal gyrus 
      8.19  -58 -32 8 
      8.15  -50 -36 10 
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Table 1. (continued). 
Contrast   p k (extent) t-value  MNI coordinates  Region/Peak   
    
  .000 476  5.34  -22 -28 -4 left/right thalamus 
      4.99  20 -28 -2 
      4.56  26 -24 -6 
  .008 230  4.98  -52 -4 52 left precentral/postcentral gyrus 
      3.93  -42 2 56 
      3.75  -54 -8 44 
 
0 < A < BM > V > 0  -    - - -  
 
 
Abbreviations: A, Audio; V, Visual; BM, Bimodal Match
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Second, we compared the mismatch conditions to the match conditions. Contrasting 
BMM with BM showed increased activations in left inferior frontal gyrus (Fig. 3 and Table 2). 
The reverse contrast (BM > BMM) did not show any significant cluster that survived the 
statistical threshold. Also contrasting AMM with AM did not show any areas that survived the 
statistical threshold (Table 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Results from the whole brain analysis comparing Bimodal Mismatch (BMM) > 
Bimodal Match (BM). Results are displayed at p < .05, family-wise error corrected at the 
cluster-level. 
 
ROI analysis 
 An ROI analysis was performed comparing mismatch to match conditions in the 
predefined ROI (8 mm sphere around MNI coordinates -42 19 14) in LIFG. The interaction 
between cue (pointing gesture / attentional cue) and congruency (match / mismatch) failed to 
reach significance, F (1,22) = 2.10, p = .162. However, dependent samples t-tests revealed that 
there was enhanced activation in LIFG in mismatch vs. match conditions when the speaker’s 
pointing gesture indicated the referent object, t(22) = -2.43, p = .024. There was no difference in 
activation in the ROI between the attentional mismatch and match conditions, t(22) = .48, p = 
.637. Figure 4 presents the contrast estimates for the four conditions. 
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Figure 4. ROI results. Mean contrast estimates for AM, AMM, BM, and BMM. Error bars 
represent standard errors around the mean.  
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Table 2. Results of the whole-brain analyses comparing congruent (match) to incongruent (mismatch) conditions. p-values are at the 
cluster-level, FWE-corrected. 
Contrast   p k (extent) t-value  MNI coordinates  Region/Peak   
BMM - BM  .01 220  4.01  -46 20 20 Left inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis)  
      3.72  -36 18 20 
      3.69  -50 28 18 
 
AMM - AM   -    - - -   
 
Abbreviations: AM, Attentional Match; AMM, Attentional Mismatch; BM, Bimodal Match; BMM, Bimodal Mismatc
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Discussion 
The present study investigated the neural integration of pointing gestures and speech in a 
visual, triadic context in comprehension. Both a mismatch paradigm and a bimodal enhancement 
manipulation were employed. We found that LIFG is sensitive to the congruence between speech 
and a concurrently presented pointing gesture towards a referent, whereas the posterior STS 
region is not. The results of the bimodal enhancement comparisons show that the bimodal 
presentation of our stimuli activated similar brain areas (i.e. bilateral occipital, left premotor, and 
bilateral temporal incl. STS/STG/MTG) compared to the sum of the presentation of the unimodal 
stimuli and that these areas were not activated significantly more in the bimodal compared to the 
unimodal case as evident from the conjunction analysis. We will now relate these findings to the 
speech-gesture integration literature and previous studies of audiovisual binding more broadly. 
Enhanced activation in LIFG has been found in previous studies that investigated the 
integration of iconic gestures with speech (e.g., Dick et al., 2014; Skipper et al., 2007; Willems 
et al., 2007; 2009), pantomimes with speech (Willems et al., 2009), and metaphoric gestures with 
speech (Kircher, Straube, Leube, Weis, Sachs, et al., 2009; Straube, Green, Bromberger, & 
Kircher, 2011). The common denominator in these studies is that an increase in semantic 
unification load led to an increase in LIFG activation (cf. Andric & Small, 2012; Dick et al., 
2014; Hagoort et al., 2009; Özyürek, 2014). For instance, gestures that are unrelated to 
concurrently presented speech require additional semantic processing because they are harder to 
semantically integrate with speech compared to iconic gestures that relate to the concurrently 
presented speech. Therefore, the former lead to enhanced LIFG activation compared to the latter 
(Green et al., 2009). The same holds for metaphoric co-speech gestures compared to iconic co-
speech gestures (Straube et al., 2011). Similarly, iconic gestures or pantomimes that are 
incongruent with speech activate LIFG more than iconic gestures and pantomimes that match the 
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speech they accompany (Willems et al., 2007; 2009). Confirming such previous findings, in the 
current study incongruence between speech and a visible object, as induced by a pointing 
gesture, led to enhanced activation in LIFG compared to a matched congruent condition.  
Previous studies have criticized the use of mismatch paradigms in gesture-speech 
integration studies, for instance arguing that “mismatches, which are rarely encountered in 
spontaneous discourse, may trigger additional integration processes which are not normally part 
of multimodal language comprehension” (Holle et al., 2010, p. 876), such that activations in 
LIFG may be a result of “the processing of unnatural stimuli and rather relate to error detection 
processes” (Green et al., 2009, p. 3317; Straube et al., 2011). There are convincing reasons to 
believe, however, that gesture-speech mismatch manipulations tap into semantic speech-gesture 
integration. For instance, LIFG activation is often also present in the “match” condition 
compared to baseline (e.g. Willems et al., 2009). Furthermore, enhanced LIFG activation has 
also been found in speech-gesture integration studies that manipulated semantic load in a 
different way, not using a mismatch paradigm (e.g., Dick et al., 2014; Skipper et al., 2007). Dick 
et al. (2014), for instance, compared the integration of supplemental iconic gestures with speech 
to the integration of “redundant” iconic gestures with speech. The former gestures added 
information to the speech they accompanied (e.g. the verb in the phrase “Sparky attacked” was 
combined with a “peck” gesture) and therefore increased semantic processing and unification 
load compared to the latter gestures (“Sparky pecked” combined with a “peck” gesture). Indeed, 
a robust increase in activation was found in LIFG for the gestures that added information to the 
speech and therefore required additional semantic processing compared to the “redundant” 
gestures (Dick et al., 2014). Crucially, both such gestures commonly occur in everyday 
interactions (Holler & Beattie, 2003; Kendon, 2004; McNeill, 1992). 
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LIFG plays a role not only in semantic unification of speech and gesture, but also in the 
semantic unification of word meaning and world knowledge into a preceding context in speech 
itself (Hagoort, 2013; Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004; Hagoort et al., 2009; Zhu, 
Hagoort, Zhang, Feng, Chen, et al., 2012). The current study extends previous work in showing 
that semantic unification recruits LIFG across semiotic domains. LIFG thus plays a crucial role 
in the case of an indexical semiotic relation between gesture, speech, and a referent (the current 
study), in addition to symbolic and iconic manners of signification (as in arbitrary word-meaning 
mappings and resemblance between iconic gestures/pantomimes/pictures and referents 
respectively). Furthermore, a core property of language (including iconic gestures) is that is 
allows for displacement, i.e. the ability to refer to entities that are not immediately present 
(Hockett, 1960; Perniss & Vigliocco, 2014). The current study shows that also when a referent is 
physically present in the immediate visual context, LIFG subserves the semantic unification of 
auditory and visual information at a higher-order semantic level. The involvement of LIFG in the 
case of pointing-speech integration may be dependent on whether transmitted information is 
semantic and/or communicatively intended, as it was not sensitive to the congruence between 
speech and an attentional cue around a visual object. 
Comparing the bimodal (match) condition to the sum of unimodal conditions showed that 
large parts of bilateral temporal cortex (including STG, STS, and MTG) and bilateral occipital 
cortex are also involved in speech-gesture perception in a triadic context. The bimodal 
enhancement manipulations arguably tap into audiovisual binding, because in the bimodal 
condition auditory and visual information streams are integrated whereas in the unimodal 
conditions they are not. Nevertheless, the regions activated by the bimodal condition showed 
great overlap with the regions activated by the unimodal conditions compared to baseline, 
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including (primary) visual and auditory cortices (see Figure 2). These findings are in line with 
previous studies that investigated speech-gesture integration and with studies looking at 
audiovisual binding more broadly using bimodal enhancement paradigms (e.g., Belardinelli et 
al., 2004; Calvert, Brammer, Bullmore, Campbell, Iversen, et al., 1999; Hein, Doehrmann, 
Müller, Kaiser, Muckli, et al., 2007; Macaluso, Frith, & Driver, 2000; Van Atteveldt, Formisano, 
Goebel, & Blomert, 2004; Van Atteveldt, Formisano, Blomert, & Goebel, 2007; Willems et al., 
2009). Belardinelli et al. (2004), for instance, compared the perception of bimodal stimuli 
(pictures of entities such as animals and tools paired with environmental sounds) to the unimodal 
presentations of the same stimuli (audio-only, vision-only) and even found enhanced activation 
in visual areas in the occipital lobe in the bimodal condition. Such results indeed suggest an 
important role for (primary) sensory areas in audiovisual binding (cf. Van Wassenhove, Grant, & 
Poeppel, 2005), possibly in a dynamic interplay of several areas in a cortical network that may 
also involve “heteromodal” (Calvert et al., 2000) neuronal populations in STS and STG 
(Belardinelli et al., 2004; Calvert, 2001; Van Atteveldt et al., 2004; but see Hocking & Price, 
2008).  
Holle et al. (2008) argued that semantic integration of gesture and speech recruits the 
posterior part of the STS region. However, in both the mismatch manipulation and the bimodal 
enhancement comparisons, no differential activation was found in the canonical posterior 
portions of the STS. In contrast, Willems et al. (2009) argued that pSTS/MTG is involved in 
mapping different sources of information onto a common memory representation. A 
parsimonious interpretation of the results of the present study and these previous investigations is 
therefore that STS/STG may be involved in audiovisual binding/integration (cf. Beauchamp, 
2005; Calvert, 2001; Dick et al., 2014), whereas MTG may subsequently map information from 
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different input streams onto a common representation in memory, particularly in the case of 
iconic gestures and speech (cf. Hagoort et al., 2009; Willems et al., 2009). Indeed, in audiovisual 
information processing the onset of enhanced activation in superior temporal areas and primary 
visual areas precedes the onset of enhanced activation in MTG and LIFG (Campbell, 2008; 
Fuhrmann Alpert, Hein, Tsai, Naumer, & Knight, 2008). Note that we do not argue that these 
areas are solely involved in these functions, as the same cortical area can serve different 
functions as a flexible component in different neural networks (e.g., Andric & Small, 2012; 
Hagoort, 2014; Hein & Knight, 2008; Mesulam, 1998).  
In addition, we found an increase in activation in premotor areas (BA 6, left-lateralized) 
in the bimodal match condition compared to the sum of the unimodal conditions, and in the 
unimodal conditions compared to baseline. Previous studies have interpreted activity in such 
areas in speech-gesture comprehension in line with a putative mirror neuron system in humans 
(e.g., Holle et al., 2008; Skipper et al., 2007; Willems et al., 2007). Here we refrain from 
interpreting our results in such a way, because we did not include a condition in which 
participants produced pointing movements and speech themselves and because without using 
paradigms such as repetition suppression one cannot be sure that the activations one finds 
involve the same neuronal population recruited in movement planning/execution and speech 
production. However our findings are in line with a more general function attributed to premotor 
areas in the perception of purposeful hand actions (see Andric & Small, 2012), possibly related 
to the simulation of perceived actions, and further specify that these areas may be recruited in the 
perception of implied motion as well, as in the case of the static images used in the current study 
(cf. Pierno et al., 2009). 
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Finally, previous studies investigating the neural mechanisms involved in the perception 
of pointing gestures have focused on the gesture as a directional cue outside a speech context 
(see Ulloa & George, 2013). Pierno et al. (2009), for instance, compared the observation of a 
static image of a hand pointing at an object to the observation of a hand grasping that object and 
to a control condition of a hand resting next to that object. Compared to the control condition, 
both types of actions activated a left-lateralized network that included parietal areas (postcentral 
gyrus and supramarginal gyrus) and left middle occipital gyrus. The activation patterns in our 
visual-only condition compared to baseline (see Figure 2B) confirm that these regions are 
recruited in integrating pointing gestures with visual objects. In the Pierno et al. (2009) study, no 
area was activated significantly more in the pointing condition compared to the grasping 
condition. Future work may therefore investigate whether the results of the current study 
generalize to situations in which a speaker grasps an object while concurrently producing speech. 
After all, in everyday life speakers may both point at an object and grasp and hold up or place an 
object to bring it into their addressee’s attention (Clark, 2003). It is not unlikely that the extent of 
overlap between pointing-speech integration and grasping-speech integration might differ as a 
function of the perceived communicative intentions of the speaker (see Kelly et al., 2014).   
In sum, the current study investigated the neural integration of pointing gestures and 
speech in a visual, triadic context. Bilateral auditory and visual regions and left premotor regions 
were found to be involved in the concomitant perception of speech, gesture and referent, whereas 
LIFG subserved the semantic unification of referential gesture and speech in a triadic context. 
This study can be informative as a starting point for studies investigating specific populations 
with impairments in the comprehension and integration of deictic speech and gesture and the 
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subsequent establishment of joint attention in everyday life (e.g. as in autism spectrum 
disorders).   
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Summary and Discussion 
 
“Here a psychologist has presented his suggestions  
as to how in his view certain linguistic facts should  
be interpreted” (Bühler, 1934/1990, p. 126)  
 
Demonstrative reference has been an important topic of investigation in many academic 
disciplines, including anthropology, linguistics, philosophy and psychology. However, verbal 
(e.g. spatial demonstratives) and non-verbal (e.g. pointing gestures) markers involved in 
establishing joint attention to a referent have often been studied in isolation. Furthermore, 
egocentric, spatial accounts of demonstrative reference have ignored that establishing joint 
attention to a referent is a social and collaborative process. In addition, the neural mechanisms 
involved in everyday multimodal reference are unclear. This thesis therefore brings spatial 
demonstratives and pointing gestures together using an experimental and neurobiological 
approach and studies the phenomenon of demonstrative reference from both the production and 
the comprehension side. This approach allowed for contrasting egocentric and sociocentric views 
of spatial deixis. In addition, it furthered our understanding of the neurobiological underpinnings 
that allow us to refer to the things around us and in turn those that allow us to understand other 
people’s multimodal referential acts. Before turning to a description of the broader theoretical 
implications of the empirical findings presented in the current thesis, I will first briefly 
summarize the main results of each chapter. 
 
Summary of the main findings 
 In Chapter 2 the interplay of different social and visual contextual factors in the 
production of spatial demonstratives in Dutch and Turkish was investigated. A controlled 
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elicitation task was developed to disentangle the independent roles of the location of a referent, 
the locus of visual attention of the addressee, and the presence of a pointing gesture in 
demonstrative choice in two-term Dutch and three-term Turkish. In both languages, proximal 
demonstratives were used for referents close to the speaker and distal demonstratives for 
referents at three locations away from the speaker. No linear increase in distal demonstrative use 
was found with an increase in distance of a referent to the speaker. Moreover, the presence of 
visual joint attention between speaker and addressee to the referent enhanced the choice for a 
distal demonstrative in Turkish. Finally, pointing gestures were found to be closely tied to 
demonstratives but not to the use of other linguistic referential expressions. These findings were 
interpreted in line with a sociocentric view of demonstrative reference and against purely spatial 
accounts.   
 Chapter 3 contrasted and tested an egocentric versus a sociocentric view of 
demonstrative reference from a comprehension perspective. In two ERP experiments, 
participants looked at pictures in which a speaker pointed at one of two objects while they 
listened to her referential speech. Analysis of event-related potentials time-locked to the onset of 
perceiving a spatial demonstrative in such a visual context showed that, whenever participants 
were oriented in a dyad with the speaker in the pictures and both possible referents were between 
them, the comprehension of a distal demonstrative led to higher processing costs compared to the 
comprehension of a proximal demonstrative. This preference was irrespective of whether the 
referent was relatively close to the speaker or relatively far away. These findings suggest that 
addressees interpret spatial demonstratives as a function of the physical orientation of themselves 
in relation to the speaker and the spatial location of possible referents. More broadly, the findings 
suggest that interlocutors may construe a shared space in which all referents become 
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‘psychologically proximal’. In general, this chapter also showed the feasibility of using 
neuroscientific methods to inform cognitive theory in the case of spatial demonstratives. 
 Chapter 4 investigated multimodal exophoric reference from the production side. More 
specifically, it examined the role of communicative intentions in shaping the kinematics of 
unimodal and bimodal acts of pointing as a function of the shared knowledge between speaker 
and addressee. Furthermore it explored how one’s communicative intentions modulate the neural 
activity involved in planning and producing a communicative pointing gesture. Participants 
produced index-finger pointing gestures in the lab for a confederate addressee, while their index-
finger movement kinematics and electrophysiological brain activity were continuously recorded. 
The informativeness of their pointing gesture and/or speech was manipulated in a block design 
and used as a proxy to tap into their communicative intentions. Behaviorally, participants 
prolonged the duration of the stroke and post-stroke hold phase of their gesture to be more 
informative. Electrophysiological effects of informativeness suggested that both attentional and 
intentional mechanisms may be involved in planning a communicative gesture. The kinematic 
effects are largely specific to cases where gesture carries the informational burden in a 
multimodal communicative act, whereas the attentional neurophysiological effect is modality-
independent.  
 Chapter 5 investigated the neuronal mechanisms involved in the integration of pointing 
gestures and referential speech in comprehension using fMRI. Participants watched images of a 
person pointing at one of two objects and listened to her speech. As evident from a mismatch-
match comparison, left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) is recruited in semantic unification of 
referential speech and pointing gesture towards an object. A bimodal enhancement manipulation 
showed the involvement of bilateral temporal areas (STG/STS/MTG), occipital areas, and 
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premotor areas in the perception and integration of speech and gesture in a referential, triadic 
context. These results specify the nodes in the network involved in the perception and 
understanding of referential speech-gesture combinations. At the same time, they suggest overlap 
in the mechanisms involved in integration and unification of different types of gesture (e.g., 
iconic and pointing gestures) with speech. These findings may be taken as a starting point in the 
study of populations that have impairments related to multimodal communication, such as in 
autism spectrum disorder. 
 
No more egocentricity! Towards a sociocentric view of spatial deixis 
One aim of the current thesis was to contrast and test egocentric and sociocentric views 
of spatial deixis. The findings presented in Chapters 2 and 3 falsify three claims that are central 
to the egocentric, spatialist account of spatial deixis, which has been the dominant view in the 
literature over the last 80 years: 
 
1. “[T]he anchoring point of deictic expressions is egocentric (or, better, speaker-centric). 
Adult speakers skillfully relate what they are talking about to this me-here-now” (Levelt, 
1989, p. 46). 
2. By using spatial demonstratives, speakers “indicate the relative distance of an object, 
location, or person vis-à-vis the deictic center (…), which is usually associated with the 
location of the speaker” (Diessel, 1999, p. 36). 
3. “[D]emonstratives are interpreted based on the speaker’s body” (Diessel, 2014, p. 122). 
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The first claim is seriously challenged by the data presented in Chapter 2. In Turkish, 
speakers took into account the locus of visual attention of the addressee when using a 
demonstrative. The distal demonstrative term o was used significantly more often when there 
was joint attention between speaker and addressee to a referent compared to when the addressee 
looked at a different part of the visual scene. This finding is incompatible with an egocentric 
view of deixis in which the speaker is the sole anchoring point and in which factors related to the 
addressee do not play a role in driving a speaker’s demonstrative choice. Rather than relating the 
demonstrative they produced to the me-here-now, participants related it to the we-here-now, 
taking into account the addressee. 
 The second claim, which identifies the relative distance of a referent to the speaker as the 
main factor driving demonstrative choice, is also not in line with the data reported in this thesis. 
In Chapter 2, the relative distance of a referent to the speaker did not drive demonstrative choice 
in Dutch or Turkish. Although in both languages proximal demonstratives were used for 
referents close to the speaker and distal terms for referents further away, there was no linear 
increase of distal demonstrative use with a linear increase in distance of a referent to the speaker. 
Thus, relative distance does not drive demonstrative choice. Rather, speakers may carve up the 
physical space into different meaningful zones (Enfield, 2003; Kendon, 1977). This suggests that 
the location of a referent in a specific region of meaningful space is more important than its 
relative distance to the speaker. This finding confirms a similar conclusion drawn by Enfield 
(2003) on the basis of analysis of observational data from Lao. Moreover, contextual factors 
beyond the location of a referent also influence the choice for one demonstrative over another, 
such as the locus of attention of the addressee. Because the pointing gesture in exophoric use will 
generally create a vector towards the referent, and the height of the raised arm indicates the 
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distance of the referent (e.g., Gonseth, Vilain, & Vilain, 2013), one could even argue that it is the 
pointing gesture, rather than the demonstrative term, that indicates the relative distance of a 
referent to speaker and addressee. 
 The third claim is directly falsified by the findings presented in Chapter 3. The 
participant addressees in two experiments did not interpret demonstratives on the basis of the 
speaker’s body, but rather as a function of the orientation of their own body in relation to the 
speaker’s body and the location of referents inside or outside of the dyad. These findings again 
confirm that demonstrative reference is a sociocentric phenomenon in which both speaker and 
addressee play a crucial role. Interestingly, these findings were not predicted from linguistic 
intuitions elicited in a pre-test. The discrepancy between intuitions and actual data is reminiscent 
of similar findings in the domain of demonstrative production (e.g. Enfield, 2003; Özyürek, 
1998). People’s personal metalinguistic intuitions about their demonstrative choice and their 
demonstrative comprehension align with the egocentric, spatialist view, but not with patterns of 
use and perception in actual data.   
 The findings in Chapters 2 and 3 together suggest that people may carve up space in 
different ways in different contexts (cf. Enfield, 2003). In Chapter 2, a zone close to the speaker 
was distinguished from the rest of the physical space. In Chapter 3, the shared space between 
speaker and addressee was distinguished from the space outside of the dyad. Future work may 
shed more light on which physical and social factors influence how interlocutors carve up the 
space around them in the context of demonstrative reference. In addition to physical boundaries 
and social considerations, the interlocutors’ areas of manual and attentional engagement during 
interaction, and whether these overlap or not, may play a crucial role in the process of building 
Summary and Discussion 
209 
 
up shared space (Enfield, 2003; Hanks, 1990), subsequently influencing their choice of 
demonstrative.  
 Supporting evidence against egocentric and purely spatial accounts of demonstrative 
reference comes from research looking at pointing gestures and from research into referential 
communication more broadly. 
 
Supporting evidence from the gestural modality 
 In everyday communication the production of a spatial demonstrative is generally part of 
a richer communicative act that involves a pointing gesture produced by the speaker. The 
kinematic findings presented in Chapter 4 indicate that people tailor the form properties of their 
gesture to the context-specific needs of their addressee, which further specifies previous 
observational work (Enfield, Kita, & De Ruiter, 2007; Kendon & Versante, 2003). This suggests 
that people’s sociocentric approach to demonstrative reference expresses itself in both the spoken 
and the gestural modality. The gestural findings align well with the broader literature on 
pointing, for instance related to the gesture’s role in ontogeny. 
An important focus over the last few decades in the study of pointing gestures has been 
on the gestures’ role in prelinguistic communication and first language acquisition (e.g., Bates, 
Camaioni, & Volterra, 1975; Butcher & Goldin-Meadow, 2000; Butterworth, 2003; Csibra, 
2010; Iverson & Goldin-Meadow, 2005; Kita, 2003; Leung & Rheingold, 1981; Moore & 
D’Entremont, 2001; Tomasello, 2008; Tomasello, Carpenter, & Liszkowski, 2007). By pointing 
to the things around them infants start expressing their communicative intentions and they 
continue to do so throughout life. The aim of infants’ (and adults’) pointing gestures is often 
simply declarative, i.e. to share interest in a certain referent and for the addressee to recognize 
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one’s communicative intentions (Tomasello et al., 2007). Even in imperative pointing, generally 
defined as pointing to request an object from someone, it seems reasonable that one has to 
recognize the other as an intentional, social agent (Southgate, van Maanen, & Csibra, 2007). It is 
hard to unite such a view of pointing as deeply social and communicative with an egocentric 
view of spatial deixis in which the speaker disregards the addressee in choosing a demonstrative 
and only takes into account the relative distance of an object to him- or herself. Rather, the social 
and communicative nature of human pointing confirms that multimodal demonstrative reference 
is an interpersonal, collaborative process in which the addressee plays a pivotal role (Clark & 
Bangerter, 2004).  
What is the nature of the exact interplay between spatial demonstratives and pointing 
gestures in sociocentric demonstrative reference? Diessel (2006) suggests that demonstratives 
and pointing gestures have the same function in shifting the addressee’s attention to an intended 
referent. However, simply uttering a demonstrative term without any indexical bodily 
accompaniment will generally not suffice in making one’s addressee shift gaze and identify an 
intended referent, whereas a pointing gesture without concurrently produced speech may suffice 
in certain cases. Alternatively, it has been suggested that demonstratives shift the addressee’s 
attention to the speaker’s pointing gesture (Bangerter, 2004; Bühler, 1934), while “pointing 
gestures immediately deflect that attention elsewhere” (Cooperrider, 2011, p. 7), i.e. to the 
referent. As outlined in Chapter 4, people design the kinematics of their gesture for their 
addressee, and the use of a demonstrative could indeed make the addressee pay attention to such 
an effort. In addition, the specific demonstrative term used will provide some additional 
information to the addressee about where the intended referent is located (such as inside or 
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outside of the shared space). In such a sociocentric view, the speaker thus uses both the gestural 
and the spoken modality to inform the addressee. 
 
Supporting evidence from a broader perspective 
 The current thesis rejects the egocentric account of spatial deixis on empirical grounds. 
Moreover, this account also has undesirable philosophical shortcomings. For instance, deictic 
terms almost always have a relational character. The words here, now, and I, for example, derive 
their meaning for a large part because of their opposition to other terms - there, then, and you 
(Jones, 1995). In order then to assume a deictic center, one has to presuppose “the existence and 
identification of entities – people, places and times – outside the charmed circle of individual 
subjectivity” (Jones, 1995, p. 33). Consequently, the speaking ego always stands and derives its 
meaning in relation to a hearing other, and deictic terms, including this and that, always already 
assume a social, relational context in which the speaker is just one element of a larger deictic 
field. It is exactly in such a social situation that spatial deictic reference usually takes place, and 
the addressee is just as necessary and important in such a field as the speaker.    
The theoretical progress from an egocentric to a sociocentric view of spatial deixis is 
reminiscent of the development in our understanding of reference production more broadly. In 
the General Introduction I have argued that the egocentric account is largely based on linguistic 
intuitions and not on rigorous empirical testing. Sophisticated observational work in different 
languages suggested that these intuitions were unreliable, which was confirmed experimentally 
in the current thesis. As outlined by Clark and Bangerter (2004), similar developments have 
taken place in the field of reference production in general. Traditional accounts of reference 
production considered reference production an autonomous and addressee-blind act that speakers 
do on their own without taking into account beliefs about their addressees (Clark & Bangerter, 
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2004, pp. 26-27). However, more recent views consider reference production a collaborative act 
that requires that speaker and addressee work together, for instance in building conceptual pacts 
(e.g., Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), i.e. bilateral agreements on how to conceptualize and name 
a particular referent (Brennan & Clark, 1996). Such agreement is established through interaction, 
and again, the addressee is just as important as the speaker in reaching agreement and 
establishing reference. A sociocentric view of spatial deictic reference thus fits well within the 
broader context of reference production as a social, interactive phenomenon. 
 
Towards a neurobiological account of demonstrative reference 
 The results presented in Chapters 3-5 further our understanding of the neural and 
cognitive mechanisms involved in the production and comprehension of demonstrative 
reference. In the planning of referential speech and gesture, attentional resources are recruited as 
a function of one’s communicative intentions. Furthermore, the production of declarative 
pointing involves activation in the mentalizing network in adults (cf. Brunetti et al., 2014) and 
previous work has shown that it activates its precursor in infants (Henderson et al., 2002). In 
comprehension, hearing an (at the pragmatic level) incorrectly used spatial demonstrative term 
leads to an ERP component that is similar to the “typical” N400 in its negative directionality and 
its time-course. Moreover, the integration of referential speech and gesture in comprehension 
requires audiovisual and semantic integration processes to take place at a neuronal level. 
 Together these findings thus suggest a complex interplay between different neural 
mechanisms involved in the production and comprehension of multimodal (i.e. pointing gestures 
and speech) reference, including attentional (as indicated by the P3b effect in Chapter 4), 
intentional (the frontal ERP effect in Chapter 4), action-related (the readiness potential in 
Chapter 4 and the activation of premotor areas in Chapter 5), audiovisual perceptual and 
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integrative (primary visual and auditory, and temporal lobe activations in Chapter 5), and word 
processing and semantic unification mechanisms (N400-type effects in Chapter 3 and LIFG 
activation in Chapter 5). A challenge for future work will be to further relate the activation of 
different networks and different nodes in these networks to their functional roles over time and to 
identify possible overlap between neuronal populations involved in reference production and 
comprehension.  
 
Future directions 
The work reported in this thesis focused on the exophoric gestural use of spatial 
demonstratives, i.e. when a speaker uses a demonstrative in reference to a certain entity (such as 
a physical object) that is physically present in the extra-linguistic, physical context of a linguistic 
interaction (Halliday & Hasan, 1976; see Levinson, 2004). However, demonstratives serve 
several functions in language, for instance non-deictically in anaphoric and empathetic uses (see 
Diessel, 1999; Himmelmann, 1996; Levinson, 2004). Furthermore, the empirical study of 
demonstratives as described in this thesis was restricted to their adnominal/adjectival use (as in 
this book). Whether the conclusions drawn in the current thesis generalize to the use of 
demonstratives as pronouns (as in this tastes delicious) or adverbs (e.g., here-there) is left for 
future study.  
Similarly, the current thesis also only investigated index-finger pointing gestures in their 
exophoric use. In addition, it focused on simple situations in which what was pointed at was also 
what was referred to. In everyday life, however, pointing gestures may be more or less abstract. 
By using abstract pointing gestures, speakers place a concept or idea in physical space, and as 
such they do not direct the addressee’s attention to a physically present object (McNeill, 1992). 
Moreover, pointing gestures often require quite some inferencing in order to be fully understood 
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(Clark, Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983). For instance, depending on the common ground between 
interlocutors a simple pointing gesture produced towards a particular building may mean 
something complex like “Remember the last time we were here ten years ago” (see Clark et al., 
1983; Tomasello, 2008, for better examples). Future work may shed more light on whether the 
findings presented in this thesis generalize to more complex uses of pointing gesture, such as 
when there is a discrepancy between demonstratum and referent (Clark, 1996; Clark et al., 1983; 
Clark & Bangerter, 2004). 
 
Conclusion 
This thesis focused on the production and comprehension of spatial demonstrative terms 
and index-finger pointing gestures as pivotal parts of the larger complex system of referential 
communication in a visual, triadic context. In the General Introduction, I argued that seemingly 
simple acts of reference require a complex interplay between speaker and addressee, arguably 
relying on multiple cognitive mechanisms and multimodal social cues: In a prototypical instance 
of successful everyday referential communication, a speaker produces a manual pointing gesture 
to a physical object, often in temporal alignment with a spoken referential expression that 
canonically contains a spatial demonstrative (as in I have bought that book), while alternating 
gaze between addressee and referent. At the same time, the addressee perceives the speech, 
gesture, and other bodily behavior of the speaker, integrates the transmitted visual and auditory 
information, recognizes and understands the speaker’s communicative intention and social 
motive, and shifts her gaze to identify the referent and establish joint attention.  
 The four empirical chapters of this thesis each focused on different elements of this 
complex phenomenon. It was found that speakers may take into account the visual attentional 
status of their addressee in their choice of demonstrative (Chapter 2) and tailor the kinematics of 
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their pointing gestures to the needs of their addressee in line with their communicative 
intentions, and supported by attentional and intentional underlying neural mechanisms (Chapter 
4). Furthermore, speaker and addressee may build up a shared space in which all possible 
referents become “psychologically proximal” (Chapter 3). Understanding a speaker’s referential 
speech and gesture recruits a neural network that comprises left inferior frontal, bilateral 
temporal and occipital, and left premotor areas (Chapter 5). 
All in all, in line with supporting evidence from studies of multimodal reference 
production in general, the findings presented in this thesis suggest that it is now time to 
definitively leave behind egocentric and purely spatial accounts of demonstrative reference, 
which have dominated the field for at least the last 80 years. Furthermore, the results of this 
thesis open up new avenues towards understanding the neural and cognitive mechanisms 
underlying demonstrative reference from a social and multimodal perspective. 
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In het dagelijks leven verwijzen we naar de dingen in de wereld om ons heen. We 
gebruiken het gesproken woord om dingen te benoemen, en onze lichamen (in het bijzonder 
ogen, hoofd, handen en torso) om een locatie of entiteit aan te duiden waarop een 
gesprekspartner zijn aandacht dient te vestigen om te herkennen waar we het precies over hebben 
(Bühler, 1934; Clark & Bangerter, 2004). Op het eerste gezicht lijkt dit een erg simpel onderdeel 
van menselijke communicatie. Nadere inspectie leert, echter, dat simpele referentiële taaluitingen 
een complexe interactie vereisen tussen de spreker en zijn/haar gesprekspartner, waarbij 
meerdere cognitieve mechanismen en multimodale, sociale overwegingen een rol spelen. In een 
prototypisch voorbeeld van succesvolle referentiële communicatie maakt een spreker een 
wijsgebaar richting een fysiek object, vaak in temporele afstemming met een gesproken 
referentiële uitdrukking (zoals Ik heb zojuist dat boek gekocht) inclusief aanwijzend 
voornaamwoord, ondertussen de blik alternerend tussen gesprekspartner en het object waarnaar 
verwezen wordt (de 'referent'). Tegelijkertijd hoort de gesprekspartner de spraak, ziet zij de 
gebaren en andere lichamelijke uitingen van de spreker, integreert zij de overgebrachte visuele 
en auditieve informatie, herkent zij de communicatieve intentie en sociale motieven van de 
spreker, en verplaatst zij haar blik richting de referent om daar, samen met de spreker, haar 
aandacht even op te rusten. Dit proefschrift heeft als doel een beter begrip te krijgen van zulke 
complexe situaties waarin een spreker voor een adressant met taal en gebaar verwijst naar een 
zichtbaar object. Het neemt hierin een experimentele, cross-linguïstische en neurobiologische 
benadering. Iedere analytische benadering van een complex fenomeen vraagt om het opdelen van 
het complexe geheel in simpelere, behapbare elementen (Kita, 2003). De verschillende 
hoofdstukken van het proefschrift richten zich daarom op verschillende onderdelen van het 
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hierboven beschreven fenomeen van referentiële communicatie in taal en gebaar, om de 
elementen vervolgens in een algemene discussie terug bijeen te brengen. 
 Op basis van eerder onderzoek binnen de linguïstiek (Enfield, 2003; Levinson, 1983; 
Lyons, 1977), de antropologie (Hanks, 1990), de filosofie (Peirce, 1955; Russell, 1940; Quine, 
1960; Wittgenstein, 1953) en de psychologie (Clark & Sengul, 1978; Coventry et al., 2014; 
Tomasello et al., 2007) kan er grofweg een onderscheid gemaakt worden tussen twee 
theoretische benaderingen in het denken over verwijzen in taal en gebaar. Aanhangers van de 
eerste stroming zijn vaak geïnspireerd door het werk van Karl Bühler (1934) en stellen, impliciet 
dan wel expliciet, dat verwijzen een egocentrische aangelegenheid is. Deze stroming richt haar 
aandacht voornamelijk op het ontdekken en beschrijven van patronen in het gebruik van 
aanwijzende voornaamwoorden, zoals dit en dat in het Nederlands. Door zulke woorden te 
gebruiken zouden sprekers de relatieve afstand van een bepaald object, een locatie, of een 
persoon aangeven in verhouding tot hun eigen fysieke locatie. In de praktijk van het Nederlands 
zou dat betekenen dat sprekers dit boek zeggen wanneer ze verwijzen naar een boek dat relatief 
dicht bij hen in de buurt verkeert, en dat boek voor een boek dat zich relatief ver weg bevindt. De 
spreker, met andere woorden, schikt zich in de rol van ego en relateert alles aan zijn of haar 
eigen gezichtspunt (Lyons, 1977). Er wordt zelfs beweerd dat sprekers van alle talen een 
dergelijk egocentrische benadering gebruiken wanneer ze met aanwijzende voornaamwoorden 
verwijzen naar de dingen om zich heen (Diessel, 2004). Deze egocentrische benadering van het 
verwijzen is intuïtief erg aannemelijk en erg invloedrijk in de wetenschappelijke literatuur over 
het onderwerp (zie bijvoorbeeld Anderson & Keenan, 1985; Clark & Sengul, 1978; Coventry, 
Valdés, Castillo, & Guijarro-Fuentes, 2008; Diessel, 2005, 2014; Fillmore, 1982; Halliday & 
Hasan, 1977; Hottenroth, 1982; Lakoff, 1974; Levelt, 1989; Lyons, 1977; Rauh, 1983; Russell, 
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1940; Stevens & Zhang, 2013). Een dergelijke, egocentrische benadering voorspelt dat sprekers 
niet alleen hun talige uitingen, maar ook hun wijsbewegingen niet aanpassen aan de contextuele 
behoeften van hun gesprekspartner. 
 Een alternatief op de egocentrische benadering is, per definitie, de stelling dat verwijzen 
een sociocentrische aangelegenheid is (Hanks, 1992). In een dergelijke benadering staat niet 
enkel de spreker centraal, maar is degene voor wie de spreker verwijst (de adressant) minstens 
even belangrijk. Toegepast op het gebruik van aanwijzende voornaamwoorden betekent dit dat 
de keuze voor een specifiek aanwijzend voornaamwoord niet gedreven wordt door de relatieve 
afstand van het object waarnaar verwezen wordt in verhouding tot de spreker, maar veeleer door 
contextuele factoren die te maken hebben met de verhouding tussen spreker, adressant en object. 
Enfield (2003) beweert bijvoorbeeld op basis van uitgebreide analyse van referentieel 
taalgebruik in alledaagse contexten dat verwijzen een sociaal, interactief proces is waarin de 
keuze voor een bepaald aanwijzend voornaamwoord gedreven wordt door hoe gesprekspartners 
de fysieke ruimte om zich heen waarnemen en interpreteren. Jungbluth (2003) stelt eveneens dat 
het gebruik van aanwijzend voornaamwoorden toont dat verwijzen geen egocentrische 
aangelegenheid is. Haar bevindingen suggereren dat gesprekspartners, wanneer ze in een gesprek 
tegenover elkaar zitten, een onderscheid maken tussen de ruimte tussen hen in en de ruimte 
buiten de conversationele dyade. Alle ruimte binnen de dyade wordt als 'dichtbij' ervaren, en de 
keuze voor een bepaald aanwijzend voornaamwoord zou in dergelijke gevallen onafhankelijk 
zijn van het gegeven of een object zich relatief dichtbij of op een grotere relatieve afstand van de 
spreker binnen de dyade bevindt. Een dergelijke, sociocentrische benadering voorspelt dat 
sprekers niet alleen hun talige uitingen, maar ook hun wijsbewegingen kinematisch afstemmen 
op de communicatieve behoeften van hun gesprekspartner. 
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 Dit proefschrift test en contrasteert in vier experimentele hoofdstukken de egocentrische 
en de sociocentrische benaderingen van verwijzen in taal en gebaar. Het kiest voor een 
experimentele benadering en is daarmee een aanvulling op linguïstisch en antropologisch 
veldwerk dat elders gedaan is (bijvoorbeeld Enfield, 2003; Hanks, 1990). Desalniettemin wordt 
het gebruik en begrip van taal en gebaar in referentiële communicatie in dit proefschrift in een 
rijke, multimodale context bestudeerd. Eerder onderzoek naar aanwijzend voornaamwoorden 
heeft zich over het algemeen voornamelijk bezig gehouden met de talige elementen van 
referentiële communicatie, daarbij minder aandacht schenkend aan de handgebaren die vaak 
gepaard gaan met een succesvolle verwijs-act. Eerder onderzoek naar wijsgebaren belichtte juist 
vaak enkel de non-verbale kant van het fenomeen. Dit proefschrift brengt taal en gebaar bij 
elkaar. De experimentele methoden gebruikt in het beschreven onderzoek, zoals elektro-
encefalografie (EEG) en functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), worden ontleend aan 
de cognitieve neurowetenschappen. Deze benadering heeft twee voordelen. Ten eerste verschaft 
het de mogelijkheid om de twee theoretische benaderingen te testen door naar de respons van het 
brein te kijken op verschillende talige en non-verbale uitingen. Ten tweede zijn de cognitieve en 
neurale mechanismen betrokken bij het produceren en begrijpen van referentiële 
communicatieve uitingen verre van bekend en brengt dit proefschrift ons denken daarover een 
stap verder.  
 Hoofdstuk 2 van het proefschrift rapporteert een onderzoek naar de invloed van 
contextuele factoren op het gebruik van aanwijzend voornaamwoorden in het Nederlands en het 
Turks. Zowel Nederlandse als Turkse proefpersonen kregen visuele stimuli te zien waarin een 
spreker, een adressant en een object aanwezig waren. Er werd hun gevraagd inleidende zinnen af 
te maken op basis van de gepresenteerde visuele context. In de context werden de locatie van het 
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object t.o.v. de spreker en de adressant, de visuele focus van de aandacht van de adressant, en het 
gebruik van een wijsgebaar door de spreker orthogonaal gemanipuleerd. Het gebruik van 
aanwijzend voornaamwoorden in het Nederlands (2-term-systeem) en het Turks (3-term-
systeem) werd geanalyseerd in verhouding tot het gebruik van lidwoorden in het Nederlands en 
tot het gebruik van een bredere klasse van bepaalde uitdrukkingen in het Turks. In beide talen 
werden proximale aanwijzend voornaamwoorden (dit/deze in het Nederlands, bu in het Turks) 
gebruikt voor objecten dicht bij de spreker. Distale aanwijzend voornaamwoorden (dat/die in het 
Nederlands, şu, o in het Turks) werden in beide talen gebruikt voor objecten op drie locaties iets 
verder verwijderd van de spreker. Er werd geen lineaire toename in het gebruik van distale 
aanwijzend voornaamwoorden gevonden met een lineaire toename van de fysieke afstand van 
een object tot de spreker. Dit gaat in tegen de predicties van de egocentrische stroming, die een 
dergelijk lineair effect voorspelt. Het Turkse aanwijzend voornaamwoord o werd relatief vaker 
gebruikt wanneer de aandacht van spreker en adressant reeds op het referent-object rustte dan 
wanneer dit niet het geval was. Wijsgebaren waren in beide talen sterk verbonden met het 
gebruik van aanwijzend voornaamwoorden, maar niet met het gebruik van andere referentiële 
uitdrukkingen zonder aanwijzend voornaamwoord. Deze bevindingen tonen aan dat de keuze van 
een specifiek aanwijzend voornaamwoord niet enkel gedreven wordt door de relatieve afstand 
van een object tot de spreker. Ook overwegingen die te maken hebben  met de aandachtsfocus 
van de adressant en het parallelle gebruik van een wijsgebaar spelen een rol.    
 Hoofdstuk 3 van het proefschrift contrasteerde de egocentrische met de sociocentrische 
benadering tot verwijzen in taal en gebaar in twee EEG experimenten in het Nederlands. 
Proefpersonen kregen plaatjes te zien met daarop een spreker die een wijsgebaar maakte naar een 
object terwijl ze tegelijkertijd luisterden naar zinnen uitgesproken door de spreker. Analyse van 
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de elektrofysiologische respons op het horen van een aanwijzend voornaamwoord in een 
dergelijke audiovisuele context toonde aan dat het verwerken van distale aanwijzend 
voornaamwoorden (die/dat) hogere kosten met zich meebracht dan het verwerken van proximale 
aanwijzend voornaamwoorden (deze/dit) wanneer een object binnen de conversationele dyade 
tussen spreker en proefpersoon gesitueerd was. Deze verwerkingskosten waren onafhankelijk 
van de locatie van het object binnen de dyade, relatief dichtbij of verder weg van de spreker. 
Deze bevindingen tonen aan dat adressanten aanwijzend voornaamwoorden interpreteren op 
basis van de fysieke oriëntatie van henzelf in verhouding tot de spreker en de locatie van 
mogelijke referenten. In een breder kader suggereert dit dat gesprekspartners een gedeelde 
ruimte opbouwen tijdens een conversatie, waarbij alle objecten binnen die ruimte als 
psychologisch dichtbij worden ervaren. Eveneens toont dit onderzoek aan dat het haalbaar is om 
methoden uit de cognitieve neurowetenschap te gebruiken om cognitieve theorieën naar 
verwijzen in taal en gebaar verder te brengen. 
 Hoofdstuk 4 van dit proefschrift onderzoekt hoe iemands communicatieve intenties de 
kinematische parameters van zijn/haar wijsgebaren beïnvloeden. Eveneens bestudeert het hoe 
iemands communicatieve intenties de neurale activiteit beïnvloeden die voorafgaat aan het 
produceren van een communicatief wijsgebaar. Proefpersonen werd gevraagd om in het lab 
wijsgebaren te maken voor een adressant terwijl een sensor op de nagel van hun wijsvinger de 
kinematische kenmerken van hun wijsgebaar registreerde en tegelijkertijd hun elektro-
encefalogram continue werd geregistreerd. In een block design werd de informatieve waarde van 
de wijsbewegingen gemanipuleerd, waardoor proefpersonen in verschillende condities een 
verschillende communicatieve intentie hadden. Proefpersonen vertraagden hun wijsbeweging 
wanneer ze de intentie hadden om informatiever te zijn, en ze verlengden de duur van de fase 
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waarin de vinger gericht op een referent stil werd gehouden om de adressant meer tijd te gunnen 
om de juiste referent te herkennen. De elektrofysiologische bevindingen suggereerden dat 
proefpersonen meer aandacht besteden aan de taak wanneer ze informatievere wijsbewegingen 
maakten, en dat frontale, intentionele mechanismen actiever waren bij het plannen van een 
informatiever wijsgebaar. 
 Hoofdstuk 5 van dit proefschrift onderzoekt met behulp van fMRI de neuronale 
mechanismen die betrokken zijn bij het integreren van spraak en wijsgebaar in een alledaagse, 
referentiële, audiovisuele context waarin een spreker in woord en gebaar verwijst naar een 
object. Proefpersonen keken in de MRI-scanner naar plaatjes van een spreker die naar een object 
wees terwijl ze luisterden naar haar spraak. Analyse van de op deze manier verkregen data 
toonde aan dat het inferieure deel van de frontale cortex in de linker hersenhelft betrokken is bij 
de semantische integratie van woord en gebaar. Voorts werd duidelijk dat, meer algemeen, 
temporale, occipitale en premotor gebieden betrokken zijn bij het waarnemen en integreren van 
de auditieve en visuele informatie die wordt overgebracht wanneer iemand naar een object 
verwijst in taal en gebaar. De bevindingen die het belang aantonen van het inferieure deel van de 
frontale cortex tonen samen met eerder onderzoek naar de integratie van andere typen gebaren 
(bijvoorbeeld iconische gebaren) met spraak aan dat dit gedeelte van ons brein van belang is bij 
de semantische integratie van verschillende informatiestromen.  
 Op basis van de vier experimentele hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift kunnen meerdere 
conclusies getrokken worden wat betreft de theoretische stromingen met betrekking tot 
verwijzen in taal en gebaar en wat betreft de neurobiologische structuren en mechanismen die het 
ons mogelijk maken om naar de dingen in de wereld om ons heen te verwijzen en zulke 
verwijzingen te begrijpen. Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 tonen aan dat het verwijzen naar een referent 
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met behulp van een aanwijzend voornaamwoord niet simpelweg door egocentrische 
overwegingen wordt gedreven, zoals decennialang in de linguïstische, filosofische en 
psychologische literatuur is beweerd. Hoofdstuk 3 toont zelfs aan dat de relatieve afstand van 
een object tot de spreker geen enkele rol lijkt te spelen in de interpretatie van een aanwijzend 
voornaamwoord. Dergelijke bevindingen suggereren dat het tijd is om de egocentrische stroming 
te vervangen door een theorie waarin centraal staat dat zowel spreker als adressant een cruciale 
rol spelen in situaties waarin iemand naar iets in de wereld verwijst. Zo'n theorie wordt bevestigd 
door de bevindingen uit Hoofdstuk 4, waarin duidelijk werd dat proefpersonen de specifieke 
kinematische kenmerken van hun wijsbeweging afstellen op de informatieve behoeften van hun 
adressant. Wederom toont dit dus aan dat het verwijzen naar een object geen egocentrisch proces 
is, maar veeleer een sociale aangelegenheid waarbij spreker en adressant samen betrokken zijn 
en samenwerken om tot een staat van gedeelde aandacht te komen. De gemiddelde dreumes 
verwijst al rond zijn/haar eerste verjaardag met een wijsgebaar naar objecten in zijn/haar 
omgeving, vaak simpelweg declaratief om interesse in een dergelijk object te delen en om 
zijn/haar communicatieve intenties kenbaar te maken aan een ander. Het is lastig om een 
dergelijk proces dat al van jongs af aan sociaal-communicatief en collaboratief is te beschouwen 
in het daglicht van een egocentrische theorie van verwijzen in taal en gebaar. 
 Het onderzoek beschreven in dit proefschrift zet ook een stap in de goede richting wat 
betreft het begrijpen van de neurobiologische en cognitieve mechanismen die betrokken zijn bij 
het produceren en begrijpen van verwijzingen in taal en gebaar. Tijdens het plannen van een 
wijsgebaar worden attentionele bronnen aangesproken op basis van iemands communicatieve 
intenties. Het horen van een aanwijzend voornaamwoord dat op een pragmatisch niveau niet 
overeenkomt met de verwachtingen die men heeft op basis van de positie van menzelf ten 
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opzichte van de spreker leidt tot een ERP component die in timing en directionaliteit 
vergelijkbaar is met de "reguliere" N400 component. De audiovisuele perceptie en semantische 
integratie van taal en wijsgebaar teneinde een multimodale verwijzing te begrijpen leidt tot 
neurale activiteit in frontale, temporele, occipitale en premotor gebieden van ons brein.  
 Kortom, het onderzoek beschreven in dit proefschrift toont aan dat het tijd is om de 
egocentrische theorie van verwijzen in taal en gebaar te vervangen door een sociaal alternatief. 
Verder opent het nieuwe deuren richting een beter begrip van de cognitieve en neurale 
mechanismen die ten grondslag liggen aan het produceren en begrijpen van verwijzingen in taal 
en gebaar - een alledaags, sociaal fenomeen dat fundamenteel is in het tot stand brengen van 
geslaagde menselijke communicatie. 
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